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Those familiar with the academic world of philosophy will probably note that 
this is an ‘Edinburgh’ thesis. I couldn’t agree more; indeed, I cannot imagine 
undertaking this work in any other institution. But I must also admit I could 
have never arrived in such a friendly and stimulating environment without 
the support of loving and trusting people life has blessed me with. To avoid, 
however, being (too) personal, I will try to thank those who immediately 
come in mind, and do so in categories—although many of them should 
probably show up in more than one place.     
 First of all, I cannot express enough gratitude to my supervisors, 
Duncan Pritchard, Mark Sprevak, and Andy Clark. Their philosophical work 
has being an immense inspiration, and in its absence I could have produced 
hardly any arguments for my thesis. Moreover, they have all proved to be 
excellent advisors. They have spent ample time providing me both with 
professional advice and invaluable feedback on my work. And they have all 
treated me in the wisest way, allowing for me to genuinely enjoy working on 
my thesis.           
 Also, I am largely indebted to the faculty and postgraduate community 
of the philosophy department at the University of Edinburgh, in general. 
They afforded a stimulating intellectual circle in which I could develop and 
try out my ideas, and they helped me gain confidence in my academic 
pursuit. Some of the people I can single out are Shane Ryan and Eusebio 
Waweru, with whom I have had many interesting conversations. Also, 
exchanging opinions and literature with Evan Butts (who received his PhD on 
a similar topic to mine, last year) has been distinctively helpful. Above all, 
however, I owe a sincere debt of gratitude to Barbara Scholz who 
unexpectedly passed away a year ago. Barbara was one of my first 
philosophy teachers. I met her when I first arrived in Edinburgh for my MSc 
degree, and she was the first person who encouraged me to apply for a PhD 
in philosophy.          
 Apart from my academic friends, however, I must also thank some 
people who have been personally close to me. One way or another, they 
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thank him for having always surrounded me with many inspiring books; 
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overcome my teen-denial and actually go on and read (some of) them. In 
addition, they both showed a huge amount of trust in me and helped me 
make the choice to switch to philosophy. And then, I cannot help mentioning 
my brother, Dennis, for showing a genuine interest in philosophy and in what 
I have been working on all these years, despite having just turned 17. 
Probably, he is the only one who might try reading some of it.  
 Next are my two best Edinburgh friends, Sara De Las Heras, and Scott 
Kerzman, who have been incredibly considerate and supportive. In addition 
to that, they are also responsible for all those nights of “unbridled 
debauchery” (Scott’s words) we spent together, and which I deem necessary 
for dealing with a PhD degree. Scott is also a fellow colleague and, during 
many of those nights, we had several passionate and productive debates. 
 And finally, having commented on how my dissertation is specially 
related to its place of origin, I need to thank the two people that helped me 
arrive here. Four years ago, I knew nothing about academic philosophy. In 
fact, it was Niki Andrikopoulou who suggested the University of Edinburgh 
and agreed to accompany me here; she would study poetry, while I would 
study philosophy—and so it happened. If it hadn’t been for her, I wouldn’t 
have found my way to this destination. And the person who helped me make 
my way here is my first philosophy mentor, Professor Aristides Baltas. He 
introduced me to the world of philosophy, radically changed my 
understanding of science, and guided me through a transition that I could 
have never made on my own.         











The aim of the present thesis is to reconcile two opposing intuitions; one 
originating from mainstream individualistic epistemology and the other one 
from social epistemology. In particular, conceiving of knowledge as a 
cognitive phenomenon, mainstream epistemologists focus on the individual 
as the proper epistemic subject. Yet, clearly, knowledge-acquisition many 
times appears to be a social process and, sometimes, to such an extent—as in 
the case of scientific knowledge—that it has been argued there might be 
knowledge that is not possessed by any individual alone. In order to make 
sense of such contradictory claims, I combine virtue reliabilism in mainstream 
epistemology with two hypotheses from externalist philosophy of mind, viz., 
the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses. Reading virtue reliabilism 
along the lines suggested by the hypothesis of extended cognition allows for a 
weak anti-individualistic understanding of knowledge, which has already 
been suggested on the basis of considerations about testimonial knowledge: 
knowledge, many times, has a dual nature; it is both social and individual. 
Provided, however, the possibility of distributed cognition and group agency, 
we can go even further by making a case for a robust version of anti-
individualism in mainstream epistemology. This is because knowledge may 
not always be the product of any individual’s cognitive ability and, thereby, 
not creditable to any individual alone. Knowledge, instead, might be the 
product of an epistemic group agent’s collective cognitive ability and, thus, 
attributable only to the group as a whole. Still, however, being able—on the 
basis of the hypothesis of distributed cognition—to recognize a group as a 
cognitive subject in itself allows for proponents of virtue reliabilism to 
legitimately apply their individualistic theory of knowledge to such extreme 
cases as well. Put another way, mainstream individualistic epistemologists 
now have the means to make sense of the claim that p is known by S, even 












The driving force behind the present dissertation is the intuition that much of 
our knowledge is social. This is not necessarily to deny that it is also 
individual—although, as we shall see, this denial might, in certain cases, be 
correct as well.          
 On the contrary, mainstream epistemology has traditionally been 
individualistic, thereby obscuring from view and suppressing the social 
nature of knowledge. That is, conceiving of knowledge as a cognitive 
phenomenon, mainstream epistemologists have tended to focus on the 
individual as the proper epistemic subject. Cognition, after all, it is largely 
held, rests within the individual’s head. Accordingly, if one is to account for 
knowledge, one should focus on the cognitive/epistemic properties of the 
individual agent. So, having such methodological considerations in mind, 
makes it unsurprising that, until recently, the most popular epistemological 
approach was that of epistemic internalism: One knows some true 
proposition only if one has, in principle, internal access (i.e., by reflection 
alone) to the reasons/justification for one’s true belief in that proposition. 
And such a view, in turn, appears to entail the demand for intellectual 
autonomy. If one must be internally justified for one’s true belief, then one’s 
reasons for holding that belief cannot originate from anywhere else, but from 
oneself, alone. Hence, knowledge cannot be social.    
 Surely, however, not all knowledge can be like that. Testimonial 
knowledge, for instance, appears to be a clear counterexample, as it depends 
both on the hearer’s and the speaker’s reasons for believing the reported 
proposition. In other words, knowledge acquisition many times appears to be 
a social process. And sometimes—as in the case of scientific knowledge—to 
such an extent that it has been argued (Hardwig 1985) there might be 
knowledge that is not possessed by any individual alone. Accordingly, such 
and similar considerations have given rise to social epistemology, which, 
reasonably, is wildly held to be at odds with individualistic epistemology.  
 Here is then, stated in general terms, the main question my thesis aims 
to address: How can we bridge the unsettling gap between mainstream 
individualistic epistemology and social epistemology—how can those two 
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distinct theoretical domains with the same subject matter be brought 
together? In other words, could there be one single account of knowledge able 
to deal not just with individual knowledge, but also with knowledge that is 
partly individual and partly social, or even with knowledge that is entirely 
social?          
 In order to provide a positive response to the above questions I will 
employ considerations that originate from recent advances within philosophy 
of mind and cognitive science. In particular, I will focus on two distinct, yet 
interrelated, hypotheses within externalist philosophy of mind, namely the 
extended and distributed cognition hypotheses (HEC and HDC, respectively). 
Both of them go against traditional internalist philosophy of mind, which 
holds that cognition is restricted within the individual’s head, or at most her 
organismic boundaries (reminiscent to epistemic internalism that holds that 
one’s justification should be restricted within one’s head). The first one does 
so by claiming that cognition extends to the epistemic artifacts an agent might 
employ, while the second goes even further by postulating that cognition 
might be distributed across a group of individuals and their epistemic 
artifacts. Both of these theses are the extreme consequents of a paradigm shift 
within cognitive science, namely the approach of embodied and embedded 
cognition. This was the result of the recognition that an agent’s brain-
functions are heavily dependent on the agent’s body and environment. 
Several embodied cognition theorists, however, have claimed that an agent’s 
brain and his/her body are interdependent to such an extent that we should 
consider the agent’s body as a constitutive element of the agent’s overall 
cognitive system (notice that this move is sometimes allowed by opponents of 
HEC and HDC). HEC and HDC theorists, however, go even further by 
claiming that when an agent’s internal cognitive processes and specific 
aspects of his/her environment (these aspects can be epistemic artifacts such 
as pen and paper, or other individuals) are heavily interdependent then 
cognition is not just embedded. Instead, in such cases, there is an overall 
extended, or distributed cognitive system that comprises of both the agent 
and his/her epistemic artifacts, or the individuals he/she is mutually 
interacting with.         
 But how can such hypotheses be associated with mainstream 
epistemology? Fortunately not all mainstream epistemology is internalist. As 
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mentioned before, this has been so only until recently. In the second half of 
the 20th century, due to independently motivated reasons (mainly having to 
do with Gettier’s (1963) counterexamples to epistemic internalism and the 
problems of Humean and radical skepticism) there appeared epistemic 
externalism. Epistemic externalism is the denial of epistemic internalism. That 
is, according to externalists in epistemology, the knower does not need to 
have internal access to the reasons of holding her true beliefs. So long as one’s 
true beliefs are reliably and/or safely formed then one can be said to know 
even if one has no beliefs about the reasons for one’s true beliefs. Now, notice 
that in so denying the demand for internal access to the reasons for holding a 
true belief seriously undermines the accompanying commitment to 
intellectual autonomy and, thus, opens the way for anti-individualist (i.e., 
social) epistemology.         
 I will here concentrate on a kind of externalist epistemology that only 
commits itself to the ability intuition on knowledge. This is the idea that 
knowledge must be the product of cognitive ability. Crucially, however, 
virtue reliabilism (VR)—as the target view is known in the literature—makes 
no claims about what may count as a cognitive ability, thereby being open to 
interpretations along the lines suggested by HEC and HDC. In particular, VR, 
roughly, is the view that knowledge is creditable true believing that is true in 
virtue of one’s cognitive ability. This is the starting point of my thesis, which 
is divided in two parts. Part 1 (chapters 1, 2, and 3) presents the broader 
virtue reliabilistic framework and HEC, and demonstrates how the two views 
can be combined. Part 2 (chapters 4, 5, and 6) explores the ramifications of 
reading virtue reliabilism along the lines suggested by HEC and HDC, and 
demonstrates how such a reading can reveal and account for the social nature 
of several kinds of knowledge.        
 In more detail, in chapter 1, I motivate VR on the basis of Humean 
skepticism and several thought experiments, all of which will allow us to 
delineate the core tenets of the view. As I further argue, however, virtue 
reliabilism, as it stands, cannot account for certain crucial counterexamples 
(including testimonial knowledge), and it cannot explain how one can have 
knowledge that is the product of the operation of epistemic artifacts. Only 
after we embrace a virtue reliabilistic necessary condition on knowledge that 
has been recently proposed by Pritchard—namely, COGAweak—can we 
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account for testimonial knowledge. Moreover, on the basis of COGAweak we 
can also claim that the operation of some epistemic artifact can count as a bona 
fide cognitive ability, such that we can acquire knowledge on its basis, while 
being in line with the ability intuition on knowledge.    
 Claiming, however, that epistemic artifacts can be part of one’s 
cognitive system is a rather radical claim, which had better not been left 
metaphysically unsupported. Accordingly, in chapter 2, I explore HEC. In 
particular, I offer a detailed defense of the view from its most serious 
objections—namely the ‘coupling-constitution’ fallacy and ‘cognitive bloat’ 
worry—on the basis of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST). The outcome is a 
set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on cognitive extension that 
can safeguard HEC from the aforementioned objections, as well as clearly 
distinguish it from the hypothesis of embedded cognition.    
 Interestingly, turning back to COGAweak, in chapter 3, I argue that the 
very same set of criteria is required for a process to be knowledge-conducive. 
And this is as it should be; COGAweak holds that knowledge must be the 
product of cognitive ability and HEC sets out to reveal which processes can 
count as cognitive abilities without being distracted by the arbitrary 
boundaries of skin and skull.        
 Having so wedded the two views—which is the aim of Part 1—I turn 
to the second part, which is dedicated to revealing the social nature of much 
of our knowledge—mainly by focusing on the ramifications of reading 
COGAweak along the lines suggested by HEC and HDC. First, in chapter 4, I 
am interested in the claim that many instances of knowledge have a dual 
nature—they are both social and individual. Focusing, for example, on 
testimonial knowledge and knowledge acquired on the basis of epistemic 
artifacts—both software and hardware—these are true beliefs that are 
creditable both to the individual who appropriately accepted the offered 
report, or employed the relevant artifacts, and to the individual(s) who offered 
the reliable report, or brought the relevant artifacts about (remember that 
according to VR and COGAweak, knowledge is creditable true believing, which 
is true in virtue of one’s cognitive ability). We therefore now have a good case 
for what might be called a weak version of anti-individualism in mainstream 
epistemology.          
 Provided, however, the possibility of distributed cognition and group 
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agency, we can go even further by making a case for a robust version of anti-
individualism in epistemology. This is the theme of the last two chapters. In 
chapter 5, I motivate the existence of group agents by combining the 
consequences of the phenomena of multiple realizability and wild disjunction 
for constructing scientific laws with the arguments from DST that I used to 
argue for HEC, in chapter 2. Having so argued for the existence of group 
agents, I then ask whether there could be epistemic group agents.   
 And considering Transactive Memory Systems and scientific 
experiments performed by research teams, I argue in chapter 6, points to a 
positive answer. Both cases appear to be about epistemic group agents, which 
exist and gain knowledge in virtue of non-reducible collective belief-forming 
processes. The interesting point, however, is that this is knowledge that is not 
produced by any individual’s cognitive ability and, thereby, not creditable to 
any individual alone. Instead, in such cases, knowledge is the product of the 
group’s collective cognitive ability and must be attributed to the group as a 
whole. Still, however, being able to recognize a group as a cognitive subject in 
itself, allows for the proponents of VR, and COGAweak in particular, to 
legitimately apply their individualistic theory of knowledge to such extreme 
cases as well.          
 In other words, by the end, we will have a picture according to which 
we can use a mainstream individualistic approach to knowledge that can 
account for all kinds of knowledge; i.e., knowledge that is strictly individual, 
knowledge that is partly individual and partly social, and knowledge that is 
entirely social (i.e., not possessed by any individual alone). And if such a 
picture is possible, then the prospects for a unified epistemology that goes 
beyond the boarders of individualistic and social epistemology should be 
rich.           
 Finally, before closing this foreword, let me also stress two points 
regarding the dialectics of the thesis. First, for the sake of intellectual honesty, 
let me note a worry that I, myself, have with respect to the metaphysical 
support I offer to HEC and HDC in chapters 2 and 5, respectively. In both 
cases, I use arguments from DST, and in the case of HDC I further combine 
them with considerations about what might count as a lawful causal 
explanation within science. Both argumentative lines proceed this way: Given 
how science is performed and/or DST (the best available mathematical 
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language for the study of complex systems) we must accept that HDC and 
HEC are correct, respectively. So both arguments rely on what may count as a 
good explanation, and given that explanatory concerns are epistemological 
concerns, it now appears that neither of these two argumentative lines is 
strictly metaphysical, i.e., independent of what might one say or know. Yet it 
is also true that much of the metaphysics within contemporary philosophy of 
mind is done this way: so long as X does significant explanatory work then X 
cannot be metaphysically eliminated and should, thereby, be considered as 
real. I leave it to the reader to decide what this skeptical point may amount to. 
 Second, I want to warn the reader about my attitude towards the 
several theses I employ for the sake of my arguments. As you will find out I 
write as if I completely buy into all COGAweak, HEC, and HDC. This is partly 
because I really do. I recognize, however, that I could have resisted this risky 
and maybe provocative attitude. Perhaps, I could have instead presented the 
views, thoroughly criticized them, demonstrated that none of the criticisms is 
conclusive, and further argued for what happens if we combine them. I am 
afraid, however, that such an approach would have resulted in a much longer 
manuscript, including details that would be irrelevant to my main thesis. 
Moreover, I find it hard to see how one could present a positive picture by 
being overly defensive. Instead, I have preferred to offer what I consider to be 
the most serious objections facing the views I support, and provide answers 
to them, arguing, in effect, that one could non-problematically cling to them. 
Since, however, some of these theses are widely thought to be radical, or even 
implausible, I offer this additional warning note, and I leave it to the reader to 
form an opinion about their force on the basis of his/her intuitions and the 



















In this first chapter the focus will be on the introduction of a necessary 
condition on knowledge that has been recently put forward by Pritchard 
(2010b), namely COGAweak. COGAweak describes knowledge as a kind of action 
which must be significantly creditable to one’s cognitive agency for acting on 
her reliable belief-forming dispositions in order to get things right. The reason 
I am interested in this particular condition is twofold. Apart from fitting 
nicely with the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) within 
contemporary philosophy of mind (more on this fit in chapter 3), it also 
appears to be a (if not the most) promising formulation of a necessary 
condition on knowledge, which is capable to accommodate a wide range of 
diverse epistemological considerations.      
 The last claim will become gradually obvious through the discussion of 
how COGAweak captures a fundamental insight concerning the nature of 
knowledge. I am referring to the ability intuition on knowledge, which 
expresses the popular, amongst contemporary epistemologists, realization 
that knowledge must be the product of cognitive ability. To get a grip on the 
importance of this guiding idea, we will first concentrate on process 
reliabilism and, then, we will move on to the consideration of a subsequent 
proposal, that of virtue reliabilism. By then, the background will be clear 
enough for introducing COGAweak. 
 
1.2) Process Reliabilism 
 
COGAweak, as we shall see later on, is a virtue reliabilistic necessary condition 
on knowledge. By way of introducing it, therefore, we must first talk both 
about virtue reliabilism and process reliabilism, of which the former is a 
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descendant view. Process reliabilism is an externalist approach to knowledge 
in that it denies that the agent must have—even in principle—reflective access 
to the reasons for which his beliefs are true. In order to understand and 
appreciate the reason for this denial let me briefly note what is thought to be 
one of the primary motivations for it.       
 If we demanded that one always have, at least in principle, reflective 
access to the reasons for which one’s beliefs are true—as internalist theories of 
knowledge do—then one would need to be able to provide deductive 
arguments as reasons for holding one’s beliefs about unobserved matters of 
fact and the external world. As Hume’s skeptical arguments demonstrate, 
however, this is impossible. Accordingly, it has been traditionally assumed 
that Hume’s arguments lead to skepticism about our empirical beliefs. 
 The problem of induction is well known, but let me expand on it a bit. 
We form our beliefs about unobserved matters of facts and the external world 
on the basis of evidence provided by past and present observations, and the 
external world, respectively. But, in order for our empirical conclusions to 
logically (i.e., necessarily) follow from the evidence offered in their support, 
we must also make the assumptions that the future will resemble the past and 
that sensory appearances are a reliable indication to reality, respectively. The 
problem, however, is that both of these assumptions rely for their support on 
what they assert. So, given that circular reasoning cannot give rise to 
knowledge, they cannot be known. Consequently, since all our empirical 
beliefs depend for their justification on unknown assumptions, they cannot 
logically (i.e., necessarily) follow from the evidence offered in their support.  
Accordingly, the conclusion that has been traditionally drawn is that our 
empirical beliefs cannot amount to knowledge.     
 Contemplating on Hume’s skeptical arguments, however, Greco (1999) 
argues that this is too fast. Hume’s arguments should not be considered as 
one-way skeptical ones. Instead, the immediate conclusion to be drawn from 
them is that our empirical beliefs do not necessarily follow from their 
evidence; if the evidence for our empirical beliefs is reliable then it is at most 
contingently reliable. This realization alone, however, cannot automatically 
lead to skepticism. Only after we embrace an internalist understanding of 
knowledge, such that one’s beliefs should always necessarily follow from 
their evidence, do we face skepticism.       
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 In other words, in order to avoid skepticism about empirical and 
perceptual knowledge, we must allow knowledge to be grounded on 
evidence that is merely contingently reliable, and so we must give up the 
requirement that one’s beliefs should always be internally—i.e., by reflection 
alone—justified. Put another way, we must recognize that if the evidence 
offered in favor of our empirical and perceptual beliefs is indeed a reliable 
indication of the truth—thereby delivering knowledge—then “this is at most 
a contingent fact about human cognition, rather than a function of any 
necessary relations, deductive or inductive, between evidence and belief” 
(Greco 1999, 273). Accordingly, argues Greco, any adequate epistemology 
must be able to account for the fact that merely contingently reliable evidence can 
give rise to knowledge (1999, 273).  Are there, however, any resources for 
supporting this radical alternative?       
 At this juncture, Greco puts forward process reliabilism, which is the 
idea that knowledge is true belief that is the product of reliable belief-forming 
processes, where a reliable process is a process that tends to result in true 
rather than false beliefs. Moreover, in response to our skeptical 
considerations, “reliabilism denies that evidential relations must be necessary, 
and denies that one must know that one’s evidence is reliable” (Greco 1999, 
284); if forming a belief on a certain kind of evidence constitutes a reliable 
belief-forming process, it does not matter that the evidence is only 
contingently reliable. “Reliabilism makes de facto reliability the grounds of 
positive epistemic status” (Greco 1999, 284-5).     
 Notice, then, that process reliabilism is an externalist approach to the 
theory of knowledge. On this view—contrary to the traditional account of 
knowledge as internally justified true belief—in order to know one does not 
need to know, or be justified in believing (by reflection alone, or any other 
means) that one’s beliefs are formed in a reliable fashion. So long as one 
employs a reliable belief-forming process one is justified in holding the 
resulting beliefs.1         
                                                
1 Notice, however, that Greco concedes that a plausible account of knowledge should be able 
to satisfy the intuition that one must also be sensitive to the reliability of one’s evidence. But, 
if, as Hume’s skeptical reasoning demonstrates, the relation between evidence and belief is 
not necessary, then it is far from obvious how a person can be so subjectively sensitive, 
especially in externalist approaches such as process reliabilism; if a condition of ‘subjective 
sensitivity to the reliability of one’s evidence’ must be satisfied then this should better be 
accomplished in a way that will not require knowledge of, or even beliefs about the said 
reliability. Otherwise, at least in cases of empirical knowledge, such a requirement would 
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 So we see that process reliabilism has the resources to overcome the 
Humean skepticism. There is, however, a serious complication with the view. 
That is, process reliabilism, as it stands, is too weak a condition on knowledge 
because it allows any reliable belief-forming process to count as knowledge-
conducive, and this is intuitively incorrect. Consider the following three 
examples. 
 
Hercules (Adapted from Pritchard’s Temp (2009, 48)) 
Hercules tosses a drachma whenever he wants to form a belief about the 
weather outside. If it is heads, he forms the belief that it is sunny; if it is tails 
he believes it is cloudy; and if it balances in between, he believes it is rainy. 
As it happens, Hercules’ way of forming his weather beliefs is perfectly 
reliable, because Zeus, who wants to save Hercules from the embarrassment 
of forming false weather beliefs, has an eye on him; every time he sees 
Hercules tossing the coin arranges the world accordingly.  
 
Serendipitous Brain Lesion (Greco 2010, 149) 
Suppose that S has a rare brain lesion, one effect of which is to reliably cause 
the true belief that one has a brain lesion. Even if the process is perfectly 
reliable, it seems wrong that one can come to have knowledge that one has a 
brain lesion on this basis.  
 
Careless Math Student (Greco 2010, 149) 
Suppose that S is taking a math test and adopts a correct algorithm for 
solving a problem. But suppose that S has no understanding that the 
algorithm is the correct one to use for this problem. Rather, S chooses it on a 
whim, but could just as well have chosen one that is incorrect. By hypothesis, 
the algorithm is the right one, and so using it to solve the problem constitutes 
a reliable process. It seems wrong to say that S thereby knows the answer to 
the problem, however. 
 
How does process reliabilism rule in these cases? Hercules’ beliefs are formed 
in a highly reliable way and so, on the adjudicated view, Hercules has 
knowledge of the weather conditions. Intuitively, however, knowledge 
should not be attributed to Hercules. Why not? On a first analysis, we may 
just say that in cases of knowledge we want our beliefs to be responsive to the 
                                                                                                                                      
drive us straight back to the Humean problematic. In section 1.3.2, we will see how Greco 
accommodates this intuition—which has arguably been the central motivation for internalist 
theories of knowledge—but in a way that avoids the Humean problematic. 
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facts, whereas in Hercules’ case, the direction of fit is exactly the opposite; it is 
not Hercules’ beliefs that agree with facts, but the other way around. 
Likewise, the unfortunate agent’s way of forming his true belief about his 
brain lesion on the basis of his brain lesion is reliable as well. Accordingly, 
process reliabilists must accept that he can gain knowledge in this way. As, 
Greco claims, however, this doesn’t sound correct. Why not? Mainly, because 
the way the agent forms his belief is so strange that no one could accept that 
one can gain knowledge in this way—not even the agent himself. And finally, 
the careless student’s way of solving the problem is also reliable. But, again, it 
seems incorrect to attribute knowledge to her. Why not? Well, she employed 
the right method on a whim, such that she could have very easily employed 
another, incorrect method.        
 So, how is this problem to be resolved? Is there a way to restrict the set 
of reliable belief-forming processes to those that are intuitively knowledge-
conducive; i.e., to those processes that are responsive to the world, and which 
are neither strange nor fleeting? A more detailed analysis of what goes on in 
the cases just described should be illuminating. 
1.3) The Ability Intuition and Virtue Reliabilism 
1.3.1) The Ability Intuition 
Let us focus on Hercules first. Hercules’ way of forming his beliefs is perfectly 
reliable as his beliefs will systematically come out true. But we cannot 
attribute knowledge to him. The problem, as we noted before, is the direction 
of fit between his beliefs and the facts. In cases of knowledge, we want our 
beliefs to be true because they respond to the facts, and not because the facts 
comply with our beliefs; when one knows, one’s true beliefs are about how 
the world is, not the other way around. In Hercules’ case, however, his beliefs 
are not true because they are formed in a way that detects the facts. Instead, 
he first forms his beliefs in an arbitrary way—he makes no efforts to ensure 
that they will come out true—and then Zeus takes over so that the facts will 
comply with Hercules’ beliefs. But this is not knowledge; this is the ‘luck of 
the gods’. So, if, one day, Zeus had a fight with Hera, Hercules’ beliefs would 
cease coming out true. But notice that if Hercules used his cognitive 
abilities—say, by taking a look at the sky—to form his weather beliefs, then 
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he would not run into any such problems. If he formed his beliefs not in an 
arbitrary way, but on the basis of his cognitive abilities, he would not need 
Zeus to tweak the world so that his beliefs could systematically turn out true. 
If one’s beliefs are the product of one’s cognitive abilities they will be true 
because they are sensitive to the facts. In other words, the direction of fit will 
be correct.          
 So, it may be proposed that the way to restrict the reliable belief-
forming processes to those that get the direction of fit correctly—such that 
they can be knowledge-conducive—is to identify them with one’s cognitive 
abilities, or, in other words, with one’s reliable cognitive processes. But can all 
reliable cognitive processes count as cognitive abilities? Not really, because, 
as the serendipitous brain lesion and careless student examples demonstrate, 
there are certain intuitions—which, as it will soon become apparent are 
closely connected to the issue of subjective justification—that disallow this 
move.  Let me say more about them.     
 First, the serendipitous brain lesion demonstrates that there might be 
reliable cognitive belief-forming processes that we wouldn’t like to claim they 
constitute cognitive abilities that can produce knowledge, because they are 
strange. More precisely, the intuition here is that for a cognitive process to 
count as a cognitive ability it must not be strange, in the sense that it must fit 
well with the rest of the agent’s doxastic cognitive system.  The reason is that 
if the cognitive process is strange, then, in light of the rest of his doxastic 
cognitive system, the agent will reject both the process and its deliverances, 
despite that it is in fact reliable—from the agent’s point of view, it isn’t. So, in 
order for a cognitive process to count as a cognitive ability such that it can be 
knowledge-conducive it must not be inconsistent with the rest of the agent’s 
beliefs, and his methods for producing them. In other words it must be such 
that it can become part of, or, integrated within, the rest of the agent’s 
doxastic cognitive system. But, clearly, this is not the case with the 
serendipitous brain lesion. The process is a cognitive malfunction, and, even 
more crucially, its output is so bizarre that no epistemic agent could accept as 
true. In other words, the serendipitous brain lesion cannot count as 
knowledge-conducive because it is so strange that it cannot be part of the rest 
of the agent’s doxastic cognitive system, and so cannot count as a cognitive 
ability.         
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 Second, the careless student’s method of forming her true belief 
demonstrates that even a reliable cognitive process that is normal enough to 
become part of the rest of her doxastic cognitive system cannot yet count as a 
cognitive ability that can produce knowledge. The reason is that her reliable 
cognitive process of forming her true belief is a fleeting one; it is not a habit or 
a disposition of hers. In other words, she is in no sense aware that this is the 
way to solve the target problem; the reliability of the process is accidental 
from her point of view. Accordingly, given the same circumstances, the 
careless student could have so easily picked another, incorrect cognitive 
process for forming her beliefs, thus, ending up with a falsehood. If, instead, 
the student had habitually invoked the correct algorithm when the problems 
called for it, then we would indeed be inclined to claim that she can gain 
knowledge on its basis. The reason for this is that if a cognitive process is a 
disposition or a habit of the agent, then the agent will be able to become 
aware of the circumstances in which it can be unreliable. Otherwise, it seems 
arbitrary that the agent employed it in an appropriate, but isolated case, and 
so cannot gain knowledge on its basis. In other words, a reliable cognitive 
process that is normal—such that it can, in principle, become part of the rest 
of one’s cognitive system—won’t count as a cognitive ability, unless it is also 
a disposition or a habit of the agent. Why is this so? Well, the intuition is that 
abilities, in general, are habits or dispositions possessed by agents. But apart 
from such intuitions, we have also noted that in order for a reliable cognitive 
process to count as a cognitive ability it must be such that it can become part 
of (or, integrated within) the rest of the agent’s doxastic cognitive system. One 
requirement for this, we have noted, is that the process not be strange such 
that it is not inconsistent with the rest of the agent’s cognitive system. What is 
further required, however, is that it also be coherent with it. In other words, 
the agent must be able to become aware that it is unreliable in certain 
circumstances, so that she will be able to non-accidentally endorse it in the 
rest of the circumstances. And if the cognitive process is a disposition or a 
habit of the agent, then she can become aware of this.    
 So, we see that in cases of knowledge, we want one’s way of forming 
one’s beliefs to be responsive to the facts. Accordingly, we claimed that only 
reliable cognitive processes can be knowledge-conducive. But not all reliable 
cognitive processes will do; they also need to be normal dispositions, or 
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habits of the agent so that they can become part of (or, integrated in) the rest 
of his doxastic cognitive system, such that they can count as cognitive abilities 
of the agent.          
 Greco (2004, 111), in a similar vain, claims that when we attribute 
knowledge to someone “we imply that the person is responsible for believing 
the truth”, because believing the truth is the product of his cognitive abilities. 
Put another way, “to say that someone knows is to say that his believing the 
truth can be credited to him. It is to say that this person got things right due to 
his own abilities, efforts and actions, rather than due to dumb luck, or blind 
chance, or something else” (Ibid.).      
 Noticeably, the general idea, which all the above considerations are 
alluding to is that for a reliable process to be knowledge-conducive it must be 
a cognitive ability. This idea has also come to be known in the literature as the 
ability intuition on knowledge: Knowledge must be the product of cognitive 
abilities.2 Moreover, the upshot of the above considerations is that for a 
process to be able to qualify as a cognitive ability, such that it can deliver 
knowledge, it must be a normal dispositional or habitual cognitive process. 
As we shall now see, it is exactly this understanding of the ability intuition on 
knowledge that when combined with process reliabilism gives rise to virtue 
reliabilism.     
1.3.2) Virtue Reliabilism 
 
So, in order to introduce virtue reliabilism, let us follow Greco who has 
proposed that not all reliable belief-forming processes are knowledge-
conducive; rather “it is those processes that have their bases in the stable and 
successful dispositions of the believer that are relevant for knowledge and 
justification” (1999, 287). In other words, an epistemic agent S will be 
objectively justified in believing p just in case his true believing results from 
one of his dispositional reliable cognitive processes.     
 As Greco further notes (1999, 285), however, “it is not enough that 
one’s belief is formed in a way that is objectively reliable; one’s belief must be 
formed in a way that is subjectively appropriate as well”. In other words, 
                                                
2 The idea that knowledge must be grounded in cognitive abilities can be traced back to the 
writings of Sosa (1988; 1993) and Plantinga (1993). For more recent approaches to the idea see 
Greco (1999; 2004; 2007) and Pritchard (2009; forthcoming; 2010a; 2010b).    
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Greco concedes that internalists are correct with respect to their intuition that 
one must be somehow sensitive to the reliability of the evidence one offers in 
favor of one’s beliefs. Nevertheless, in order to remain fast to externalism 
such that he will also avoid Hume’s skepticism, Greco suggests that 
subjective justification must be accommodated in a way that does not involve 
knowledge of, or even beliefs about reliability (see fn. 1). Accordingly, he 
proposes (1999, 289) that “a belief p is subjectively justified for a person S (in 
the sense relevant for having knowledge) if and only if S’s believing p is 
grounded in the cognitive dispositions that S manifests when S is thinking 
conscientiously” (i.e., when S is motivated to believe what is true). In this way 
the agent will employ his reliable cognitive processes in circumstances that 
have not been problematic in the past (i.e., those which are objectively 
reliable) and he will be able to do so without even having any beliefs about 
their reliability.3          
 In addition, Greco notes that the dispositions/habits that a person 
manifests when she is thinking conscientiously are the stable properties of her 
cognitive character (Greco 1999, 290). So, “a belief p has a positive epistemic 
status for a person S just in case S’s believing p results from the stable and 
reliable dispositions that make up S’s cognitive character” (Greco 1999, 287-8). 
In this way, Greco does away both with strange and fleeting processes. 
Strange processes cannot be part of the agent’s cognitive character because 
they are not the kind of processes that a conscientious agent would employ. 
Fleeting processes are also excluded: First, because they are not dispositions 
or habits—so, they cannot really count as character traits. And, second, 
                                                
3 The fact that people manifest highly specific, finely tuned dispositions to form their beliefs 
in certain ways but not in others amounts to an implicit awareness of the reliability of those 
dispositions.  
 
 For example suppose that it seems visually to a person that a cat is sleeping on the 
couch, and on this basis she believes that there is a sleeping cat on the couch. Suppose 
also that this belief manifests a disposition that the person has, to trust this sort of 
experience under these sorts of conditions, when motivated to believe the truth. 
Now, suppose that much less clearly, it seems visually to the person that a mouse has 
run across the floor. Not being disposed to trust this kind of fleeting experience, the 
person refrains from believing until further evidence comes in. The fact that the 
person, properly motivated, is disposed to trust one kind of experience but not the 
other, constitutes sensitivity on her part that the former is reliable. There is a clear 
sense in which she takes the former experience to be adequate to her goal of believing 
the truth, and takes the latter experience not to be. And this is so even if she has no 
beliefs about her goals, her reliability, or her experience (Greco 1999, 290 ) . 
       
A similar argument can be found in (Sosa 1993, 60-63). 
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because it is only dispositions or habits that one can become aware they are 
unreliable in certain circumstances, and, so—without relying on any beliefs 
about their reliability—use them conscientiously in the rest of the 
circumstances.4          
 But, what might be part of one’s cognitive character? On this view, 
one’s cognitive character consists of one’s cognitive faculties of the 
brain/central nervous system (CNS) including, of course, one’s natural 
perceptual cognitive faculties, one’s memories and the overall doxastic 
system. In addition, however, it can also consist of acquired habits of thought, 
“acquired skills of perception and acquired methods of inquiry, including 
those involving highly specialized training or even advanced technology” 
(1999, 287).          
 Virtue reliabilism is, therefore, a refinement of process reliabilism in 
that it accommodates the ability intuition on knowledge. In order for a belief 
to be both subjectively and objectively justified it’s not enough that it is the 
product of a reliable belief-forming process; it must be the outcome of one of 
the agent’s stable and successful cognitive belief-forming processes that make 
up his/her cognitive character. Accordingly, virtue reliabilism is usually 
formulated as follows:5  
Virtue Reliabilism 
S knows that p if and only if S’s reliable cognitive character is the most 
important necessary part of the total set of causal factors that give rise 
to S’s believing the truth regarding p.  
 
As far as the ability intuition on knowledge is concerned, the thinking 
behind virtue reliabilism is this: if S’s true belief that p is the product of some 
                                                
4 So, given the discussion of the previous subsection, one can only employ a conscientious 
attitude towards the processes, which can, in principle, become part of (i.e., integrated in) 
one’s cognitive character. In order, however, for one to indeed be conscientious towards them 
they must have actually been integrated within one’s cognitive character. And this, as we 
shall see in chapter 3, further requires that the relevant processes densely interact with the 
rest of the agent’s cognitive abilities. In a similar vein, Greco (2010, 152) writes: “in general, it 
would seem, cognitive integration is a function of cooperation and interaction, or cooperative 
interaction, with other aspects of the cognitive system”.   
5 Notice that Greco calls his view ‘agent reliabilism’. I have here preferred this alternative 
name for two reasons. First, in the article that we have so far been closely following, Greco 
does not clearly present his view as a complete account of knowledge. Second, I wanted to 
make explicit that this approach falls under the broader trend of virtue epistemology, “since 
the stable and successful dispositions of a person are appropriately understood as virtues” 
(Greco 1999, 287).  
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cognitive ability, then we may conclude that S’s cognitive character figures 
most importantly in the causal explanation of how S came to believe the truth 
regarding p, and thus that S knows that p.     
 Notice, moreover, that the reason why virtue epistemologists are 
inclined towards such a strong virtue-theoretic account of knowledge is their 
attempt to do away with the knowledge-undermining epistemic luck 
involved in Gettier cases.6 As Gettier demonstrated, one’s justified belief may 
turn out to be true without thereby counting as an instance of knowledge. In 
the typical scenario, one’s belief, which is the product of faulty reasoning, just 
happens to be true for reasons that are extraneous to one’s justification. Or 
again, one may come to believe the truth on the basis of a lucky guess. 
Contrast this with cases of success through ability. “There is a sense of “luck” 
on which lucky success is precisely opposed to success through virtue or 
ability” (Greco 2007, 58).  When one’s success is the product of one’s ability 
then clearly one’s success cannot have been a lucky one. Accordingly, virtue 
epistemologists hold that when one knows, one’s intellectual success is the 
product of cognitive ability.7 In other words, they claim, the cognitive success 
must be primarily creditable to one’s cognitive character. (Alternatively: one’s 
cognitive character must be the most salient factor in the causal explanation of 
how one acquired one’s true belief).8      
 So, let us now direct our attention to several thought experiments that 
will help us properly evaluate virtue reliabilism. First, consider Hercules. 
Obviously, Hercules’ beliefs are not the result of his cognitive abilities, so his 
                                                
6 See (Gettier 1963).  
7 Notice, here, that the claim is that the cognitive success must be the product of cognitive 
ability. It is not the weaker claim that cognitive ability must have been involved in the 
acquisition of one’s true belief, since this can be satisfied far too easily in ways that do not 
exclude luck. 
8 Obviously, this is a ‘causal explanatory’ reading of virtue reliabilism. There is a, however, 
one more standard understanding of virtue reliabilism available in the literature. Roughly, 
according to this second understanding, the view is formulated by demanding that one’s 
cognitive success be because of one’s cognitive ability, where the ‘because of’ relation between 
true belief and ability is not understood in purely causal terms, but on the basis of the 
‘dispositions manifestation’ model of explanation. See, for example, (Sosa 2007: ch. 5). 
Although these two understandings of virtue reliabilism will, in most cases, produce the 
same results, notice that dispositions are second-order properties that derive from further 
properties of their bearers. For example, the fragility of a vase depends on the molecular 
structure of the vase. Accordingly, if we tried to understand why the vase broke, the 
‘dispositions manifestation’ model of explanation would stop at the fragility of the vase, 
whereas a ‘causal explanatory’ model would penetrate further, by referring to the molecular 
structure of the vase. It could be the case, therefore, that these two formulations of virtue 
reliabilism may, sometimes, produce different results.      
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cognitive character has nothing to do with his believing the truth regarding 
the temperature of the room. On the contrary, it is Zeus’ intervention that is 
the most salient factor in the causal explanation of how Hercules believes the 
truth. Hence, virtue reliabilism rules correct that Hercules lacks knowledge.
 Or, consider Roddy: 
 
Roddy (Pritchard 2009, 11)9 
Roddy is a farmer. One day he is looking into a field near-by and clearly sees 
something that looks just like a sheep. Consequently he forms a belief that 
there is a sheep in the field.  Moreover, this belief is true in that there is a 
sheep in the field in question. However, what Roddy is looking at is not a 
sheep, but rather a big hairy dog that looks just like a sheep and which is 
obscuring from view the sheep standing just behind. 
 
Roddy’s cognitive success cannot be attributed to his cognitive character. The 
reason is that Roddy’s actions (taking a look at a sheep-shaped dog) are not 
the most important part in the correct causal explanation of how he believes 
the truth. Instead, what is salient for explaining his success is the abnormal 
presence of a great amount of epistemic luck (i.e., there being a real sheep 
behind the sheep-shaped dog). According to virtue reliabilism, then, and in 
line with our intuitions, Roddy cannot gain knowledge in this way.  Before 
moving on, however, let me note a subtle detail, which is of great importance 
to the formulation of virtue reliabilism. The demand is that one’s belief be true 
because of/in virtue of one’s cognitive character. Virtue reliabilism rejects the 
weaker claim that one must believe on the basis of one’s cognitive character 
and that one’s belief happens to be true. Such a weaker claim could not 
accommodate the Roddy case.         
 So far so good for virtue reliabilism. The following counterexample, 
however, shows the view to be too weak an account of knowledge.  
 
Barney (Pritchard 2009, 12)10  
Barney is driving through the country and happens to look out of the 
window into a field. In doing so, he gets to have a good look at a barn-shaped 
object, whereupon he forms the belief that there is a barn in the field. This 
belief is true, since what he is looking at is really a barn. Unbeknownst to 
Barney, however, he is presently in ‘barn-façade country’ where every object 
                                                
9 The Roddy case is described in Chisholm (1977, 105). 
10 The Barney case is described in Goldman (1976) and credited to Ginet. 
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that looks like a barn is a convincing fake. Had Barney looked at one of the 
fake barns, then he would not have noticed the difference. Quite by chance, 
however, Barney just happened to look at the one real barn in the vicinity. 
 
Barney comes to truly believe that he is looking at a real barn by 
employing his cognitive abilities; he is looking directly at the barn. Therefore, 
we now have a case where despite the fact that Barney’s true belief is solely 
formed on the basis of his cognitive ability, his cognitive success cannot be 
called knowledge given that his belief could have so easily been false (Barney 
is in a barn-façade environment). Put another way, the objection is that we 
now have cognitive success that does not amount to knowledge even though 
it is solely formed on the basis of Barney’s reliable cognitive character. 
 Consequently, it has been argued that virtue reliabilism cannot 
ultimately do all the work that is expected to do. Despite virtue 
epistemologists’ initial expectations, the ability intuition on knowledge seems 
unable to fully accommodate the equally important intuition that knowledge 
must not be due to luck, viz., the anti-luck intuition on knowledge. Instead, it 
seems that in order to fully deal with knowledge-undermining luck, virtue 
reliabilists must also incorporate a separate anti-luck condition into their 
theory of knowledge.11 The upshot appears to be that these two intuitions 
about knowledge “impose independent epistemic demands on our theory of 
knowledge” (Pritchard forthcoming).     
 Accordingly, friends of anti-luck epistemology claim that any adequate 
theory of knowledge must explicitly have as a central component an anti-luck 
epistemic condition such as the safety or the sensitivity principle.12 In contrast 
                                                
11 Notice, here, a subtle difference: In regular Gettier cases, the knowledge-undermining luck 
is very direct, in that the luck concerns the relationship between the belief and the fact. One’s 
belief is erroneously formed but there is a lucky fact that renders it true. Luck intervenes 
between the belief and the fact. On the contrary, in cases like the one Barney is in, the 
knowledge-undermining luck is quite indirect; indeed, it is specifically environmental. Barney 
does look at a real barn and believes that there is a real barn in front of him. There is nothing 
wrong with the way he forms his belief. Given, however, the environmental conditions he 
cannot acquire knowledge in this way. Luck interferes with the environment in such a way 
that even a well-formed belief will be a lucky one if true.  So, it seems that while the ability 
condition on knowledge can deal with the normal (non-environmental) knowledge-
undermining epistemic luck involved in Gettier cases, it may not be able to deal specifically 
with environmental knowledge-undermining luck. See also (Kallestrup & Pritchard 
(forthcoming). I have elsewhere argued that a virtue reliabilistic condition on knowledge can 
deal with all sorts of knowledge-undermining luck (Palermos forthcoming). 
12 The sensitivity principle is usually formulated as follows: If S knows that p, then S’s true 
belief that p, is such that, had p been false, S would not have believed p. The classic defenses 
of the sensitivity principle can be found in Dretske (1970) and Nozick (1981). The safety 
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to the ability condition on knowledge, which arguably addresses the problem 
posed by knowledge-undermining luck only indirectly, these modal 
conditions on knowledge are primarily targeted to capture the anti-luck 
requirement, as they are explicitly concerned with the responsiveness of one’s 
belief to relevant counterfactual circumstances (such as the scenario in which 
Barney looks at a barn-façade instead of a real barn). Arguably, then, for 
virtue reliabilism to be a fully adequate account of knowledge it may have to 
be supplemented by a specific anti-luck condition on knowledge such as 
safety or sensitivity.13        
 On the face of the Barney counterexample, therefore, virtue reliabilism 
appears to be an insufficient condition on knowledge. The following case, 
however, demonstrates that it is too strong as well. 
 
Jenny (Pritchard 2009, 68) 14 
Jenny gets off the train in an unfamiliar city and asks the first person that she 
meets for directions. The person that she asks is indeed knowledgeable about 
the area, and gives her directions. Jenny believes what she is told and goes on 
her way to her intended destination. 
 
Now, unless we want to deny a great amount of knowledge that we suppose 
we have, we must admit that Jenny gains knowledge in this way. Given the 
way Jenny gains knowledge, however, her cognitive character, it seems, has 
nothing to do with the truth status of her belief. Instead, it is the informant’s 
cognitive character that is the most salient (and maybe the only) factor in the 
causal explanation of why Jenny believes the truth. So, according to virtue 
                                                                                                                                      
principle is usually understood thusly: if S knows that p, then S’s true belief that p, is such that 
S’s belief that p could not have easily been false. For recent defenses of the safety principle see 
Sosa (1999; 2000) and Pritchard (2002; 2008). For a very good discussion concerning the 
relation between the ability and the anti-luck intuition on knowledge see Pritchard 
(forthcoming).  
13 Consider for example Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology: S knows that p if and only if S’s safe belief 
that p is the product of her relevant cognitive abilities (such that her safe cognitive success is to a 
significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency) (Pritchard forthcoming, 20). Again, in 
(Pritchard 2010a, 76) we can read: “ knowledge is safe belief that arises out of the reliable 
cognitive traits that make up one’s cognitive character, such that one’s cognitive success is to 
a significant degree creditable to one’s cognitive character”.  
14 The Jenny case is adapted from Lackey’s ‘Morris case’ (2007, 352). As the thought 
experiment is here laid out, nothing is really changed, apart from the hero’s name. As we 
shall see in the next section, however, Pritchard favors a slightly different—and admittedly 
more intuitive—understanding of the case. 
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reliabilism Jenny lacks knowledge that she in fact possesses.15   
 This counterexample shows virtue reliabilism to be too strong as it 
stands, and that it should therefore be somehow weakened. Accordingly, it is 
now time to move on to the consideration of Pritchard’s recent attempt to 
capture the ability intuition by putting forward a necessary condition on 




Before quoting COGAweak, however, we should first take a look at which 
considerations have led to it by investigating the Jenny case in some more 
detail. First, as Pritchard explains, to say that Jenny gains knowledge, we 
must read the example in such a way that Jenny is in an epistemically friendly 
environment—i.e., the city that Jenny visits had better not be renowned for its 
dishonest informants. Were that the case, we would not credit Jenny with 
knowledge. Second, notice that we presuppose some natural inclinations 
about Jenny’s cognitive character. We expect that Jenny can distinguish 
between potentially reliable and clearly unreliable informants; we do not 
expect that Jenny would be happy to ask just anybody. For example, we 
anticipate that she would not ask someone who clearly looked like a tourist 
(i.e., an unreliable informant). “Had the first person she met been obviously 
mad, or a stereotypical tourist, for example, then we would expect her to 
move on to the next prospective informant down the street” (Pritchard 
                                                
15 Traditionally, accounts of testimonial knowledge are divided in two main trends. The first 
one is called reductionism and it is the view that a hearer is justified in believing a speaker’s 
testimony if and only if she has non-testimonial positive reasons in favor of the speaker’s 
reports, such that her justification for accepting them is reducible to basic sources of 
knowledge such as sense perception, memory and inductive inference. Some of the 
proponents of reductionism are considered to be Hume (1977), Faulkner (2000), Fricker 
(1994). The second trend is called non-reductionism and it is the view that one is by default 
justified in believing one’s testimony unless one has negative reasons for doing so. In this 
view, testimonial justification cannot be reduced to more basic sources of knowledge. Typical 
proponents of non-reductionism on testimonial knowledge are thought to be, amongst others, 
Reid (1983), Burge (1993), Weiner (2003) and Audi (1998). Recently, however, Jennifer Lackey 
(2008) has put forward a dualist account of testimonial knowledge, which accommodates 
both of the aforementioned views.       
 Virtue reliabilism appears to accord only with reductionism on testimonial 
knowledge, due to its strong demand that the cognitive success should be primarily 
creditable to the hearer’s cognitive character. 
16 Pritchard argues for this condition in a number of places, though under different names 
and slightly different formulations. See (Pritchard forthcoming, 20), (Pritchard 2009, 74) and 
(Pritchard 2010a, 76).    
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forthcoming, 18). Moreover, we expect that she is able to distinguish between 
potentially reliable and clearly unreliable information and thereby that she 
would not believe whatever she was told, had it been obviously false (for 
instance to go past the city hall whereas, in fact, she is in a village). 
“Furthermore, if the manner in which the informant passed on the directions 
was clearly questionable—if the informant was vague, shifty, hostile, and 
evasive, say—then we would expect our hero to exercise due caution” 
(Pritchard forthcoming, 18). In other words, had Jenny not been responsive to 
these epistemologically relevant factors we would not have normally 
attributed knowledge to her. We, therefore, see that it is not that Jenny’s 
cognitive character has nothing to do with her believing the truth; it is just 
that the informant’s role is more important. It is upon these considerations 




If S knows that p, then S’s true belief that p is the product of a reliable belief-
forming process, which is appropriately integrated within S’s cognitive 
character such that her cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable 




Obviously COGAweak can easily handle the Jenny case; although the cognitive 
success is not primarily creditable to Jenny’s cognitive character—but rather 
the stranger who delivers the reliable information—Jenny, in so being 
responsive to the epistemologically relevant factors, has the right sort of 
abilities and employs them in the right sort of way so as to accept the 
stranger’s information, such that believing the truth is significantly creditable 
to her cognitive agency. According to COGAweak, then, Jenny can gain 
knowledge in this way.       
 What is of import here is to notice the lenient demands of COGAweak 
regarding the creditability of the cognitive success to one’s self. In contrast to 
virtue reliabilism where believing the truth must be primarily creditable to 
one’s cognitive character and thereby to one’s self, COGAweak loosens the 
required dependence of the cognitive success on one’s cognitive agency thereby 
                                                
17 Notice that Pritchard avoids making COGAweak a complete account of knowledge because, 
having in mind counterexamples such as the Barney case, he holds that for an adequate 
account of knowledge, COGAweak must be supplemented by an anti-luck condition on 
knowledge such as the safety principle.  
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allowing significant part of the credit to be attributable to other factors as 
well. Therefore, according to COGAweak, even though the most salient factor 
that explains Jenny’s cognitive success is the informant’s contribution, Jenny’s 
cognitive abilities render her cognitive agency significantly creditworthy, 
thereby allowing her to gain knowledge in this way.18 
Put another way, since Jenny employs the relevant belief-forming 
processes in order to rationally accept the speaker’s report, believing the truth 
is significantly—though not primarily—creditable to her cognitive agency and 
therefore, just as COGAweak allows, Jenny can gain knowledge in this way. 
Crucially, however, the rest of the credit should be, in accordance to our 
intuitions, attributed to the speaker’s cognitive agency for delivering reliable 
information. Therefore, COGAweak has the means to explain the dual sources 
of justification in cases of testimonial knowledge by attributing credit to both 
parties of the said exchange.19  
Furthermore, COGAweak rules correct with respect to all the previous 
thought experiments that we have so far encountered. Hercules lacks 
knowledge, because believing the truth is in no degree creditable to his 
cognitive agency but, instead, to Zeus. Moreover, neither the agent with the 
serendipitous brain lesion, nor the careless math student possesses 
knowledge. The reason is that their reliable belief-forming processes cannot 
become, or do not yet count, respectively, as parts of (i.e., they cannot be, or 
they have not yet been, appropriately integrated within) their cognitive 
characters. And, finally, the only worth-mentioning factor in the causal 
explanation of how Roddy believes the truth is the abnormal presence of luck 
that there happens to be a real sheep behind the sheep-shaped dog. 
Consequently, believing the truth cannot be significantly credited to his 
cognitive agency. 20 
 
 
                                                
18 Notice, then, that the cognitive success being primarily creditable to one’s cognitive agency 
and it being the product of one’s cognitive abilities is not exactly the same thing. That is, one’s 
cognitive success can be the product of one’s cognitive abilities even if it is not primarily 
creditable to one’s cognitive agency. 
19 For a more detailed analysis of COGAweak along the lines of dualism in the epistemology of 
testimony, as put forward by Lackey (2008), see (Palermos 2011). See also section 4.2.   
20 The Barney case should not be a problem for COGAweak which is only a necessary condition 
on knowledge; even if Barney’s cognitive success can be significantly credited to his cognitive 
agency, he may nevertheless lack knowledge because he fails to satisfy some supplementary 
condition on knowledge such as the safety principle.  
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1.4.2) Cognitive Agency, Epistemic Artifacts, and the Ability Intuition 
Having seen how COGAweak is able to overcome the problems that its 
predecessors face, I now want to discuss a both presentational and 
explanatory advantage of the view, namely the explicit recognition of the 
central role that one’s cognitive agency plays in the knowledge-acquiring 
process. Before that, however, notice that what virtue reliabilism and 
COGAweak have in common is their attempt to understand knowledge, or at 
least a necessary aspect of it—recall that COGAweak is not supposed to be a 
sufficient condition on knowledge—in terms of credit attributions. This is so 
because in trying to accommodate the ability intuition on knowledge, both 
views share another common idea: credit is usually attributable in cases of 
success through ability.21        
 Greco (2004) claims that credit attribution involves ascribing action and 
ascribing action involves causal citation of the subject who performed the 
relevant action. Accordingly, any adequate account of intellectual credit 
attribution should—or so I suggest—not only refer to the person’s cognitive 
character, but, also, to the person’s cognitive agency (which acted on the 
person’s cognitive character for getting things right). If this is right, then the 
formulation of COGAweak is clearly advantageous in comparison to virtue 
reliabilism, since the former condition, in contrast to the latter, explicitly 
demands that one’s true belief be creditable to one’s cognitive agency and not 
merely to one’s cognitive character. It may be objected, however, that this 
should not be more than a merely presentational concern.  
 This worry brings me to the second point I want to make concerning 
the explanatory merits of COGAweak. Recall that in addition to one’s 
organismic cognitive abilities of the brain/CNS, a person’s cognitive character 
                                                
21 A subtle difference between the two proposals, however, is that while Greco presents 
knowledge as true belief which is ‘of credit’, Pritchard insists on thinking about knowledge 
merely as ‘creditable’ true belief. These two notions are not the same. “For example, one’s 
cognitive success could be creditable to one’s cognitive agency without being at all of credit 
to one (perhaps the cognitive success is the result of an inquiry that one ought not to be 
pursuing, because, say, there are epistemically more desirable inquiries that one should be 
focusing instead” (Pritchard forthcoming, en. 26). While this distinction is not important to the 
present discussion, it is of great significance with respect to the debate on the value of 
knowledge. If, as Greco claims, knowledge is true belief, which is ‘of credit’, this is because 
knowledge is an achievement. Since achievements are finally valuable, knowledge turns out 
to be finally valuable, as well. Considering, however, cases such as the one mentioned above, 
or mundane instances of knowledge such as perceptual beliefs, Pritchard claims that 
knowledge is not always an achievement and so not finally valuable either. For further 
discussion on this issue, see (Pritchard 2010a, §2.4). 
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may also consist of “acquired skills of perception and acquired methods of 
inquiry, including those involving highly specialized training or even 
advanced technology” (Greco 1999, 287). The reason for this move is that 
virtue reliabilism needs to also account for advanced cases of knowledge in 
which one’s believing the truth is the product of the operation of epistemic 
artifacts such as telescopes, microscopes, and so on. In the traditional 
conception, however, cognition takes place strictly within an agent’s head and 
so artifacts cannot be parts of one’s cognitive character.   
 One way to sidestep this problem for virtue reliabilism could be to 
claim that, in such cases, it is merely the agent’s training and skill of using the 
artifact, as mirrored in the agent’s neural/bodily architecture, that is the most 
salient factor in the causal explanation of acquiring the cognitive success. 
Notice, however, that when an agent employs an epistemic tool, his true 
belief arises as the product of the interaction between his internal processes 
and the artifact. What this means is that the agent’s cognitive process that 
allows him to detect the truth is not merely ‘aided’ or ‘assisted’ by the artifact, 
but, is, instead, constituted by it, as it arises out of his ongoing engagement 
with the artifact. It thereby appears that it will be impossible to disentangle 
the agent’s training and skill of using the artifact from his actual engagement 
with it, in a causal explanation of how the agent acquired his true belief.22 
 But even if such decomposition were possible, notice in addition that 
the part of the process that allows the cognitive agent to detect the truth, or in 
other words to be sensitive to the facts, is the external component. To make 
this point clear, consider, on one hand, an untrained agent in possession of a 
properly working artifact. In that case it is obvious that even though the agent 
will initially be unable to form any (true or false) beliefs, eventually—
provided that he gains sufficient experience—not only will he form beliefs, 
but he will also reliably enjoy cognitive success. On the other hand, think 
about a well-trained agent, but in possession of a faulty artifact. In this case, 
despite the agent’s excellent internal skills, it is evident that he would be 
unable to reach any (non-lucky) true beliefs, no matter how much he tried. It, 
therefore, seems that, in such cases, the only significant factor that explains 
                                                
22 Provisionally this point may seem ambiguous but it will hopefully become clearer in the 
discussion of chapter 2 where I explore the consequences of the phenomenon of continuous 
reciprocal causation between the organismic agent and her epistemic artifact. 
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the agent’s cognitive success is the epistemic artifact.23 In other words, since 
the epistemic artifact is the only significant part of the integrated belief-
forming process that produces one’s true believing, the virtue reliabilist must 
account for it being part of one’s cognitive system. Given, however, that 
cognition is normally supposed to take place within the agent’s head, Greco 
has no principled way to show why such artifacts may count as proper parts 
of one’s cognitive character. Therefore, there seems to be a worrying tension 
between the ability intuition on knowledge and such a broad understanding 
of the notion of one’s cognitive character.   
 According to COGAweak, however, so long as one forms true beliefs on 
the basis of some process in such a way that believing the truth can be 
significantly creditable to one’s cognitive agency, then one may be said to 
know the target proposition. Since COGAweak is a formulation of the ability 
intuition on knowledge, what this means is that so long as one’s true belief is 
significantly creditable to one’s cognitive agency, then the process by which 
one came to form one’s belief can be said to have been appropriately 
integrated within one’s cognitive character, and thereby count as a bona fide 
cognitive ability.24 Therefore, in contrast to virtue reliabilism, COGAweak with 
its appeal to one’s cognitive agency offers a principled way to account for the 
acquisition of knowledge on the basis of epistemic artifacts, while retaining 
the ability intuition on knowledge.      
 Consequently, we see that far from being merely a presentational point 
of consideration, the inclusion of the notion of one’s cognitive agency in the 
formulation of COGAweak does a great deal of explanatory work. That is, apart 
from directing our knowledge attributions to the primarily responsible 
element of the knowledge-forming process—and not just to the subject’s 
cognitive character—COGAweak can also create some important logical space 
for explaining how cognitive agents may come to gain knowledge on the 
                                                
23 This is not to claim that one’s internal processes are not a significant factor in how one 
forms one’s beliefs. The only significant factor, however, in how one believes the truth of the 
matter is the artifact. 
24 Pritchard makes this point in (2010b, 137; en. 7). Although this might generally be a good 
way to start judging whether a process can count as a bona fide cognitive ability, notice that 
Pritchard uses the terms ‘cognitive agency’ and ‘cognitive character’ interchangeably thereby 
running the risk of rendering his criterion circular or at least unsafe. As I argue in section 3.3, 
where I discuss several thought experiments, Pritchard has indeed been led astray by his 
criterion with respect to one version of the Temp case. Therefore, we are in need of an 
alternative way to judge whether an external process has been appropriately integrated within 
one’s cognitive character. I offer such an alternative, which is nevertheless in the spirit of 
Pritchard’s suggestion, in section 3.2.  
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basis of processes which lie outside their heads but which, nevertheless, may 
be proper parts of their cognitive characters. 
1.5) Conclusion         
In this chapter we focused on the motivation for a theory of knowledge that 
accommodates the recognition of the contingent reliability of our evidence. 
Process reliabilism initially seemed to fit the bill, but we soon realized that a 
plausible account of knowledge must also ensure the correct direction of fit 
between one’s beliefs and the facts, as well as deny that strange and fleeting 
processes can give rise to knowledge. Accordingly, process reliabilism, we 
claimed, must be enriched with the ability intuition on knowledge (i.e., 
knowledge must be the product of cognitive ability), thus giving rise to virtue 
reliabilism. The latter proposal, however, turned out to be a both too strong 
and weak account of knowledge on the basis of several counterexamples. 
This, eventually, led us to the embracement of COGAweak.   
 Furthermore, apart from accommodating our intuitions with respect to 
the thought experiments that trouble virtue reliabilism, COGAweak can also 
create some important logical space for explaining how we may come to 
acquire knowledge on the basis of epistemic artifacts, which lie outside our 
heads, but which may nevertheless count as parts of our cognitive characters.  
Considering, however, artifacts as part’s of one’s cognitive character such that 
their employment can count as a bona fide cognitive ability is a rather radical 
claim, which had better not been left unsupported.  
 Accordingly, there remains to see whether there are available any 
independent resources for properly conceptualizing the use of artifacts in a 
way that is continuous to our understanding of organismic cognitive 
abilities.25 And should there be such an account, what does it take for those 
artifacts to be appropriately integrated within (i.e., be proper parts of) one’s 
overall cognitive character, other than our intuitions on the degree of 
creditability of one’s cognitive success to one’s cognitive agency? Moreover, 
the notions of one’s ‘cognitive character’, ‘cognitive agency’ and ‘reliable 
belief-forming processes’ (i.e., cognitive abilities), which are all central to the 
                                                
25 That is, even though we might be epistemologically motivated to accept the employment of 
artifacts as bona fide cognitive abilities, such a claim would be very weak in the absence of any 
metaphysical support.   
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formulation of COGAweak, have only been vaguely discussed.   
 The following chapter will try to set the framework that will allow us 
to disambiguate all the above points. For this reason we will concentrate on 
contemporary philosophy of mind and, in particular, on the Hypothesis of 




    
 










    




















Most probably, the only way to argue for the inclusion of artifacts within 
one’s cognitive character is through the consideration of the hypothesis of the 
extended cognition (HEC). According to HEC, “the actual local operations 
that realize certain forms of human cognizing include inextricable tangles of 
feedback, feedforward and feed-around loops: loops that promiscuously 
criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world” (Clark 2007, sec. 1).  
 HEC is a form of active externalism, which should be distinguished 
from meaning (or passive) externalism as presented in the writings of Putnam 
(1975) and Burge (1986). Active externalism, which is different from the 
aforementioned traditional forms of externalism in that it concerns the aspects 
of the environment that drive one’s cognitive loops in an ongoing way has 
been defended by many philosophers and appears in the literature with as 
many names as the number of its proponents: the extended mind (Clark and 
Chalmers 1998), environmentalism (Rowlands 1999), locational externalism 
(Wilson 2000; 2004), cognitive integration (Menary 2007) and so on. However, 
for reasons of simplicity and theoretical affinity to the epistemological 
framework of virtue reliabilism—as it will be explored in the chapter to 
follow—I will here discuss active externalism only on the basis of the 
terminology and argumentative lines that appear in Clark and Chalmers’ 
initial proposal (1998).  
 To start with, consider first the well-known arcade game Tetris. In 
order to decide where the falling pieces (two-dimensional geometric shapes) 
will best fit in changing ‘sockets’ at the bottom of the screen, the player has 
two options: either (a) perform in his imagination a mental rotation or (b) use 
an onscreen button that causes the falling piece to rotate. Imagine, however, a 
third case (c): in the future, the agent is equipped with a neural implant, 
which can perform the rotation operation as fast as the rotation button in case 
(b). 
 Let us now see what the relation between these cases is. Clark and 
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Chalmers claim that the third case of the neural implant seems to be on a par 
with case (a). Moreover, the second case of the rotation button manifests the 
same computational structure as case (c) despite the fact that it is distributed 
across the agent and the onscreen button.26 Therefore, if one treats case (c) as 
cognitive—since it is on a par with case (a)—there is no principled way to 
deny that case (b), where the process of decision by rotation is distributed 
across the player and the computer, is cognitive as well. For if one points to 
the skin and skull boundary, she will beg the question as this is exactly what 
is at issue here. 
 With this thought experiment in mind, Clark and Chalmers propose 
(1998, 8) the following principle as a way to challenge our intuitions on the 




If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, 
were it go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of 




The essence of the parity principle is this: whether a process should count as a 
cognitive one must not depend on spatial considerations (i.e., whether it lies 
beyond one’s skin) but, instead, on whether it plays ‘the right kind’ of active 
role in driving one’s overall cognitive loops.27  
Moreover, according to HEC, when parts of the environment become 
properly coupled to an agent’s brain, they can be considered as constitutive 
parts of the overall cognitive mechanism—viz., cognition potentially extends 
to the world surrounding the agent. Put another way, “in these cases, the 
human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction 
creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own 
right” (Clark & Chalmers 1998, 8). Clark has also termed this two-way 
interaction as ‘continuous reciprocal causation’ (CRC): “CRC occurs when 
                                                
26  That is, instead of being wholly realized within the player’s head.  
27 Where ‘the right kind’ of role is to be determined by a commonsense functionalist 
understanding of the relevant cognitive task. In the Tetris case, for example, the cognitive 
task is the ‘decision where to place the falling piece by rotating it’, and the claim is that since 
the interaction between the agent, the onscreen button and the visual perception of the 
rotating piece plays the same functional role in deciding where to place the falling piece as 
‘mental’/imaginary rotation does, then the externally delegated version of the process should 
count as cognitive as well.  
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some system S is both continuously affecting and simultaneously being 
affected by activity in some other system O” (Clark 2008, 24). In such cases, 
according to Dynamical Systems Theory, in order to model the temporal 
evolution of the two systems S and O, one must further postulate a coupled 
system E consisting of both S and O. So the claim is that, in cases of extended 
cognition, one’s internal cognitive capacities are combined (i.e., mutually 
interact) with some environmental element O to form an extended cognitive 
whole, E, whose behavioral competence will drop if one removes the external 
component, just as it would drop if one removed part of its brain.  
 Consider, for example, the use of pen and paper when trying to solve a 
complex, say, a three-digit multiplication problem such as 987 times 789. It is 
true that few, if any, of us can solve this problem by looking at or 
contemplating on it. We may only perform the multiplication by using pen 
and paper to externalize the very problem in symbols. Then, we can serially 
proceed to its solution by performing simpler multiplications starting with 9 
times 7. In this way, the pen and paper compensate for our limited working 
memories allowing us to perform a task that is otherwise infeasible. If one 
should try to describe how a regular human mind may perform such a 
cognitive task then, apart from the states and properties of a typical human 
brain, one should also factor in both the normative aspects of the 
notational/representational system involved, and the properties and ongoing 
states of the mediums with which the manipulation of the representations 
was performed.28         
 Or, think about the role of language when writing a philosophy paper. 
According to Clark, language too is “an external epistemic artifact designed to 
complement, rather than recapitulate or transfigure, the basic processing 
profile we share with other animals” (1998, 169). As I write down this essay, 
 
I am continually creating, putting aside, and re-organizing chunks of text. I 
have a file, which contains all kinds of hints and fragments, stored up over a 
long period of time, which may be germane to the discussion. I have source 
texts and papers full of notes and annotations. As I (literally, physically) 
move these things about, interacting first with one, then another, making new 
notes, annotations and plans, so the intellectual shape of the chapter grows 
and solidifies. It is a shape which does not spring fully developed from inner 
cogitations. Instead, it is the product of a sustained and iterated sequence of 
                                                
28 For the importance of the normative aspects of the external representational systems in 
explaining cognition see (Menary 2007).  
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interactions between my brain and a variety of external props (Clark 1998, 
173). 
 
The moral, Clark claims, is that public language and text play more than just a 
preserving-and-communicating-ideas role:  
Instead, these external resources make available concepts, strategies and 
learning trajectories which are simply not available to individual un-
augmented brains. Much of the true power of language lies in its 
underappreciated capacity to re-shape the computational spaces which 
confront intelligent agents (Clark 1998, 173).29 30 
 
To return, now, to the discussion of the core tenets of HEC, let us take a 
look at a further example that Clark and Chalmers (1998) use in order to 
argue for the more provocative Extended Mind Thesis from the existence of 
extended mental states.31 First, think about a normal case of a belief stored in 
biological memory. Inga learns about an interesting exhibition in MOMA. She 
thinks, recalls that the museum is on 53rd street and starts walking to the 
museum.  Now take a look at Otto who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease; as a 
consequence, Otto has to rely on information in the environment to help 
structure his life and, thus, carries a thick, well-organized notebook 
everywhere he goes; when he learns new information he writes it down, 
when he needs some old information he looks it up. Otto hears about the 
                                                
29 For a discussion on Clark’s view regarding language see (Wheeler, 2004). For a 
straightforward criticism, see (Rupert, 2010). 
30 Moreover, if one allows for such an understanding of public language and text, then 
important conceptual space is created so as to lengthen the list of epistemic artifacts in 
interesting ways. For, as Robert Logan (2003, 275) claims,  “speech, writing, math, science and 
computing form an evolutionary chain of languages. Each of these activities can be 
considered as a separate language because each allows us to think differently, create new 
ideas and develop new forms of expression. Another consideration is that each of these five 
forms of language possesses its own unique semantics and syntax and hence qualifies as a 
language in itself according to criteria set by classical linguistics”. While much more remain 
to be said on this matter, concentrating on the case of scientific theories, it is interesting that 
philosophers of science such as Imre Lakatos write: “[scientists] use our most successful theories 
as extensions of our senses” (Lakatos 1970, 107, emphasis in the original). Given the appropriate 
theorizing, however, this may turn out to be more than just a metaphor. That is, it could be 
the case that scientific theories, like public language and text, are software epistemic artifacts 
that extend one’s cognitive abilities beyond one’s natural cognitive capacities. I will return to 
this claim in section 3.4.   
31 Given that cognitive processes are mental processes, HEC can also lead to the extended 
mind thesis. I here say, however, that the latter is more provocative, because its motivation in 
the literature relies on extended mental states, such as beliefs. The existence of extended 
mental states, however, is a claim that is admittedly more counterintuitive and much less 
easier to motivate than the claim that there are extended cognitive processes.   
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same exhibition and decides to go see it. He opens the notebook, finds the 
address of the museum and starts heading towards 53rd street.  
 Clark and Chalmers claim that Otto walked to 53rd street because he 
wanted to go to MOMA and believed that MOMA was on 53rd street. What is 
more, if one wants to say that Inga had her belief before she consulted her 
memory, then one could also claim that Otto believed that the museum was 
on 53rd street even before looking up the address in his notebook. This is 
because the two cases are functionally on a par;32 “the notebook plays for Otto 
the same role that memory plays for Inga; the information in the notebook 
functions just like the information [stored in Inga’s biological memory] 
constituting an ordinary non-occurent belief; it just happens that this 
information lies beyond the skin” (1998, 13).    
 Although the postulation of extended mental states is not necessary for 
making the case for HEC, thereby allowing us to bypass the admittedly long 
debate that Otto has generated, the discussion of this example is helpful as it 
has produced some very important intuitions on what is required for an 
external artifact to count as a putative part of one’s overall cognitive 
economy. In particular, investigating the case in more detail, Clark (2010a) 
notes that the availability and portability of the resource of information might 
be crucial. Accordingly, he offers the following set of additional criteria to be 
met by non-biological candidates for inclusion into an individual’s cognitive 
system (2010a, 46)33: 
1) “That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked”. 
2)“That any information thus retrieved be more-or-less automatically 
endorsed. It should not usually be subject to critical scrutiny. […] It should be 
deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological 
memory”. 
3)“That information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as 
and when required”.         
 
These criteria have also come to be known in the literature as the ‘glue and 
trust’ criteria and they are primarily meant to ensure the effect of ‘transparent 
                                                
32 That is, they are ‘functionally on a par’ as explained in fn. 27. 
33 This paper was first published in The Extended Mind, (2010), Menary (ed.) Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, MIT press, but it has been available online since 2006. The ‘glue and trust’ 
criteria, however, had already made their appearance in (Clark and Chalmers 1998), although 
the phrasing was somewhat different. 
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equipment’: “equipment (like the carpenter’s hammer) with which we are so 
familiar and fluent that we do not think about it in use, but rather rely on it to 
mediate our encounters with a still-wider world” (Clark 2006, 106). Put 
another way, an external element is part of one’s ongoing cognitive loops 
when it is not part of the problem space but is instead one of the mediums 
manipulated in order to complete the cognitive task at hand.   
2.2) Objections 
It is true that in its relatively short history HEC has faced an impressive 
number of objections. In this section, the discussion will focus on some 
specific objections which, even though have not been deemed particularly 
worrying, will help us familiarize with the view. This will allow us, in the 
next section, to address two distinctively important, yet interrelated 
objections—namely the ‘coupling-constitution’ fallacy and the ‘cognitive 
bloat’ worry—whose discussion, as it will gradually become apparent, is 
closely connected to the aim of delineating the hard core of HEC. Proceeding 
in this way will also help us to distinguish HEC from a superficially similar, 
yet fundamentally different view, that of the hypothesis of embedded 
cognition.          
 Let us, then, start by considering a worry that Clark and Chalmers 
themselves raise against the Otto case (1998): Despite the functional 
equilibrium between Otto’s notebook and Inga’s biological memory in 
driving their behavior, and despite the satisfaction of the ‘glue and trust’ 
criteria by both processes of information retrieval, Clark and Chalmers note 
that an obvious objection would be to say that all Otto actually believes is that 
the address is in his notebook, and then describe his actions in two steps: In 
the 1st step Otto initially believes that the address is in the notebook, which 
leads him to the 2nd step of consulting his notebook and, eventually, to form 
a new belief about the specific address. 
In spite of the initial plausibility of this description, Clark and 
Chalmers argue (1998) that this is not the right way to go. To see why, they 
propose, one should treat Inga in the same way: Inga believes that the address 
is stored in her biological memory, she thinks, consults her memory and 
finally forms a new belief about the actual address. But, this way of 
explaining Inga’s behavior adds unnecessary complexity, because “Inga relies 
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on no beliefs about her memory as such. She just uses it transparently as it 
were” (Clark 2010a, 46). The same, though, goes for Otto who, having 
satisfied the ‘glue and trust’ criteria, is so used to using the notebook that he 
accesses it automatically. Recall that the satisfaction of these criteria is meant 
to ensure that the notebook is transparent equipment for Otto just as 
biological memory is for Inga. In any case, it adds needless and 
psychologically unreal complexity to introduce additional beliefs about the 
components of one’s cognitive system. 
 Next, consider the objection from consciousness (Clark & Chalmers 
1998, 10). It has been claimed that we should identify the cognitive with the 
conscious. Consequently, given that it seems implausible to extend 
consciousness beyond the head, what is external to the organism turns out not 
to be conscious and, therefore, not cognitive either. To this, however, Clark 
and Chalmers reply that not every cognitive process is a conscious one. On 
the contrary, it is a commonplace that many cognitive processes such as 
memory retrieval, linguistic processes and skill acquisition, to name a few, fall 
well out the borders of consciousness. So, alone by the speculation that 
consciousness may be necessarily internal does not follow that what is 
cognitive must be internal too.        
 A similar worry raised by Keith Butler (1998) concerns cognitive 
control. It is beyond doubt, the objection goes, that the locus of computational 
and cognitive control rests inside the agent’s head. Therefore, if cognitive 
control is an essential feature of the mind, then contributing external 
processes can be safely excluded from it. Clark, however, responds that this is 
a false worry and the best way to see why is to readdress the problem to the 
inner realm; should we not count as part of one’s mind any neural 
subsystems that are not the final arbiters of action and choice? “Suppose only 
my frontal lobes have the final say—does that shrink the real mind to just the 
frontal lobes!? What if, as Dennett suspects, no neural subsystem has always 
and everywhere the ‘final say? Has the mind and self simply disappeared?”(Clark 
2006, 111) But, even if there is some particular inner locus of ultimate choice, 
we should not identify that with the cognitive agent’s mind. My long-term 
memory is no more an ultimate arbiter of choice than is Otto’s notebook. 
Should I deny my long-term memory as being partially constitutive of my 
mind? The answer seems to be clearly negative as it would “divorce my 
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identity as an agent from the whole body of memories and dispositional 
beliefs that guide and shape my behaviors”, shrinking the mind and self 
beyond recognition (Clark 2010a, 56). It seems that cognitive control cannot be 
the mark of the mind.  
Another common objection concerns Otto’s perceptive rather than 
introspective route for recalling information. Whereas a normal subject would 
introspect in order to remember some information, Otto uses vision in order 
to read the address written in his notebook. Given the fact that the results are 
obtained in so fundamentally different ways, the explanation of the two cases 
should not be the same. Clark (2010a, 56), however, answers back that 
whether the recall of information should count as perceptual or introspective 
depends on how one treats the overall case. From the point of view of the 
extended cognition, Otto and his notebook count as a single unified system and 
the flow of information is internal to that system. Notice, then, that if 
introspection is used to describe the internal flow of information within a 
cognitive system, this seems to be clearly satisfied by the coupled system of 
Otto and his notebook, no matter that vision, instead of one’s inner eye, is 
involved. If, on the contrary, one argued that the meaning of introspection is 
to look into one’s own head one would, again, beg the question.  
 So finally, let us consider a kind of worry pertaining to the 
dissimilarity between the inner and the outer contributions to the cognitive 
system. Traditional-minded cognitive theorists point to the fact that inner 
cognitive processes differ so much from the external ones proposed by the 
HEC theorist that we should not treat them in the same way. Terry Dartnall, 
for instance, has raised the objection34 that Otto’s notebook cannot count as a 
form of long-term external memory as it significantly differs from the active 
nature of biological memory; memory is not a kind of static store of 
information awaiting retrieval and use. Imagine, Dartnall argues, that you 
had a chip in your head that gave you access to a treatise in nuclear physics. 
Could you say that you know about nuclear physics? The answer seems to be 
negative, because sterile text cannot support cognition; text based storage is 
so unlike biological memory. 
 And in a similar vein, Robert Rupert (2004) argues that Otto’s way of 
recalling information is essentially different to biological memory to such an 
                                                
34 In personal communication with Clark. 
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extent that the two information-retrieving mechanisms cannot be both treated 
as mental processes. Indicatively, Rupert notes, retrieving information from 
the notebook does not seem likely to exhibit the ‘negative transfer’ and/or the 
‘generation’ effects which are typically manifested in the process of recalling 
information from biological memory.35        
 Now, with respect to Dartnall’s worry, Clark happily accepts the active 
nature of biological memory, but his claim is not that the notebook on its own 
would constitute any kind of cognitive system. “It would not but in this 
respect it is no worse off than a single neuron or neural population” (2010a, 
53). Based on the parity principle, the claim was that so long as Otto’s 
employment of the notebook functions in a similar way in driving his 
behavior as a normal subject’s employment of his/her biological memory 
does, the two processes of information storage and retrieval should be equally 
treated.36 Granted, the information stored in the notebook may not affect the 
rest of Otto’s ongoing subconscious parallel cognitive processes in the same 
way that biological memory does. Think, for example, about “the ongoing 
underground reorganizations, interpolations, and creative mergers that 
characterize much of biological memory (Clark 2010a, 54). (Still, however, 
given that we should now consider as the unit of analysis the coupled system 
of Otto and his notebook, then practical aspects of the two units’ interaction 
may give rise to similar—though of course not identical—effects. And, mutatis 
mutandis, the same could be claimed about the ‘negative transfer’ and 
‘generation’ effects). Even if, however, the extended system does not have the 
same (or similar) effects as those its biological counterpart would have to the 
rest of Otto’s mind, “when called upon, its immediate contributions to Otto’s 
behavior still fit the profile of a stored belief” (Clark 2010a, 54).   
In other words, the parity principle is not an irrational demand for 
identity between essentially different processes. “Parity is not about the outer 
performing just like the (human-specific) inner” (Clark 2008, 114); it is a way 
to intuitively judge what may belong to the process of cognition rather than, 
say, digestion by not being distracted by the boundaries of skin and skull. In 
                                                
35 ‘Negative transfer’ is a particular form of interference effect, which appears when past 
learning detrimentally effects the subjects’ capacity to learn and remember new associations. 
The ‘generation’ effect on the other hand is a mnemonic advantage of subjects who generate 
their own meaningful connections between pieces of materials learned. For more details see 
(Rupert 2004). 
36 See fn. 27 again. 
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this way, we also safeguard ourselves from possibly denying cognition to 
intelligent aliens whose brains may not be exactly the same as ours. It is a way 
to avoid the highly chauvinistic thought that what should count as cognitive 
should bear a fine-grained sameness of processing and storage with the 
human brain. Similarly then, with respect to Rupert’s version of the 
dissimilarity objection, Clark writes:  “just because some alien neural system 
failed to match our own in various ways (perhaps they fail to exhibit the 
“generation effect” during recall […]) we should not thereby be forced to count 
the action of such systems as noncognitive” (Clark 2008, 114-5).    
 To bring this brief overview to an end, then, the above discussion 
suggests there is no easy or straightforward way to refute HEC. Instead, 
opponents of HEC must submerge below the surface of ordinary intuitions 
regarding the domain of the mental—as this is exactly what is called into 
question—into questions which are closely related to the nature of the mind. 
The exposition of these questions is the aim of the following section where I 
discuss a series of interrelated objections that reach—and thereby allow us to 
clearly delineate—the hardcore of HEC.37   
 
2.3) ‘Cognitive Bloat’, the ‘Coupling-Constitution’ Fallacy, HEMC, and 
Dynamical Systems Theory 
 
2.3.1) ‘Cognitive Bloat’, the ‘Coupling-Constitution’ Fallacy, and 
HEMC 
 
Let us now focus on a sequence of interrelated objections that appears to be a 
                                                
37 I nowhere explicitly address questions inspired from the field of philosophy of science. 
Specifically, I do not discuss whether there could be a science of the extended mind in 
general, or scientific kinds of extended (aka hybrid) mental states in particular (see (Clark 
1998; 2007; 2008, 2010a; 2010b), (Rupert 2004; 2009), (Adams and Aizawa 2001; 2008; 2010), 
(Menary 2006; 2007)). The reason is twofold. First, it seems that said objections are neither 
relevant to the broader epistemological project I want to argue about, nor will they promote a 
better understanding of HEC. Second, these objections seem to rest on significantly outdated 
methodological grounds such as conservatism (see Rupert 2009). Cognitive science, far from 
having produced a mature paradigm, cannot really dictate the direction of future research. 
But even if there was a mature research programme available, conservatism is not a well-
advised attitude since, as prominent philosophers of science—such as Lakatos (1970)—have 
observed, when rival alternative research programmes make their appearance, it is necessary 
to allow sufficient time in order for auxiliary hypotheses and accompanying research and 
experimental techniques to develop, before start judging whether they are progressive or 
degenerating. And as it should be clear, HEC is a nascent research programme whose 
advantages, if any, are yet to be disclosed.  
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particularly worrying one since it starts by challenging the necessary 
conditions for HEC and ends up by questioning the very metaphysical core of 
the view. 
 Recall the three ‘glue and trust’ criteria that an external part of the 
world must satisfy so as to count as a genuine part of one’s cognitive 
economy: (i) its employment must be typical and reliably available, (ii) any 
information retrieved on its basis must be more-or-less automatically 
endorsed, and (iii) the information in the resource should be easily accessible 
as and when required. The problems for the HEC theorist begin with the 
observation that these criteria may be far too easily satisfied and, therefore, 
they are not enough to ensure that some external element can count as part of 
one’s cognitive system.38 
 For example, Rupert (2004, 401-5) argues that when a person has access 
to a phonebook, or a directory service through the use of her cellular phone 
she can be said to satisfy the criteria that Clark has set forth. Clearly, however, 
it would be highly counterintuitive to conclude that the phonebook, or the 
directory service is part of that person’s overall cognitive system allowing her 
to have non-occurent true beliefs about the phone numbers of everyone 
whose number is listed.         
 In other words, if any external element that both satisfies the ‘glue and 
trust’ criteria and causally affects one’s cognitive processes is to count as part 
of one’s cognitive system, we are going to be led to a ‘cognitive bloat’ (Clark 
2001, Rowlands 2009) whereby cognition will seem like leaking all the way 
out in implausibly many directions. We will be led to an “unacceptable 
proliferation of systems (many of them extremely short lived)” (Rupert 2004, 
396), such that we will loose our grip on the persisting and distinct cognitive 
agents that are meant to be our objects of study.   
 Notice, moreover, that this would be the outcome of committing the 
‘coupling-constitution’ fallacy that Adams and Aizawa have pointed out. The 
objection is that proponents of HEC often put forward their view by arguing 
                                                
38 In (Clark & Chalmers 1998, 17) the authors consider a further criterion: “Fourth, the 
information in the notebook has been consciously endorsed at some point in the past, and 
indeed is there as a consequence of this endorsement”. As the authors further note, however, 
“the status of the fourth feature as a criterion for belief is arguable (perhaps one can acquire 
beliefs through subliminal perception, or through memory tampering?)”, so they 
subsequently drop the said criterion.  
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that since an external process (e.g., the directory service) causally affects a 
cognitive process (e.g., the search for a phone number), then the external 
process is a genuine part of the overall cognitive process. But this, Adams and 
Aizawa note, is fallacious: “it simply does not follow from the fact that 
process X is in some way causally connected to a cognitive process that X is 
thereby part of that cognitive process” (2008, 91).39  
 Accordingly, instead of arguing for the constitutive contribution of the 
external artifacts to one’s overall cognitive economy, one should simply 
endorse the much less provocative idea that cognition is many times dependent 
on external elements. Consequently, one should better opt for a less radical 
position which has come to be known as the Hypothesis of Embedded 
Cognition (HEMC) (Rupert 2004, 393). 
HEMC: Cognitive processes depend very heavily, in hitherto unexpected 
ways, on organismically external props and devices and on the structure of 
the external environment in which cognition takes place. 
 
This hypothesis is close to HEC as it acknowledges the dependence of 
cognition on its environment. It is, however, a much more conservative view 
because it denies that environmental aspects are proper parts of cognition; 
external factors may only serve as tools and props to cognition, which is 
restricted within the organismic brain or, at most, the organismic body as a 
whole. Thus, according to HEMC, cognition is organism-bound, potentially 
aided by environmental factors, but not extended to them. In other words, 
HEMC denies that cognitive mechanisms are external, but it also denies that a 
mechanistic explanation of how psychological processes work should be a 
purely internal story. “An advocate of HEMC may claim that cognitive 
mechanisms are internal, but that the mechanistic explanation of how they 
work is a complex story involving both internal activity and environmental 
resources” (Sprevak 2010, 356).       
 More precisely, it has been argued that since both accounts are 
                                                
39 Call this the simple version of the fallacy. Adams and Aizawa have also identified a second 
version of it, which unfolds in two steps: “The first is to move from the observation of some 
sort of causal connection to the claim that the brain, body and relevant parts of the world 
form a cognitive system. The second step is a tacit shift from the hypothesis that something 
constitutes a system to the hypothesis that is an instance of extended cognition” (Adams & 
Aizawa 2008, 92). This, however, is again fallacious: “It simply does not follow from the fact 
that one has identified an X system in terms of a causal process of type X that that process 
pervades every component of the system” (ibid., 125).  
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concerned with the way agents interact with their environments, both views 
will produce the same causal explanations with respect to cases where agents 
employ artifacts. But, if this is true, then HEMC allegedly wins the day on the 
basis of conservatism and simplicity: “If two theories embrace structurally 
equivalent explanations (with or without the same labels), but one of those 
theories simply tacks on commitment to an additional kind of enitity [e.g., 
extended cognitive processes, or extended cognitive systems], of no causal 
significance, then the relative simplicity comparison is straightforward 
(Rupert 2009, 18).40        
 Should we then abandon HEC on the face of MEMC, or are there 
reasons for not giving up so easily? Could there be a principled way to 
individuate systems in general, and cognitive systems in particular, such that 
we can avoid the ‘coupling-constitution’ fallacy and the related ‘cognitive 
bloat’ worry? Moreover, is it true that HEC and HEMC can provide the same 
mechanistic explanations and that the only difference between the two is that 
the former unnecessarily postulates the existence of extended cognitive 
systems? To answer, we must first focus on dynamical systems theory.  
 Before moving on, however, let me explain why dynamical systems 
theory might be relevant here. First, it is the best available tool for modeling 
and understanding systems that continuously and mutually interact with 
their environment—which is exactly what extended cognitive systems are 
supposed to be.  Second, within cognitive science, there has lately been an 
increasing tendency to conceptualize cognitive systems, in general, as 
dynamical systems that are environmentally (and socially) embedded, and, 
thereby, best explained using the tools of dynamical systems theory. Take, for 
example, work in evolutionary robotics (Harvey, Husbands, and Cliff 1994; 
Husbands, Harvey, and Cliff, 1995; Harvey et al., 1997; Di Paolo 2003; 
Wheeler 2005), or the work of Lee (2006) who has provided a generic 
dynamical model that can explain equally well a diverse range of skillful 
activities such as wing retraction by diving gannets, landing pigeons and 
humming birds, humans hitting balls, somersaulting, long jumping, putting 
in golf, and steering. And apart from the modeling of such skillful activities, 
to which one may nevertheless deny the status of being really cognitive, 
                                                
40 Mark Sprevak (2010), however, argues that such a straightforward comparison is, actually, 
not possible.  
 48 
dynamical systems theory has also being invoked in order to do significant 
work on the understanding of unquestionably cognitive phenomena such as 
language use, decision-making, and social coordination (see, for example, 
Schmidt, Carello, and Turvey 1990; Busemeyer and Townsend 1995; Roe, 
Busemeyer, and Townsend 2001; Busemeyer, Townsend, and Stout 2002; Port 
2003; Richardson, Marsh, and Schmidt 2005; Oullier et al. 2005; van Orden, 
Holden, and Turvey 2005; Dale and Spivey 2006; Spivey and Dale 2006; 
Marsh et al. 2006; Turvey and Moreno 2006; Richardson, Dale, and Kirkham 
2007; Richardson et al. 2007; Stephen et al. 2007; McKinstry, Dale and Spivey 
2008). And finally, we need not suppose that dynamical systems theory is or 
will only be relevant to the modeling of cognitive tasks that involve the 
interaction of the agent with his environment. As recent work by Bressler and 
Kelso (2001), Thompson and Varela (2001), Varela et al. (2001), Bressler (2002), 
and Kelso and Engstrøm (2006) demonstrates, dynamical system models 
work both in brain-only explanations and in brain–body–environment ones.  
So, having offered this brief note on the scope of dynamical systems theory 
within cognitive science and how it might be related to our present 
considerations, let us turn to the theory itself. 
2.3.2) Dynamical Systems Theory 
One of the primary activities of several scientific disciplines, such as physics, 
chemistry, biology and the social sciences as well, is the study of systems. 
Systems are sets of interdependent elements, objects, entities, or items 
standing in interrelations, on the basis of specific processes they take part in 
and give rise to, thus forming a unified whole. Of course, an element, object, 
entity, or item can be part of several systems at the same time, depending on 
the kind of processes it engages in. Thus, whether some object counts as a 
component of a system always depends on the phenomenon under study 
and, more in particular, on the processes that are thought to give rise to the 
relevant phenomenon.        
 Similarly, van Gelder writes that “a (concrete) state-dependent system 
is a set of features, or aspects of the world which change over time 
interdependently, that is, in such a way that the nature of the change in any 
member of the system at any given time depends on the state of the members 
of the system at that time” (1995, 363). Van Gelder further explains that for 
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any two (or more) identical in all relevant physical detail concrete systems 
(take for example two grand-father clocks) there will be a common abstract 
structure in their behavior, whose general properties can be studied 
independently of any particular mechanical device. This is a mathematical 
structure and is called an abstract state-dependent system. Whereas concrete 
systems belong to the real world, abstract systems exist only in the timeless 
and changeless realm of pure mathematical form. Abstract state-dependent 
systems, however, can be realized by particular parts of the real, physical 
world. “An abstract system is realized by some part of the world when we 
can systematically classify its states (for example, by measurement) such that 
the sequences of states the concrete system undergoes is found to replicate the 
sequences specified by the abstract model” (van Gelder 1995, 364).   
 Now, when scientists study systems, they often provide models. In 
general, a model is just another system whose behavior is already better 
understood—or for some (usually practical) reason, it is more open to 
exploration—and which is supposed to be similar in relevant respects to the 
target system. Moreover,  
if a model is sufficiently good, then we suppose that it somehow captures the 
nature of the explanatory target. What does this mean? Well, if the model is 
an abstract state-dependent system, then we suppose that the target system 
realizes the abstract system, or one relevantly like it. If the model is a concrete 
system, then we suppose that the model and the target system are systems of 
the same kind, in the sense that they both realize the same abstract system (or 
relevantly similar systems) (Van Gelder 1995, 364-365). 
 
Now, as far as the scientific study of systems is concerned, on one hand, we 
have dynamical modeling, which is the part of applied mathematics that is 
concerned with understanding natural phenomena by providing abstract 
dynamical models for them. Dynamical Systems Theory (DST), on the other 
hand, is a branch of theoretical mathematics, which is concerned with the 
properties of abstract dynamical models. The general strategy of DST is to 
conceptualize systems geometrically, in terms of positions, distances, regions 
and trajectories within the space of a system’s possible states. DST is thus 
primarily concerned with the geometrical properties of the flow of the system, 
which is the entire range of the possible trajectories of an abstract dynamical 
system. Let us engage with some of the technical terms involved in DST in 
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order to get a bit clearer.        
 In general, every dynamical system is characterized by a set of state 
variables x and a dynamical law L, which regulates the change of those state 
variables across time. The set of all possible values of state variables is called the 
system’s state space. And, if the dynamical law, L, depends only on the values of 
the state variables and the values of some set of fixed parameters u, then the 
system is called autonomous. This will be the first of three kinds of systems 
that we will be here concerned with.       
 Moreover, the dynamical law, L, of a continuous-time dynamical system 
is a set of differential equations x’=L(x, u) and defines a vector field on the state 
space (here we can imagine the state space as a 2-dimensional plane, which 
depicts in dots all the possible states the system can be in, and the vector field 
as arrows on this plane, indicating the next state the system will be in, given  
any one of its previous states).41 Further, starting from some initial state x0 the 
law L generates a sequence of states, which is called the trajectory of the 
system. The trajectory is related to the vector field in that its tangent at each 
point is equal to the value of the vector field at that point (that is, the arrows 
that represent the vector field on the state space, determine the direction of the 
trajectory of the system). The set of all trajectories through every point in the 
state space is called the flow and, as previously mentioned, DST is primarily 
interested in the geometrical structure of the entire flow of the system; i.e., the 
geometrical, or topological properties of all the possible behaviors the system 
might exhibit across time.        
 Here are some important behaviors that a system may exhibit. 
Sometimes, a system can converge to limit sets, which are the sets of points 
that are unaffected by the dynamical law, L, in that if the state of a dynamical 
system enters in a limit set, the dynamical law will keep it there indefinitely. Of 
particular interest are the stable limit sets, also called attractors. Attractors have 
the interesting property that they gravitate trajectories passing through all 
nearby states; if a system’s state is disturbed away from the attractor to a 
sufficiently small extent, then the dynamical law will bring the state back to the 
attractor. Accordingly, the set of initial states that converge to a given attractor 
                                                
41 There are also discrete time systems whose evolution, unlike continuous-time systems, 
does not unfold continuously across time, but, instead in discrete steps. The dynamical law of 
such systems is simply a map from current state to next state. I will here focus only on 
continuous-time dynamical systems.  
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is called its basin of attraction. The portions of the trajectories that are found 
within a basin of attraction, but which do not lie in the attractor itself are termed 
transients. The reason why attractors are important is because they govern the 
long-term behavior of a physical system. Regardless its initial state, a physical 
dynamical system will always settle near an attractor after transients have 
passed. In contrast, repellors are limit sets, which are unstable in that some 
nearby trajectories diverge from them; if the state of the system is moved even 
slightly away from the repellors, then the dynamical law will carry it away. 
 In general, the state space of dynamical systems contains multiple 
repellors and attractors (each surrounded by its own basin of attraction), which 
determine the trajectories the system may take. In other words, those basins of 
attraction constitute the different phases the system can enter into, and their 
graphical representation is called the phase portrait of the system.   
 Now, so far, we have been keeping the parameters u of the dynamical 
law, L, constant and have been concerned with the general features of the 
resulting flow (i.e., the set of all possible sequences of states (i.e., trajectories) 
the system may exhibit) only as state variables change. Since, however, the 
dynamical law (x’=L(x, u)) is also a function of u, changes in u will definitely 
bring changes to the resulting flow. Even though most dynamical systems are 
structurally stable in that most parameter settings will produce small changes in 
the flow,42 dynamical systems can become structurally unstable, such that very 
small changes in parameter values can produce substantial changes in the flow, 
bringing about phase portraits which are qualitatively different from the initial 
one.43 These qualitative changes in the system’s flow are called bifurcations.  
 Changing, therefore, the parameters of a system can bring about both 
quantitative and qualitative changes. What has been said so far, however, 
concerns autonomous dynamical systems, i.e., systems whose parameters are 
held constant for the duration of any particular trajectory. Allowing, however, 
parameters to change across time as the trajectory unfolds, gives rise to a 
second type of systems, viz., nonautonomous systems. Nonautonomous 
dynamical systems are systems in which one or more parameters are allowed 
to vary in time: x’=L(x(t), u(t)). And since “the flow is a function of the 
                                                
42 “Limit sets and basins of attraction may deform and move around a bit, but the new flow 
will be qualitatively similar (i.e., topologically equivalent, or homeomorphic) to the old one” 
(Beer 1995, 180). 
43 For example, new attractors may appear and old ones may disappear.  
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parameters, in a nonautonomous dynamical system, the system state is 
governed by a flow which is changing in time (perhaps drastically if the 
parameter values cross bifurcation points in parameter space) (Beer 1995, 
180).44            
 Now, in general, when the parameters u remain constant they either 
refer to one of the internal features of the system that may be manipulated 
(but which remains fixed during the system’s operation), or to the 
background conditions the system operates in. When the parameters change 
over time, however, we can think of them as inputs to the system.   
 Of particular interest is to see what happens when these changing 
inputs do not just originate from the system’s dynamical environment, but 
from another system with which the system under study mutually interacts. 
This mutual interaction gives rise to the third and last type of system we will 
be here concerned with, namely coupled systems. Typical examples of such 
systems include two mutually interconnected pendulums, the watt governor 
and a rotation engine, and, possibly, cognitive agents employing epistemic 
artifacts.          
 Following Beer (1995), I will here present the case by focusing on an 
agent and some specific aspect of its environment; i.e., the two 
nonautonomous dynamical systems whose dynamical law is A and E, 
respectively. We will also assume that A and E are continuous-time 
dynamical systems: xA’= A(xA, uA) and xE’= E(xE, uE). Now, to say that A and E 
engage into a constant mutual interaction is to say that the two systems are 
coupled nonautonomous dynamical systems. More specifically, two 
(nonautonomous) systems are coupled when the parameters of each system 
function as some of the state variables of the other, and vice versa. 45  
                                                
44 A parameter space is the set of all the values of the parameters encountered in a particular 
mathematical model. 
45Important note: In the example Beer offers in his paper, the environmental aspect E actually 
refers to the agent’s body, which can be seen as a non-autonomous system that can be 
coupled to another non-autonomous system (in Beer’s example, the agent’s neural network). 
Several authors who have been inspired by Beer’s understanding of autonomous agents, 
however, take E to either refer to some ambient feature of the environment (e.g., light), or to 
some particular object of perception like a tree. The problem, however, is that ambient 
features of the environment cannot be treated as systems in their own right, and even though 
objects of perception like trees can be treated as systems in their own right, as far as the agent 
is concerned, they are autonomous systems. Therefore, neither ambient features of the 
environment nor objects of perception can be seen as non-autonomous systems that can be 
coupled to some non-autonomous agent. This is an important note, because by not paying 
attention to the fact that coupled systems can only consist of mutually interacting non-autonomous 
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 Furthermore, we can represent this mutual interaction as a function S 
from the environmental aspect’s state variables to the agent’s parameters—such 
that it captures all the ways in which the environmental aspect under 
consideration can affect the agent—and a function M from the agent’s state 
variables to the environmental aspect’s parameters—such that it includes all the 
possible ways in which the agent may have an effect on the particular aspect 
of the environment. Thus S(xE) represents the effects of the environmental 
aspect on the agent and M(xA) represents the effects of the agent on the 
environmental aspect.  We thus have the following dynamical laws: 
XA’ = A (xA, S(xE), uA*) 
XE’ = E (xE, M(xA), uE*) 
Where uA* and uE* simply represent any parameters of A and E, respectively, 
which are not affected by the coupling.  
 Now, echoing Beer (182):  
I cannot overemphasize the fundamental role that feedback plays in this 
relationship. Any action that an agent takes affects its environment in some 
way through M, which in turn affects the agent itself through the feedback it 
receives from its environment via S. Likewise, the environment’s effects on an 
agent through S are fed back through M to in turn affect the environment 
itself. Thus, each of the two dynamical systems is continuously deforming the 
flow of the other (perhaps drastically if any coupling parameters cross 
bifurcation points in the receiving system’s parameter space) and therefore 
influencing its subsequent trajectory. […] It is therefore perhaps most 
accurate to view an agent and its environment as mutual sources of 
perturbation, with each system continuously influencing the other’s potential 
for subsequent interaction.  
 
Accordingly, given 1) this kind of reciprocal direct dependence between A 
and E, and 2) the definition of systems as sets of interdependent elements 
standing in interrelations on the basis of specific processes they participate in 
and give rise to, we can view the two coupled nonautonomous systems A and E 
as a unified autonomous dynamical system U…  
whose state variables are the union of the state variables of A and E and 
whose dynamical laws are given by all the interrelations (including S and M) 
                                                                                                                                      
systems, we will first have a wrong understanding of what a coupled system is supposed to 
be, which will, in turn, lead to wrong and unsurprisingly counterintuitive conclusions.  
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among this larger set of state variables and their derivatives. […] Any 
trajectories observed in the interaction between the nonautonomous 
dynamical systems A and E must be trajectories of the larger autonomous 
dynamical system U. Furthermore, after transients have died out, the 
observed patterns of interactions between A and E must represent an 
attractor of U (Beer 1995, 183). 
 
 We thus see that the coupling of nonautonomous dynamical systems into 
one autonomous unified system can give rise to a richer behavior than the 
behavior any individual subsystem could produce on its own, and some of 
the geometrical properties of the flow of the larger system will not be 
attributable to either subsystem alone. “Therefore, an agent’s behavior 
properly resides only in the dynamics of the coupled system U and not in the 
individual dynamics of either E or A alone” (ibid., 183).    
 What this means is that this mutual interaction gives rise to new 
systemic properties that do not belong to any of the subsystems, but to the 
ongoing process of interaction which is internal only to the overall coupled 
system. We also noted that system individuation does not depend on any 
physical boundaries, but, instead, on the processes one is interested in, and 
which emerge out of component interactions. So, taking these two last points 
together provides us with a first reason to think that the (ontological) 
postulation of coupled systems is far from redundant.46 We can call this the 
‘systemic properties’ argument for the existence of coupled systems. 
 There is, however, yet another reason for which the postulation of 
coupled systems appears to be necessary, and which concerns the nature of the 
components’ interaction involved in such systems. Let me try to spell this out. 
As noted before, the law of nonautonomous systems is a function both of the 
systems’ state variables x, and its parameters u: x’ = L (x(t), u(t)). That is, the 
overall behavior of the system (i.e., the flow of the system) depends on the 
changing aspects of the system (i.e., the system’s state variables) and its 
parameters. As far as the parameters are concerned, we noted that when they 
remain constant for the duration of the system’s operation they refer either to 
                                                
46 Another way to put the same point could be to claim that postulating a single coupled 
system in such cases brings explanatory value. That is, the postulation of coupled systems is 
necessary with respect to the explanation of certain systemic properties, which, otherwise, we 
would be at a loss how to account for. Coupled systems, therefore, are not open to the 
common eliminativist line that Xs do not exist because our best explanations are not 
committed to the existence of Xs, i.e., that positing Xs does no explanatory work. Thanks to 
Mark Sprevak for pointing out to me this alternative phrasing.   
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some of the system’s internal features (e.g., the material it is made of), or to 
the stable background conditions the system operates in. When parameters 
change over time, however, we can think of them as inputs to the system. 
Accordingly, when we have two causally (but not mutually) dependent 
systems the input refers to the effects of the affecting system47 on the affected 
system. The output, on the other hand, refers to the affected system’s reaction 
(i.e., the system’s behavior) to its input, but which, by hypothesis (remember 
there is only one-way dependence), has no substantial direct effects on the 
affecting system’s dynamics. Thus, it will only be represented by quantitative 
differences in one, or more of the affected system’s state variables. 
 Notice, however, that in cases of nonautonomous coupled systems, where 
some of the parameters of each system function as state variables of the other 
and vice versa, talk of inputs and outputs is not well advised. Indicatively, 
notice how in the previously quoted passage Beer diligently avoids such talk 
when he describes a coupled system:  
I cannot overemphasize the fundamental role that feedback plays in this 
relationship. Any action that an agent takes affects its environment in some 
way through M, which is turn affects the agent itself through the feedback it 
receives from its environment via S. Likewise, the environment’s effects on an 
agent through S are fed back through M to in turn affect the environment 
itself. 
 
 Apart from Beer’s avoidance of such a talk, however, the above quote also 
suggests why coupled systems cannot be described in terms of inputs and 
outputs. The reason is that the effects of the environment on the agent are 
partly defined by the agent’s ongoing activity at that time, and vice versa. It is, 
thus, impossible to deconstruct the ongoing causal effects in terms of distinct 
inputs and outputs from the one system to the other.48 The feedback loops 
                                                
47 The affecting system might be another well-defined system, or the environment in general.  
48 Notice, here, that it is very important to resist the temptation to visualize the case in terms 
of two components A and E, whereby at time t0, A is in state x0, which makes E, at time t1, 
enter state x1, which in turn makes A, at time t2, enter state x2, and so on.  If this linear story 
were correct, then we would indeed be able to identify state x0 as output of A and input to E, 
and state x1 as output of E and input to A, and so on. The differential equations, however, 
describing continuous time dynamical systems refer to infinitesimal differences (hence the 
name differential equations) in time, and so, theoretically, t0 = t1. Therefore, since x0 and x1 are 
supposed to occur at the same time, there is, again, no way in which they could be 
conceptualized in terms of inputs and outputs from A to E, and vice versa. More precisely, 
system A’s subsequent state x2 depends both on system E’s state x1 and its own state x0 (which 
affects system E’s state x1) at time t0 = t1, and so on. 
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between the two systems give rise to a dense, non-linear interaction, which is 
in fact internal to a larger system comprising of both the agent and the 
relevant environmental aspect, and which cannot be broken down in terms of 
distinct inputs and outputs from each subsystem to the other.   
 Put another way, we might say that in cases where two nonautonomous 
systems mutually interact on the basis of ongoing feedback loops, there is an 
ongoing causal amalgam between the two units that disallows their 
decomposition into two separate systems on the basis of distinct inputs and 
outputs. The reason is that the effects on each component are not exogenous to 
the component itself and so cannot be properly thought of as inputs to the 
component. Likewise, the way each component affects the other is directly 
related to the component to be affected and so cannot be properly 
conceptualized as output from the affecting to the affected component. So, 
again, since we cannot properly disentangle the interactivity of the two 
components in terms of distinct inputs and outputs from the one to the other, 
we must accept they constitute an overall system comprising of both of them. 
We can call this the ‘ongoing feedback loops’ argument for the (ontological) 
postulation of coupled systems.        
 So, to close this section, we now have two distinct arguments for the 
postulation of coupled systems. First, the properties of the interaction of 
coupled systems as studied by DST cannot be attributed to any of the 
contributing systems alone, but must instead be attributed to the overall 
coupled system. Accordingly, we must postulate the coupled system. Second, 
in cases of ongoing feedback loops between coupled systems, there is a very 
dense causal interdependence that disallows us to disentangle them in terms 
of distinct inputs and outputs from the one system to the other (the reason 
being that the effects of each component to the other are not entirely 
endogenous to the affecting component itself, and vice versa). Accordingly, 
we cannot but postulate the coupled system. Overall, then, we might say that 
the constituents of a system are the interdependent components, which, on the 
basis of feedback loops, give rise to the processes one is interested in, and 
which attracted the observer’s attention to the relevant components in the 
first place. Before closing this section, however, let me also note how we can 
distinguish the overall system from other environmental aspects that may 
nevertheless affect the system’s performance but not constitutively so. For 
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example, sunlight, the ambient temperature, or pressure might affect a 
system’s temporal evolution. However, so long as the system, on its part, has 
no (measurable) direct effect on those environmental aspects such that they 
will not, in turn, affect back the system’s performance, they can be safely 
considered as background conditions or inputs with a causal, but not 
constitutive effect on the system under consideration. Such causal effects will, 
thus, only be represented in the system’s dynamical law as its (changing, or 
constant) parameters u.49 
3.3) Feedback Loops and Cognitive Extension 
The discussion of HEC was paused on the interrelated objections of the 
‘coupling-constitution’ fallacy and the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry. That is, if we 
take the ‘glue and trust’ criteria to be both necessary and sufficient for 
cognitive extension then we are led to ‘cognitive bloat’, the reason being that 
the satisfaction of the said criteria cannot ensure that we have not committed 
the ‘coupling-constitution’ fallacy. In other words, unless we have a 
principled way on the basis of which we can decide whether external (to an 
agent’s brain, or organism) components are related to a cognitive process in a 
merely causal as opposed to constitutive way, ‘cognitive bloat’ will ensue. 
Moreover, since 1) no principled account that could draw such a distinction is 
in sight, and 2) HEMC is a rival hypothesis well suited to provide the same 
mechanistic explanation as HEC, without making the extra claim that 
whatever is causally related to a cognitive process is also part of it, thereby 
avoiding the ‘coupling-constitution’ fallacy and the concomitant ‘cognitive 
bloat’ worry, we should follow HEMC theorists in retaining the term 
cognitive for the neural, or at most the organismic processes, while fully 
recognizing the deep ways in which cognition is affected by extraorganismic 
factors; HEMC is supposed to recognize all kinds of cognitive embeddedness, 
while avoiding the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry. Cognitive scientists, should, 
therefore, give up HEC on the face of HEMC.     
                                                
49 This apparently generates a problem for the constant parameters that refer to the system’s 
inherent features. Shouldn’t the inherent features of a system count as constitutive of the 
system? Notice, however, that these parameters take their values from the realization basis of 
the system (i.e., what it is made of). Thus, saying that those parameters of the system are not 
constitutive of it, really gives rise to the notion of multiple realizability and reveals what are 
the essential aspects of the system: i.e., the relational properties of the components that arise 
out of the components’ interactions. (This also indicates that parameter spaces can provide 
information for more specific ‘multiple realizability’ claims.) 
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 Premise 1) of the previous reasoning, however, now seems 
questionable. The previous considerations on system individuation provided 
us with strong support for claiming that when two systems are mutually 
interdependent on the basis of ongoing feedback loops, then the interactive 
processes—and their properties—those systems give rise to are internal, and 
thus belong to, an overall coupled system consisting of both subsystems. In 
other words, ongoing mutual interdependence on the basis of feedback loops 
is the criterion by which we can judge whether two seemingly distinct 
systems constitute an overall system, consisting of both of them. Conversely, 
when no such mutual interaction is in play, but instead a system affects 
another in a one-way dependence, i.e., the activity of the affected system has 
no ongoing direct effect on the affecting system—such that no feedback loops 
are exhibited—then we have a paradigmatic case of a merely causal—as 
opposed to constitutive—dependence.       
 So, how is this supposed to help with respect to the ‘cognitive bloat’ 
worry? Recall the directory service case again. Even though the agent satisfies 
the 3 ‘glue and trust’ criteria, no feedback loops between him and the 
directory service are in play. The person employing those resources does not 
engage in CRC with them. Those resources are simply causally, as opposed to 
constitutively, related to the agent in that they deliver her information whose 
formulation was entirely independent of her. That is, there is no two-way 
causal interaction between the agent and the epistemic artifact. If an account 
were to be provided for this case, then it would have to be a linear one, 
probably in testimonial terms.      
 Furthermore, using the ongoing mutual interaction on the basis of 
feedback loops as a criterion of constitution50 is very much in line with what 
                                                
50 Notice that since we have said that systems are individuated on the basis of the processes 
they give rise to, such that systems may extend in virtue of interactive processes that extend 
beyond the boundaries of their components, it is not clear which of the two versions of the 
‘coupling-constitution’ fallacy that Adams and Aizawa point to we would commit, in the 
absence of the ‘ongoing feedback loops’ criterion of constitution. However, to demonstrate 
the force of the said criterion, here is how it rules with respect to the two typical examples 
that Adams and Aizawa use in order to illustrate the two versions of the fallacy.  
 Simple version: “Consider the expansion of a bimetallic strip in a thermostat. This 
process is causally linked to the motion of atoms of the air in the room the thermostat is in. 
The expansion of the strip does not, thereby, become a process that extends into the atoms of 
the air in the room” (2008, 91). Agreed, but the reason is that the bimetallic strip has no direct 
effects on the air molecules such that it will in turn affect itself. Of course, Adams and Aizawa 
could further point out that as time goes by the expansion of the bimetallic strip will turn the 
heating component off and will thus, in turn, indirectly affect the motion of atoms of the air 
in the room. Notice, however, that this is not the kind of differential interaction that the 
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has been previously said about HEC.  Remember that as we noted earlier it is 
only when the phenomenon of continuous reciprocal causation (CRC) 
between the internal and external elements is manifested that we can safely 
talk about extended cognition.51 As Clark suggests (2007, sec. 7) “when we 
confront a recognizably cognitive process, running in some agent, that creates 
outputs (speech, gesture, expressive movements, written words) that recycled 
as inputs drive the process along”, these inputs should count as constitutive 
parts of the overall cognitive process.52 In other words, we should think of 
extra-organismic parts as constitutive to the overall cognition-generating 
mechanism when they “emerge as interacting parts of a distributed cognitive 
engine participating in cognitively potent self-stimulating loops, whose 
activity is as much an aspect of out thinking as its result” (Clark 2007, sec. 7).   
And the reason, as it was demonstrated in the previous section, is that in such 
cases, the outer and the inner contributions come together in a highly 
                                                                                                                                      
arguments of the previous section from DST are referring to. More precisely, the temperature 
of the room will only appear as one of the changing parameters, u, in the thermostat’s 
dynamical law, as it is a nonautonomous system.      
 The Systems version: “The Liquid FreonTM in an older model air conditioning system 
evaporates in the system’s evaporation coil. The evaporator coil, however, is causally linked 
to such things as a compressor, expansion valve, and air conditioning ductwork. Yet the 
evaporation does not extend beyond the bounds of the FreonTM. So a process may actively 
interact with its environment, but this does not mean that it extends to its environment” (ibid. 
91). Again, agreed; the evaporation process does not extend to the rest of the system. But the 
whole process of conditioning the air is an overall process whose realization very much 
depends on the interaction between the evaporation coil and the rest of the components of the 
air conditioning system. Surely, no one would like to identify the air conditioning system 
with the evaporation coil. To provide a more charitable reading of Adams and Aizawa’s 
objection, what they seem to suggest is that the essential process of cooling the air in the whole 
process of air conditioning does not pervade all aspects of the air conditioning system. In the 
first place, however, it seems quite suspicious to claim that the evaporation coil is performing 
the only essential process in air conditioning. Second, in order to draw the parallel between 
air conditioning and cognitive systems, as Adams and Aizawa wish to do, they need to find 
the analogy of the ‘cooling component’ in the case of cognition, such that cognition is 
restricted within the agent’s brain (assuming that the relevant component, or processes can 
only be found, at least for the time being, within organismic brains). In the absence of such a 
plausible ‘mark of the cognitive’, however, when Adams and Aizawa run this version of the 
‘coupling-constitution’ fallacy against the HEC theorist, they either beg the question, or the 
ball is in their side of the court to convincingly argue for such a ‘mark of the cognitive’. See 
also fn. 54.       
51 Notice that as the following quote suggests , Clark treats CRC only as a sufficient condition 
on cognitive extension. For the reasons, however, that are being explored in this section, I 
wish to accentuate its importance by treating it as a necessary condition on cognitive 
extension.  
52 I must note, here, that given the ‘ongoing feedback loops’ argument for the ontological 
postulation of coupled systems (section 3.2) this phrase—literally interpreted—is actually 
incorrect. That is, properly speaking, when CRC is manifested, one of the points is that there 
are no distinct inputs and outputs between the interacting systems. Clark probably uses this 
wording only as a metaphor to indicate the feedback loops generated by the CRC 
phenomenon. I admit, however, that it is a good way to visualize CRC so I, too, will keep 
using this phrasing to mean the CRC phenomenon, but, when I do, it must only be 
interpreted loosely.   
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complex, probably non-linear, two-way dependence. In such cases, DST treats 
the two components as a coupled system in its own right because “the equation 
describing the evolution of each component contains a term that factors in the 
other system’s current state (technically, the state variables of the first system 
are also parameters of the second, and vice versa)” (Clark 2008, 24).53 Using, 
thus, the ‘feedback loops’ criterion to draw systemic boundaries, provides—
along with the glue and trust criteria—an objective way for locating cognition 
without being distracted by the arbitrary boundaries of skin and skull. 
 So, echoing Hurley (2010), whether external elements might be proper 
parts of one’s cognitive system should not be a metaphysical debate on the 
nature of the mind, but rather a matter of successful scientific explanation. 
The internalist should not judge from a pre-scientific and metaphysical 
standpoint, without independent arguments, whether cognition may be 
constitutively dependent on external elements, or not, because this is exactly 
what is at issue here. “To avoid thus begging the question, we should not 
operate with prior assumptions about where to place the causal-constitutive 
boundary, but wait on the results of explanation” (Hurley 2010, 106).54 
                                                
53 For more details see (Van Gelder 1995, 355-8, 373).  
54 Adams and Aizawa (2001; 2008, 2010) claim that the mark of the cognitive is the 
manipulation of representations with underived content, which is plausibly (at least for the 
time being) not a feature of any external process, and they thus avoid begging the question 
against externalism when they put forward the ‘coupling-constitution’ fallacy.  
It is not clear, however, what Adams and Aizawa have in mind and how the said 
criterion is supposed to promote internalism. One complication is that there is no commonly 
accepted and non-problematic theory of underived/intrinsic/original content. Second, as 
Menary (2006) points out, the way Adams and Aizawa make use of the idea that the mark of 
the cognitive is the manipulation of representations with underived content is either too strict 
such that it rules out many of the paradigmatic cases of cognition, or too permissive such that 
it does not disallow cognitive extension.     
Finally, after a lot of argumentation, Adams and Aizawa (2010, 70) write: “Clearly we 
mean that if you have a process that involves no intrinsic content, then the condition rules 
that the process is non-cognitive”. Focusing, however, on the extended cognitive processes 
which emerge out of the continuous reciprocal causation between extra-neural elements and 
the organismic brain would surely guarantee the involvement—courtesy of the latter 
component—of manipulations of representations with underived content, were such entities 
to exist.  
For more details on the debate on underived content as the mark of the cognitive, see 
(Clark 2008; 2010b), (Menary 2006), (Adams and Aizawa 2001; 2008; 2010), (Ross and 
Ladyman 2010).  
Another significant consideration on this topic is that within the dynamical approach 
to cognition, whether representations exist at all, or what may count as a representation are 
open questions whose answers might be conceptually alien to the classical computationalist 
approach that Adams and Aizawa seem to embrace. Indicatively, van Gelder (1995), Pollack 
(1990), Spivey (2007) and Petitot (1995) have suggested that attractors in the state space of the 
cognitive system are plausible candidates for bearing representational significance. It is, 
therefore, an open question whether attractors that arise from the agent’s interaction with 
some artifact could bear non-derived content, and it is by no means clear why we should pre-
theoretically exclude such a possibility.   
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 In the framework of the continuously and reciprocally interacting 
dynamical systems that motivates HEC, the boundaries are not “exogenous to 
explanatory aims. In cognitive applications, the state space can extend to 
include dimensions whose variables are bodily and environmental as well as 
neural, as brain, body and environment interact in mutually shaping 
patterns” (Hurley 2010, 130). Thus, only time will show whether such 
externalist approaches to cognition will keep being explanatorily helpful. In 
any case, however, “the issues between internalism and externalism should 
be resolved bottom up by such scientific practice, not by advance 
metaphysics” (Hurley 2010, 107). HEMC and HEC will have to compete with 
each other on the scientific field.55      
 Before closing this section, however, let me add to the plausibility of 
the ‘ongoing feedback loops’ criterion as a necessary condition on HEC, by 
drawing attention to two arguments in favor of HEC that have appeared in 
the literature and which, seem to parallel the two arguments that were offered 
in favor of the postulation of coupled systems in the previous section. 
 The first argument has been proposed by Clark who notes that, 
contrary to HEMC, the properties of the extended system are not identical to 
the properties of its parts. As Clark (2008, 116) writes:     
A further reason to resist the easy assimilation of HEC into HEMC concerns 
the nature of the interactions between the internal and the external resources 
themselves. Such interactions, it is important to notice, may be highly 
complex, nested, and non-linear. As a result there may, in some cases, be no 
viable means of understanding the behavior and potential of the extended 
cognitive ensembles by piecemeal decomposition and additive reassembly. 
To understand the integrated operation of the extended thinking system 
created, for example, by combining pen, paper, graphics programs, and a 
trained mathematical brain, it may be quite insufficient to attempt to 
understand and then combine (!) the properties of pens, papers, graphics 
programs, and brains. 
 
                                                
55 For an objection to the claim that scientific practice can resolve this debate see (Sprevak 
2010). In so arguing, Sprevak has in mind that both HEC and HEMC will produce the same 
causal explanations—since they are both interested in the interaction of the agent with the her 
environment—and so scientific explanation will not be able to produce a clear verdict 
regarding the success of HEC over HEMC, or the other way around. My reasons for thinking 
that it can are quite different. Should there be cases where the accomplishment of some 
cognitive task is the product of the mutual interaction between the agent and some artifact, 
then given the DST framework and the concept of coupled systems (as well as the absence of 
a plausible mark of the cognitive) any theorist will have to conclude that there is a coupled 
cognitive system that operates on the basis of extended cognitive processes.     
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Therefore, in many cases, the extra neural elements and the organismic brain 
should not be considered—as HEMC, in effect, only allows—as distinct 
systems whose coupled performance could be linearly analyzed. Instead, the 
only possible way to study their properties will be as one unified system.56 
But, now, moving back to the ‘systemic properties’ argument for the existence 
of coupled systems, notice how it basically conveys the same idea.
 Argument number two comes from Francisco Varela who writes: “If 
one says there is a machine M in which there is a feedback loop through the 
environment, so that the effects of its output effects its input [i.e., M 
reciprocally interacts with some environmental aspect through self-
stimulating loops], one is in fact talking about a larger system M’ which 
includes the environment and the feedback loop in its defining organization” 
((Varela 1979, 158); quoted by (Hurley 1998, 104). The reason is that the effects 
of the environment on M are partly defined by M’s ongoing activity and vice 
versa. Notice again how this is the same reasoning as the ‘ongoing feedback 
loops’ argument for the postulation of coupled systems. 
 Moreover, it may be claimed that these two arguments, both of which 
can be run with respect to abstract systems and concrete cognitive systems, 
should perhaps not be seen as distinct, for they both point towards the same 
underlying idea. When a behavior emerges out of the interaction of two 
components, this behavior can only belong to the overall coupled/extended 
system—as it cannot be broken down in terms of distinct inputs and outputs 
between components—and its properties cannot be understood without 
appealing to the said interaction, which again—quite trivially—depends on 
                                                
56 It has been pointed out to me that the HEMC theorist may be happy to accept that an agent 
might be in a continuous and reciprocal causal relation with some aspect in the environment, 
but still deny cognitive extension. However, this seems not to be an option for the HEMC 
theorist because given the conceptual framework of Dynamic Systems Theory, in such cases, 
HEMC collapses into HEC. In fact, Rupert, in chapter 7 of his book (2009), concedes that 
Dynamical Systems Theory can provide strong support to the hypothesis of extended 
cognition in just the way I have been here describing (Rupert 2009, 131-4). It is telling that 
none of the dynamic models that he considers in favor of HEMC concerns a two-way 
interaction between the organism and some particular environmental aspect. For more details 
see (Rupert 2009, 137-149). For more on HEMC’s failure of aggregativity see Theiner 
(manuscript). Michael Wheeler is one more theorist who has claimed that CRC between brain, 
body, and environment is a powerful indication of extended cognition. More specifically he 
writes (2005, 265): “[W]here the complex channels of continuous reciprocal causation cross 
back and forth over the physical boundaries of skull and skin, the cognitive scientist, 
operating from a functional or organizational perspective, may face not (i) a brain-body-
environment system in which brain, body, and environment form identifiable and isolable 
subsystems, each of which contributes in a nontrivial way to adaptive success, but rather (ii) 
just one big system whose capacity to produce adaptive behavior must be understood in an 
holistic manner”. 
 63 
both subsystems at the same time.       
 Consequently, then, apart from the 3 ‘glue and trust’ criteria, in order 
to account for the constitutive status of external elements within one’s overall 
cognitive mechanism, we also need the phenomenon of continuous reciprocal 
causation (which arises on the basis of ongoing feedback loops) between the 
outer and the inner parts to take place. These 3+1 criteria seem to jointly 
ensure the integration of the external artifacts within one’s overall cognitive 
mechanism, thereby overcoming the ‘coupling-constitution’ fallacy and the 
‘cognitive bloat’ worry. In such cases, the ongoing interaction deeply affects 
the ‘tendencies’, or even causes bifurcations in the agent’s and/or the 
artifact’s phase portrait, thereby giving rise to behavior, which is distinctive of 
the relevant extended process.       
 Finally, as far as the distinction between HEC and HEMC is concerned, 
what the coupling arguments from DST demonstrate is that cognition is 
indeed embedded à la HEMC whenever the environment affects the agent in 
a one-way dependence. However, if and whenever, one’s organismic 
cognitive apparatus interacts with the environment on the basis of ongoing 
feedback loops, then the HEMC theorist must recognize that the mind is not 
only embedded, but also extended à la HEC. 
2.4) Gestures: An Example of Extended Cognition 
Finally, a useful way to illustrate how extended cognition might be realized 
through the satisfaction of the above conditions is the interesting example of 
the active role that bodily gestures play in driving thought and reason.  
 In an extensive attempt to understand the nature of human gesture, the 
psychologist Goldin-Meadow wonders whether gesture simply serves the 
purpose of communicating thoughts, or might it be a part of the actual 
process of thinking (2003)? A list of indicative facts that could suggest 
abandoning the first alternative is the following: we gesture when talking on 
the phone, we do it when talking to ourselves, we do it in the dark, gesturing 
increases with task difficulty, gesture increases when one has to choose 
between options, gesturing increases when reasoning about a problem rather 
than merely describing the problem or a known solution (Clark 2007, sec. 5)
 One could, however, try to explain most of the above hints by holding 
that gesturing without a viewer merely demonstrates our habit to gesture in 
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the rest of the normal communicative cases. But, this line of answer is in 
trouble explaining the additional fact that speakers blind from birth do 
gesture, and they even do so when speaking to people they know to be blind 
too.           
 In order to investigate the impact of restricting gesture from the mix of 
available resources on thought, Goldin-Meadow asked two groups of 
children to memorize a list and then solve a mathematical problem before 
trying to recall the list. One group was allowed to gesture during the 
problem-solving task, whereas the other group was asked not to. The 
outcome was that removing gesture during problem-solving had a 
detrimental effect on the subsequent task of recall. The best explanation, 
according to Goldin-Meadow, is that gesturing shifts or lightens aspects of the 
neural cognitive resources, thus freeing up resources for the memory task. 
 A possible objection to this conclusion, however, is that gesturing does 
not lighten the neural burden carried out by the free-to-gesture group. Rather, 
asking the other group not to gesture could have added load to their neural 
resources, because they had to remember not to gesture. This could equally 
explain why the free-to-gesture group performed better in the recall task. As 
luck would have it, however, some subjects from the free-to-gesture group 
willingly chose not to gesture (thus not having to remember to hold back their 
natural inclination to gesture), which, nevertheless, turned out to have the 
same detrimental effect regarding the recall task as with the non-gesture 
group. This lucky event safeguards the initial explanation from the alternative 
one; gestures themselves seem to play some active cognitive role. 
As Goldin-Meadow writes, “gesture…expands the set of 
representational tools available to speakers and listeners. It can redundantly 
reflect information represented through verbal formats or it can augment that 
information, adding nuances possible only through visual or motor formats” 
((Goldin-Meadow 2003, 186); quoted by (Clark 2007, sec. 5)).  
In other words, verbal thinking continuously informs and alters 
gesture, which continuously informs and alters verbal thinking, i.e., the two 
form a genuinely coupled system. In the case of gesture, therefore, we 
explicitly observe a cognitive process whose realization outstrips the 
boundaries of the neural realm, extending to the biological organism. 
Crucially, however, we need not suppose that this kind of extension is 
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limited to the purely biological organism for, as Clark notes, the case of 
gesture bears a lot of similarities and is closely akin with environmentally 
extended cases such as when one is busy writing and thinking at the same 
time; “it is not always that fully formed thoughts get committed to paper. 
Rather, the paper provides a medium in which, this time via some kind of 
coupled neural-scribbling-reading unfolding, we are enabled to explore ways 




To sum up, the hypothesis of extended cognition is primarily motivated by 
the observation that, in many cases, environmental factors that are external to 
our biological organism and particularly to our neural system have a large 
impact on cognition. The most promising rival theory, namely the hypothesis 
of embedded cognition, seems too weak to explain all the ways in which 
environmental factors may contribute to the cognitive system. The reason is 
that HEMC treats the relation between the outer and the inner contributions 
merely as causal; the intelligent organismic agent consciously chooses to 
offload bits of his ongoing work to the environment and then reload it, 
benefiting from this process that can be linearly analyzed. This description, 
however, does not seem to fit entirely the picture, because the cases which 
HEC is interested in are cases where the agent is actively coupled to some 
extra-neural element. This means that the relation between the outer and the 
inner contributions is interactive in a highly complex non-linear way. And 
this emerging interaction between the organismic and the extra-neural parts is 
constitutive of an overall, extended cognitive system and not merely causal, 
because it not only helps the agent but, literally, drives and constrains her 
own evolving process of thought and reason.  
 Moreover, we noted that the satisfaction of the 3+1 criteria (i.e., the 
three ‘glue and trust’ criteria along with the phenomenon of continuous 
reciprocal causation) seems to safeguard the proponent of HEC from the 
‘coupling-constitution’ fallacy and the ‘cognitive bloat’ worry. We, therefore, 
do not need to worry that if we embrace HEC we will be led to an 
“unacceptable proliferation of systems (many of them extremely short lived)” 
(Rupert 2004, 396), such that we will loose our grip on the persisting and 
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distinct cognitive agents that are meant to be our objects of study. The reason 
for this, as we noted, is that an external element will not count as properly 
integrated within one’s cognitive system unless it is also reciprocally coupled 
to the agent’s organismic cognitive faculties, and this is only rarely the case. 
In other words, in order for an artifact to be a constitutive element of one’s 
ongoing cognitive loops, the agent must deliver on its basis outputs, which 
recycled as inputs will drive his/her cognitive system along. And this does 
not happen every time the environment has an effect on the agent, but only 
when the latter actively engages in a continuous interaction with a specific 
aspect of the former.  
 Furthermore, this realization also demonstrates that HEC clearly 
acknowledges the central role of the persisting biological organism in 
recruiting and maintaining the extended organization in order to eventually 
accomplish its very own cognizing: “Human cognitive processing 
(sometimes) extends to the environment surrounding the organism. But, the 
organism (and within the organism the brain/CNS) remains the core and 
currently the most active element. Cognition is organism centered even when 
it is not organism-bound” (Clark 2007, sec. 9). 
 So, HEC is in no danger of undermining the central role of the 
persisting biological cognitive agent. Instead, what HEC tries to underlie is 
that as soon as the extended organization has been formed, then there is no 
reason to point to the boarders of skin and skull so as to explain the way 
information flows and is processed, because “once such organization is in 
place, it is the flow and transformation in an extended, distributed system 
that provides the actual machinery of ongoing thought and reason” (Clark 
2007, sec. 4).  
 So, having by now seen how cognition may be extended, we should 
now return to the epistemological discussion and particularly to the intuition 
that knowledge must be the product of cognitive ability in order to see how 















Having introduced COGAweak and HEC, I would now like to focus on the 
observation that these two views bear some interesting core similarities, 
which render them mutually supportive and informative. Moreover, 
considering the two frameworks side by side will help us better understand 
the notions of one’s ‘cognitive character’, ‘cognitive agency’ and ‘belief-
forming processes’ which are central to the formulation of COGAweak, but 
which have so far been rather vaguely discussed.     
 I shall first outline some interesting parallels that can be drawn 
between the core concepts and claims of the two views. Once the common 
points of COGAweak and HEC become apparent, we will have gained an 
understanding of the epistemological concepts involved in the former, which 
we shall test against a number of intuitions that spring from several versions 
of two core thought experiments, namely the Temp and the Alvin case. Finally, 
I shall explore a series of extra-organismic knowledge-conducive belief-
forming processes, whose employment may extend our cognitive characters 
beyond our organismic cognitive faculties, including the interesting case of 
scientific theories. Before moving on, however, here is a prefiguration of some 
of the main ideas that I will be later expanding upon.   
 Remember that, according to HEC, “individual cognizing is organism 
centered even if it is not organism-bound” (Clark 2007, sec. 4). That is, our 
cognition may be extended beyond our organismic cognitive faculties of the 
brain/CNS, which, nevertheless, make us the persisting and distinct cognitive 
agents that we are. In so extending her cognition, the agent incorporates to 
her cognitive loops extra-neural environmental elements. These elements, 
though external to her organismic cognitive faculties, form a proper part of 
the agent’s cognitive system as they actively drive her cognition in a highly 
complex and interactive way. In this way, the agent’s cognitive economy can 
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extend beyond her organismic cognitive faculties even though it is centered to 
them; recall that it is the agent’s brain/CNS that is responsible for the 
recruitment of the extra-neural elements.      
 Now, returning to COGAweak, it appears that very similar claims can be 
made on its basis with regards to the cognitive resources of epistemic agents. 
According to COGAweak, an epistemic agent S can come to know the truth of 
some proposition p on the basis of some reliable belief-forming process so 
long as the relevant belief-forming process is appropriately integrated within 
his cognitive character. Interestingly, COGAweak makes no specifications about 
whether the process must be wholly realized within the agent’s organism or 
not; in principle, it allows the epistemic agent to extend his cognitive 
character beyond his cognitive agency by appropriately integrating within the 
former belief-forming processes that are external to the latter (just as HEC 
allows a person S to extend his cognitive system beyond his organismic 
cognitive abilities by incorporating to his cognitive loops extra-bodily 
elements). It thereby seems we have a quite interesting analogue between an 
agent’s potentially extended cognitive system and the epistemological notion 
of one’s cognitive character.      
 Moreover, think about the notion of one’s cognitive agency to which, 
according to COGAweak, the cognitive success must be significantly creditable. 
The underlying reason for this requirement seems to be that if we want to 
attribute knowledge to a specific individual S, this knowledge should have its 
origins, at least to a significant degree, in what makes that individual S a 
distinct and persisting epistemic agent. But, since according to virtue 
reliabilism, knowledge must be the product of cognitive ability in a way that 
respects the ability intuition on knowledge, one might conclude that what 
makes a specific individual S a distinct and persisting epistemic agent 
coincides with what makes S a distinct and persisting cognitive agent, i.e., S’s 
cognitive agency.         
 Note, furthermore, that according to most, if not all, theories of 
cognitionincluding HEC—what makes an individual S a distinct and 
persisting cognitive agent is her cognitive faculties of the brain/CNS.57 
Consequently, one might conclude, the epistemic agent’s cognitive agency is 
made up of her organismic cognitive faculties of the brain/CNS. Is this 
                                                
57 Obviously, I here exclude any dualist alternatives. 
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conclusion helpful? It appears so, because, in accordance to intuition, it also 
explains why when the agent comes to know on the basis of a reliable belief-
forming process which is for the most part extra-organismic, the agent’s 
cognitive success is still significantly creditable to her cognitive agency: it is 
her organismic cognitive faculties of the brain/CNS that are responsible for 
integrating within her cognitive character the partly external belief-forming 
processes that led her to come to know the truth of the target proposition.  
 Briefly then, what the above discussion is meant to foreshadow is the 
fact that two very similar claims can be made on behalf of the two theories 
under consideration. According to HEC, one’s cognitive loops that make up 
one’s cognitive system are centered around one’s organismic cognitive 
faculties of the brain/CNS, but not bound to them as one’s cognitive system 
can extend so as to incorporate extra-neural elements. Similarly, according to 
COGAweak, the epistemic agent’s belief-forming processes that make up her 
cognitive character are centered around her organismic cognitive faculties—
that make up her cognitive agency—but are not bound to them as her 
cognitive character can extend so as to incorporate extra-bodily belief-forming 
processes.  
In other words, straight parallels could be drawn between (i) the 
agent’s cognitive character and the agent’s cognitive system, (ii) the partly 
external belief-forming processes and the extended cognitive loops, and 
finally (iii) the epistemic agent’s cognitive agency and the agent’s organismic 
cognitive faculties, i.e., his brain/CNS, which are responsible for the 
recruitment of the reliable belief-forming processes. Are these mere analogues 
or should we think that they are superficially different terms, which, 
nevertheless, refer to the same notions shared by both COGAweak and HEC? 
 
3.2) COGAweak and the Extended Cognition Hypothesis 
 
In order to answer the above question we should first refresh our memory 
with respect to the criteria that a belief-forming process must meet so as to 
deliver knowledge, according to the broader virtue reliabilistic framework.58
                                                
58 Notice that since COGAweak is only a necessary condition on knowledge, the following 
criteria are supposed to be necessary but not sufficient for knowledge. Remember that 
Pritchard argues that for a full account of knowledge, COGAweak must be supplemented by 
 70 
 In general, the process must be a cognitive ability. In order for this to 
be so, we noted in section 1.3, first, the process must be a cognitive process. 
This will ensure that the direction of fit between the belief and the fact will be 
the correct one. Second, we want the belief-forming process to be reliable, 
where a reliable process is one that tends to produce true rather than false 
beliefs. Recall, however, that according to reliabilism, one does not need one’s 
evidence to be necessarily reliable; if forming a belief on a certain kind of 
evidence constitutes a reliable belief-forming process, it does not matter that 
one’s evidence is only contingently reliable. What this means, according to 
virtue reliabilism, is that the agent, on his part, does not need to know or have 
any beliefs about the reliability of his belief-forming process. It is sufficient 
that he is sensitive to the reliability of his way of forming beliefs simply by it 
being one of the cognitive processes that constitute his cognitive character, 
which he employs when he is thinking conscientiously. But as we further 
noted, in order for a process to be, in principle, part of the agent’s cognitive 
character it must be neither strange nor fleeting. It must not be strange so that 
he won’t reject it when conscientious. And it must be a disposition or a habit 
of the agent, because it is only dispositions or habits that one can become 
aware they are unreliable in certain circumstances, and so—without relying 
on any beliefs about their reliability—be, in principle, able to employ them 
conscientiously in the rest of the circumstances. And, finally, COGAweak 
demands that the process be appropriately integrated within one’s cognitive 
character. This will guarantee both that the relevant belief-forming process is 
a cognitive process, and that it is indeed part of the agent’s cognitive character 
such that he will, in fact, be conscientious in employing it.59 So, putting all the 
above points together: a belief-forming process counts as a cognitive ability such 
that it is knowledge-conducive only if it is a reliable belief-forming disposition 
properly integrated within the agent’s cognitive character. Now, let us recall what 
the three criteria to be met by non-biological candidates for inclusion into an 
individual’s cognitive system are, as offered by Clark (2010a, 46):  
1) “That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked”. That 
                                                                                                                                      
the safety condition. Not everyone agrees with this, however, and this is why I write 
“according to the broader virtue reliabilistic framework”.  
59 If the process is not actually integrated within the agent’s cognitive character, then we may 
suppose that the agent won’t have become aware when it is inappropriate to employ it, and 
so he won’t be conscientious in employing it, even when he does so in the right 
circumstances. 
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is, the agent should habitually and easily invoke the external resource. In 
other words, its employment must be a disposition/habit of the agent’s overall 
cognitive mechanism. 
2)“That any information thus retrieved be more-or-less automatically 
endorsed. It should not usually be subject to critical scrutiny. […] It should be 
deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological 
memory”. That is, the information in the resource must be regarded as reliable, 
and not be necessarily reliable, so long as its employment results into an 
equally trustworthy belief-forming process as the one of forming beliefs on 
the basis of one’s own biological memory.60   
  One might object, however, that being reliable is not the same as being 
trustworthy (i.e., being regarded as reliable).61 In response, notice first that 
Clark identifies the notion of trustworthiness of a process with the idea of 
being “more-or-less automatically endorsed” or, in other words, “not usually 
being subject to critical scrutiny”. What this means is that the target process 
must have not been (for the most part) problematic in the past. Moreover, the 
processes under consideration are supposed to be cognitive 
dispositions/habits of the agent, which he has repeatedly employed in the past, 
and so had they been problematic the agent would have noticed that and 
responded appropriately. Accordingly, a trustworthy belief-forming process, 
in Clark’s account, will be one that tends to produce true rather than false 
beliefs, which is to say that it will be objectively reliable in the virtue 
reliabilist’s sense. What the agent will deem reliable will be what is 
objectively reliable, i.e., that which has not been (for the most part) 
problematic in the past.62 
                                                
60 That is, the process does not need to be, due to underlying logical or quasi-logical relations, 
100% reliable. Notice that memory is supposed to be reliable even though one may 
misremember. 
61 The idea here is that trustworthiness (i.e., being regarded as reliable) might sometimes 
supervene on values other than objective reliability (i.e., the tendency to lead to success rather 
than failure). See the next footnote for a description of just such a case.  
62 To elaborate a bit more on this point, it has been objected to me that in the United States, 
there are many individuals who trust a particular cable TV "news organization", but this 
news organization often provides misleading information. Viewers of this cable TV "news" 
channel trust this medium, but it is not reliable in the epistemologist's sense. So, it may now 
appear that Clark's conditions and the epistemologist's reliability condition come apart. In 
response, let me draw your attention to two points. First, as noted above, Clark’s claim that in 
order for something to be trustworthy it must not usually be subject to critical scrutiny 
implies that the agent would check the object of his trust on the face of discrepancies. In 
contrast, the viewers of the American TV news channel appear that they would not, and this is 
a kind of blind trust that is quite different from the kind of trust Clark has in mind. 
Accordingly, the fact that there might be kinds of trust that have nothing to do with objective 
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  Now, notice this negative way of deeming processes reliable with 
which Clark concurs (i.e., that a trustworthy process is one that is not usually 
subject to critical scrutiny such that it is more-or-less automatically endorsed). 
What this means is that the agent does not need to have any beliefs about why 
or whether the belief-forming process is trustworthy; it suffices that it has not 
repeatedly caught his negative attention in the past. And this seems to be in 
good agreement with Greco’s demand that one’s subjective justification need 
not rely on any beliefs but simply on one’s motivation to believe the truth. For 
example, one may trust one’s vision in appropriate circumstances, just 
because vision has not been notably problematic in the past (in those 
circumstances). It suffices that one is motivated to believe the truth and will 
thereby employ the belief-forming process that has not in the past (generally) 
failed to be conducive towards this end, and, crucially, one will do so without 
even thinking about it. This methodological point, in turn, appears to be in 
line with the spirit of the glue and trust criteria which, after all, are meant to 
ensure the effect of transparent equipment: equipment that we are so fluent 
and familiar with that we have no beliefs about it in use. 
         3) “That information contained in the resource should be easily 
accessible as and when required”. That is, the agent must be able to directly 
and easily access the resource whenever necessary; he must be able to employ 
it as if it was part of his organismic cognitive mechanism. In other words, the 
resource must have been integrated within the agent’s overall cognitive 
mechanism. 
  We thus see that in order for non-biological elements to be included 
into one’s cognitive system, their deployment must meet the same criteria as 
the ones that the belief-forming processes must satisfy so as to count as 
knowledge-conducive (i.e., to be a cognitive ability). We also need, however, 
                                                                                                                                      
reliability should not generate any problems for the identification of Clark’s ‘trustworthiness’ 
condition with the epistemologist’s objective reliability criterion. 
Second, even if on Clark’s account, the American TV “news” channel were to count 
as part of one’s cognitive economy—were it to also satisfy the rest of the criteria for cognitive 
extension—one could note that this is an issue about which epistemology and philosophy of 
mind can, and should exchange normative considerations. That is, even if, when 
philosophizing about what may count as part of an agent’s mind, we do not focus on the 
nature of a good mind, epistemology could point out that a conscientious mind should try to 
believe what is true and thereby employ the resources, which are reliable in the 
epistemologist’s sense. Nevertheless, Clark seems to accommodate this normative dimension 
of the mind through his “not-usually-subject-to-critical-scrutiny” understanding of 
trustworthiness, thus having been in line with the virtue reliabilist tradition in epistemology, 
all along.  
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to make a further remark concerning the appropriate integration of the external 
elements within an agent’s cognitive character.      
  According to Pritchard, as noted in section 1.4.2, one way to test 
whether a belief-forming process is properly integrated within one’s cognitive 
character is to consider whether the cognitive success of believing the truth is 
to a significant degree creditable to the agent’s cognitive agency (Pritchard 
2010b, en. 7). This proposal is based upon the main idea that since COGAweak 
is a formulation of the ability intuition on knowledge, then so long as one’s 
true belief is significantly creditable to one’s cognitive agency, the process by 
which one came to form one’s true belief can be said to have been 
appropriately integrated within the rest of one’s cognitive character, and 
thereby count as a bona fide cognitive ability. Although this might generally be 
a good way to start judging whether a process can count as a bona fide 
cognitive ability, note that there might be cases where the cognitive success 
might be significantly creditable to one’s cognitive agency even if it is not the 
product of one’s cognitive abilities—we shall come across such a 
counterexample in the next section where I discuss several thought 
experiments. It is, therefore, important to find an additional, descriptive 
criterion to account for what it takes for the belief-forming process to be 
appropriately integrated within one’s cognitive character, such that—and in 
accordance to COGAweak—the cognitive success will be significantly creditable 
to one’s cognitive agency. But where can we find such a descriptive criterion?
  As we noted in the previous section, an artifact will not count as 
properly integrated within one’s cognitive system unless it is also reciprocally 
coupled to the agent’s organismic cognitive faculties. That is, in order for an 
artifact to be a constitutive element of one’s ongoing cognitive loops, the 
agent must deliver on its basis outputs which recycled as inputs will drive his 
cognitive character along. Therefore, in order for a belief-forming process to 
be appropriately integrated within one’s cognitive character, the phenomenon 
of continuous reciprocal causation (CRC) must be manifested between the 
target process and one’s organismic cognitive faculties.63   
  The underlying reason for this is that HEC acknowledges the central 
role of the persisting biological organism in recruiting and maintaining the 
                                                
63 Similarly, Greco has noted that “in general, it would seem, cognitive integration is a 
function of cooperation and interaction, or cooperative interaction, with other aspects of the 
cognitive system” (2010, 152). 
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extended organization in order to eventually accomplish its very own 
cognizing: “Human cognitive processing (sometimes) extends to the 
environment surrounding the organism. But the organism (and within the 
organism the brain/CNS) remains the core and currently the most active 
element. Cognition is organism-centered even when it is not organism-
bound” (Clark 2007, sec. 9). Notice, then, that using the phenomenon of CRC 
to judge whether an artifact has been appropriately integrated within one’s 
cognitive character is in line with Pritchard’s suggestion to consider whether 
the cognitive success will eventually be significantly creditable to one’s 
cognitive agency; it is the agent’s organismic cognitive faculties (i.e., the 
brain/CNS) that are first and foremost responsible for the recruitment of the 
external elements on whose basis the agent will deliver outputs which 
recycled as inputs will drive her cognitive character further along, so as to 
eventually form a true belief with respect to some proposition p.  
  We thus see that the glue and trust criteria as well as the CRC 
phenomenon (i.e., the 3+1 criteria) are common currency for both COGAweak 
and HEC, thereby rendering both accounts complementary. Reasonably, then, 
it may also be claimed that there is no principled theoretical bar disallowing 
extended belief-forming processes to count as knowledge-conducive 
cognitive abilities. That is, provided the satisfaction of the 3+1 criteria, one’s 
cognitive character may extend beyond the organismic cognitive abilities that 
make up one’s cognitive agency, by incorporating epistemic artifacts. Put 
differently, given the right conditions, the deployment of epistemic artifacts 
can count as knowledge-conducive cognitive abilities, allowing us to gain 
knowledge on their basis in accordance with the ability intuition on 
knowledge.64 
 
3.3) Case studies 
 
So let us now see how the 3+1 criteria rule with respect to several versions of 
two core thought experiments that Pritchard discusses in (2010b), namely the 
Temp and Alvin case. 
                                                
64 Remember, in section 1.4.2 we noted that as virtue reliabilism is usually formulated, it is in 
trouble explaining how epistemic artifacts can count as proper parts of one’s cognitive 
character. It is only when we embrace Pritchard’s virtue reliabilistic COGAweak that we can 




Temp’s job is to keep a record of the temperature in the room that he is in. He 
does this by consulting a thermometer on the wall. As it happens, this way of 
forming his beliefs about the temperature in the room will always result into 
a true belief. The reason for this, however, is not because the thermometer is 
working properly, since in fact it isn’t—it is fluctuating randomly within a 
given range. Crucially, however, there is someone hidden in the room next to 
the thermostat who, unbeknownst to Temp, makes sure that every time Temp 
consults the thermometer the temperature in the room is adjusted so that it 
corresponds to the reading on the thermometer. 
 
Intuitively and according to COGAweak Temp lacks knowledge of the 
temperature. As Pritchard explains, even though the way in which Temp 
forms his true beliefs is reliable, it in no way reflects his cognitive abilities. 
Therefore, since Temp fails to meet the ability intuition on knowledge, 
COGAweak disallows knowledge to Temp. One may further argue that the 
reason why Temp fails to meet the ability intuition is that the relevant belief-
forming process lies outside his head. Consider, however, Alvin. 
Alvin66  
Alvin has recently developed an unusual brain lesion, a guaranteed side 
effect of which is that it prompts him to randomly, but reliably, form true 
beliefs about the product of fairly complicated arithmetical sums. 
 
Alvin’s belief-forming process is indeed reliable. However, even though it lies 
under Alvin’s skin, Pritchard argues that Alvin lacks knowledge of the 
mathematical propositions. The reason, Pritchard claims, is that as in the 
Temp case, Alvin’s cognitive success has nothing to do with Alvin’s cognitive 
abilities but is rather the “fortunate consequence of the otherwise unfortunate 
fact that he has a brain lesion” (2010b, 136). I agree. One, however, may fairly 
wonder: why think that the way Alvin forms his beliefs is not one of his 
cognitive abilities? After all, it is part of his brain. In response, we could now 
claim that Alvin’s belief-forming process fails to satisfy the first and the 
second ‘glue and trust’ criteria. That is, Alvin’s belief-forming process 1) is not 
                                                
65 (Pritchard 2009, 48) 
66 Pritchard (2010b, 136). The case is adapted from one offered by Plantinga (1993). 
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one of his dispositions (i.e., one of his habitual cognitive routines) and thereby 
2) it cannot have been deemed trustworthy.67  
  Next, Pritchard moves back to the Temp case and asks how would our 
intuitions change if Temp came to know what is the true source of the 
reliability of his belief-forming process and that it is reliable. Pritchard (2010b, 
138) argues that it would make a great difference because in becoming aware 
of the source of the reliability Temp can now take cognitive responsibility for 
this cognitive success. Accordingly, his cognitive success is primarily 
creditable to his cognitive agency and thereby, by Pritchard’s suggestion,68 the 
relevant belief-forming process (including the broken thermometer, the 
thermostat, and the hidden helper) has been appropriately integrated within 
his cognitive character. Temp, therefore, can gain knowledge in this way.  
  At this point, however, the 3+1 criteria and the results of Pritchard’s 
suggestion to regard a belief-forming process as appropriately integrated 
within one’s cognitive character when the cognitive success is significantly 
creditable to one’s cognitive agency come apart. For in the way Temp forms 
his beliefs, no continuous reciprocal causation is being observed between 
Temp and the thermometer on the wall. Instead, the thermometer delivers 
information to Temp in a one-way causalas opposed to constitutive—
dependence.  Notice that I am not saying that Temp cannot gain knowledge 
when he knows the true source of the reliability of his belief-forming process 
and that it is reliable. He can. I am rather saying that this is not a case of 
extended cognition. Instead, a more appropriate epistemic description of this 
case would be in testimonial terms, whereby Temp has positive reasons to 
accept and/or no undefeated defeaters to deny the reading of the 
thermometer.69          
  Next, however, Pritchard (2010b, 138) asks the same question about 
Alvin: what if Alvin comes to know both what the true source of the 
                                                
67 Notice that Alvin’s lesion is not one of the belief-forming processes he would employ were 
he motivated to believe the truth. Or, in other words, forming beliefs on the basis of the brain 
lesion cannot be deemed trustworthy. Alvin cannot automatically endorse the products of 
this process; it is not the case that, from Alvin’s ‘point of view’, the resource is not usually 
subject to critical scrutiny, simply because it is a recently acquired one. 
68 Recall that, according to Pritchard, when some cognitive success is significantly creditable 
to one’s cognitive agency, then the belief-forming process by which the belief was acquired 
can be said to have been appropriately integrated within one’s cognitive character.   
69 Notice, then, that while it is the case that whenever CRC takes place the cognitive success 
will be significantly creditable to one’s cognitive agency, things do not work the other way 
around. 
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reliability of the belief-forming process is and that it is reliable? Pritchard 
claims that now Alvin can gain knowledge. I agree, because in so being aware 
of the facts he can now satisfy the first and second ‘glue and trust’ criteria.70 
Moreover, it would be very implausible to deny CRC in this case. Alvin’s 
lesion is to be found within his brain and so, most likely, the affected area 
interacts very densely with the other parts of his brain in order to produce the 
relevant outputs. Becoming, however, aware of the source of the reliability of 
a belief-forming process is a very strong condition on knowledge and it is 
exactly what externalist approaches such as virtue reliabilism set out to resist. 
Accordingly, Pritchard goes on to further explore whether one’s belief-
forming processes can be integrated within one’s cognitive character in 
weaker ways.   
 According to Pritchard (2010b, 146), one factor that seems to play a 
central role regarding our intuitions on the integration of a belief-forming 
process is whether it has always been present or whether it was added at a 
later juncture. Thus, Pritchard prompts us to imagine Tempo who is fitted 
from birth with a highly reliable device, which records the ambient 
temperature. Moreover, Tempo has grown up in a society where it is 
completely natural for one to consult the temperature-recording device in 
order to form beliefs about the ambient temperature.  
 Pritchard claims that “interestingly, in a case like this it seems entirely 
unnecessary for Tempo to know that this is a reliable belief-forming process 
or what the source of the reliability before he gain knowledge via this 
process” (2010b, 146). I think this is correct. Forming beliefs in this way is a 
disposition for Tempo and, plausibly, there is CRC involved. Having always 
been fitted with the device Tempo has a practical understanding of how his 
actions will affect his temperature beliefs and vice versa. For instance, he has 
a practical understanding that when he goes closer to a heater or the fireplace 
the quick silver is supposed to rise and that when he moves away it will drop. 
Or, that if the temperature changes while he is sitting still then some warm 
object must be near by, or a window has been opened.71 The temperature-
                                                
70 That is, in being aware of the facts, Alvin has surely deemed his belief-forming process 
reliable and, as time goes by, it can start being one of his dispositions.   
71 Put another way, Tempo has acquired knowledge of the sensorimotor contingencies that 
accompany his continuous interaction with the device. For a full account of how sensorimotor 
knowledge is constitutive of perception see (Noë 2004). “The basic claim of the enactive 
approach is that the perceiver’s ability to perceive is constituted (in part) by sensorimotor 
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recording device is not just a thermometer on the wall for Tempo. Instead, he 
is continuously interacting with the device as he moves around generating 
outputs which recycled as inputs drive his cognitive character along with 
respect to his temperature-movement related beliefs. Moreover, through all 
these interactions, it can be safely assumed that the device has been deemed 
reliable. Had the device told Tempo that it is cold while he is next to the 
fireplace, he would not have trusted it. Therefore, the device has been 
appropriately integrated within his cognitive character even though Tempo 
might not even be aware of its existence.      
 But then, Pritchard asks, what if the agent is fitted with the device at a 
later stage? So, imagine Tempo* who comes out of a comma with this device 
fitted, while being non-culpably unaware that this device has been artificially 
implanted in him (Pritchard 2010b, 148). Such a change, argues Pritchard, 
cries out for the agent to take a reflective stance on the epistemic standing of 
this change, and in its absence we cannot say that Tempo* can gain 
knowledge on the basis of his newly fitted device. Interestingly, however, 
Pritchard claims that as time goes by this intuition lessens. For if Tempo* has 
been fitted with the device, say for three years “there is now a track-record of 
beliefs formed via this process which have generally cohered with the beliefs 
formed via Tempo*’s cognitive abilities (and if they hadn’t cohered, we may 
suppose, then Tempo* would have spotted this and responded accordingly)” 
(Pritchard 2010b, 148). That is, the new belief-forming process has now both 
become a disposition for Tempo* and has been deemed trustworthy.  
Plausibly, moreover, within these three years Tempo* has become able to 
reciprocally interact with the device such that it can count as his cognitive 
ability. In other words, given that Tempo* has been fitted with the device for 
a sufficiently long period of time, our intuitions on his ability to acquire 
knowledge on its basis become more supportive, as he may have plausibly 
satisfied the 3+1 criteria.        
                                                                                                                                      
knowledge (i.e., by practical grasp of the way sensory stimulation varies as the perceiver 
moves)”. (Noë 2004, 12). “What the perception is, however, is not a process in the brain, but a 
kind of skillful activity on the part of the animal as a whole”. (Noë 2004, 2). “Perception is not 
something that happens to us or in us, it is something we do”. (Noë 2004, 1). Sensorimotor 
dependencies are relations between movements or change and sensory stimulation. It is the 
practical knowledge of loops relating external objects and their properties with recurring 
patterns of change in sensory stimulation. These patterns of change may be caused by the 
moving subject, the moving object, the ambient environment (changes in illumination) and so 
on.  
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 Now, before closing this section, one last remark is in order here. When 
discussing the Temp case where the thermometer is hanging on the wall, and 
Temp knows what the source of the reliability is, I claimed that it would be 
better analyzed in testimonial terms. So, one might fairly wonder: why not try 
to analyze any instance in which an agent is in cognitive contact with some 
epistemic artifact in testimonial terms? Although this might seem a promising 
strategy, it is not going to work for the same reason that HEMC cannot 
account for every case of an agent’s deployment of an artifact. For, in many 
cases, the agent’s true belief depends very deeply on his ongoing interaction 
with the epistemic artifact in such a way that no causal explanation of how 
the agent formed his true belief will be possible or available in 
linear/testimonial terms.  
 Consider, for instance, telescopic observation. Making observations 
through a telescope is a dynamic process that requires a great deal of 
experience in operating the artifact, and a great amount of background 
knowledge to understand what one is looking at. By moving around the 
telescope while adjusting the lenses, the agent delivers outputs (shapes on the 
lens of the telescope) which recycled as inputs drive the agent’s cognitive 
character along, so as to, eventually, identifythat is, seerecognizable 
objects in space (e.g., stars, planets, comets, galaxies et cetera). The epistemic 
artifact actively drives the agent’s cognitive mechanism in a continuous and 
highly interactive way. Therefore, agent and telescope should be considered 
as a coupled system, and the overall process as a case of extended cognition 
and not as merely a case of an agent using an instrument. That is, the 
interaction between the agent and the telescope is not linear such that the two 
systems can be neatly decomposed by having their function described in 
terms of distinct inputs and outputs from the one to the other. Accordingly, it 
would be a vain attempt to analyze one’s knowledge of stellar facts in terms 
of (artificial) testimony, whereby the telescope provides the agent with fully 
articulated pieces of information, which she must accept or deny.  
 
3.4) Extending the Cognitive Character 
 
To recap, an epistemic agent’s cognitive characteri.e., her cognitive 
systemmay be extended beyond her belief-forming faculties that make up 
 80 
her cognitive agency by incorporating belief-forming processes, which rely 
for the most part on environmental elements. In order to count as genuine 
parts of the agent’s cognitive character, these belief-forming processes must 
meet the 3+1 criteria. That is, they must be trustworthy dispositions in the 
sense of being reliably available, typically invoked and automatically 
endorsed. This also implies (though, of course, does not entail) that they are 
objectively reliable in the sense that they tend to produce true rather than 
false beliefs (otherwise, we may suppose, the processes wouldn’t be typically 
invoked, nor would their results be automatically endorsed). Moreover, these 
dispositional, reliable, belief-forming processes must be appropriately 
integrated within the rest of the agent’s cognitive character. One way to test 
whether these processes are so appropriately integrated is to check whether 
by employing them, the epistemic agent delivers outputs, which recycled as 
inputs drive his overall cognitive character along (i.e., CRC is manifested 
between the internal and the external elements of the process).   
 Therefore, the employment of hardware external elements such as 
epistemic artifacts, calculators, microscopes, telescopes, pen and paper can 
occasionally count as genuine extensions of one’s cognitive character, 
depending on whether they meet the aforementioned criteria. It should be 
interesting, however, to see whether something analogous applies to what 
would count as a software extension.        
 
 3.4.1) Languages as Software Extensions 
 
In our discussion in chapter 2, we briefly mentioned that from the HEC point 
of view, the development of language might have been, to a certain degree, 
the outcome of the human need to externalize their thoughts to the public 
space so that they can more easily manipulate them. Let us now take a closer 
look at this idea.         
 Drawing on Vygotsky’s ideas as vindicated by recent bodies of 
developmental research (see (Berk & Carvin 1984)), Clark suspects that self-
directed speech (be it vocal or silent inner rehearsal) is a crucial cognitive tool 
that allows us to highlight the most puzzling features of new situations, and 
to direct and control our own problem-solving actions (Clark 1998, 164). Of 
course, as he further notes, the effect of language on human thought need not 
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be restricted to speech, since written language may have similar, and possibly 
more powerful, results: “in constructing an academic paper, for example, it is 
common practice to deploy multiple annotated texts, sets of notes and files, 
plans, lists and more. The writing process often depends heavily on 
manipulations of these props—new notes are created, old ones juxtaposed, 
source materials are wielded on and off of work surfaces etc” (Clark 1998). 
 Briefly, the main idea is that language in general, and words in 
particular, enable us to capture abstract ideas and rich experiences in 
memory. This has the direct effect of allowing thoughts to become objects of 
further attention and reflection, opening them up to a range of further mental 
operations. This feedback of one’s thoughts to one’s own cognitive system gives rise 
to the distinctively human capacity of meta-cognition, or, as Clark calls it, 
“second order cognitive dynamics” (1998, 177). This capacity to externalize 
one’s thoughts in recyclable linguistic representations can be far more active 
and transformative than one may initially think, since the particular linguistic 
abilities one possesses may guide or restrain one’s ongoing trains of thoughts. 
Take the construction of a poem for example: “we do not simply use the 
words to express thoughts. Rather, it is often the properties of the words 
(their structure and their cadence), which determine the thoughts that the 
poem comes to express. A similar partial reversal can occur during the 
construction of complex texts and arguments. By writing down our ideas we 
generate a trace in a format that opens up a range of new possibilities. We can 
then inspect and re-inspect the same ideas, coming at them from many 
different angles and in many different frames of mind” (Clark 1998, 176)   
 The moral, Clark claims, is that public language and text play more 
than just a preserving-and-communicating-ideas role; “instead, these external 
resources make available concepts, strategies and learning trajectories which 
are simply not available to individual un-augmented brains. Much of the true 
power of language lies in the underappreciated capacity to re-shape the 
computational spaces which confront intelligent agents” (Clark 1998). 
Indicatively, some of the distinctively transformative effects of language on 
our biological cognitive systems, as Clark enumerates them (1998, 169-173), 
are memory augmentation, attention and resource allocation, and data 
manipulation and representation.     
 Interestingly, in a somewhat similar vein, but drawing inspiration from 
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complex systems and chaos theory, Logan (2003; 2006; 2008) presents the idea 
that speech is the first proper language embedded in an evolutionary series of 
languages, preceded by pre-verbal proto-languages (tool making, social 
intelligence, and mimetic communication) and followed by more task, or 
domain specific languages such as written language, mathematics and 
science. According to this picture, each new language emerged from the 
previous forms of language as a bifurcation to a new level of order in 
response to an information overload that the previous set of languages 
couldn’t handle. What is strikingly similar to Clark’s view is that Logan holds 
that a word packs a great deal of experiencing into a single utterance or sign. 
“A concept in the form of a word links many percepts of an individual and, 
hence, extends the brain’s capacity to remember. Words as concepts are a 
form of artificial memory which creates artificial connections. Words bring order 
to a chaotic mind filled with memories of a myriad of experiences. Language 
is an emergent order” (Logan 2006, 153). We thus see, that just as Clark 
thought, so Logan holds that language serves two and not just one 
fundamental function; it is obviously a form of (i) communication, but it is 
also a form of (ii) information processing.     
 As a result, on the basis of those two authors, it is tempting to claim 
that the use of language is a trustworthy dispositional cognitive process that 
actively drives the cognitive loops of the agents who possess it along the lines 
of the CRC phenomenon. But is language, or more accurately, public 
language and text, the only software external artifacts that cognitive agents 
use so as to extend their cognitive characters?  
 
 3.4.2) Scientific Theories as Software Extensions 
 
Interestingly, as we briefly mentioned before, Logan claims that  
 
speech, writing, math, science, and computing form an evolutionary chain of 
languages. Each of these activities can be considered as a separate language 
because each allows us to think differently, create new ideas and develop 
new forms of expression. Another consideration is that each of these five 
forms of language possesses its own unique semantics and syntax and hence 
qualifies as a language in itself according to criteria set by classical linguistics 
(2003, 3).          
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 I will here concentrate on the discussion of the interesting case of 
scientific theories: if scientific theories do qualify as languages and thereby, as 
software artifacts, then according to HEC and COGAweak, they could also 
count as belief-forming processes that extend the epistemic agent’s cognitive 
character beyond his natural belief-forming faculties. 
 
  3.4.2.1) A Hint: Observations Are Theory-Laden 
 
A hint that this is so comes from the old problem of theory-laden observations 
within the domain of philosophy of science. Briefly speaking, the validity of 
scientific theories depends on their accordance with empirical observations. It 
has been claimed, however, that observation involves perception as well as 
other underlying cognitive processes. As Kuhn says, “something like a 
paradigm is a prerequisite to perception itself. What a man sees depends both 
upon what he looks at and what his previous visual-conceptual experience 
has taught him to see”.72 That is, observations heavily depend on some 
underlying understanding (which stems from the already existing scientific 
theories and commonsensical habits of thought) of the way in which the 
world functions, and that understanding influences what is perceived, 
noticed, or deemed trustworthy of consideration. Therefore, the argument 
goes, since empirical observations presuppose a theoretical understanding, 
they cannot be the final arbiters of the validity of scientific theories.  
 Historically, the issue first emerged between Hempel (1966, 1970), who 
defended the distinction between observational and theoretical terms, and 
Hanson (1961; 1969) who maintained the theory-laden thesis of observation. 
Specifically, according to Hanson, not only are the observational sentences 
theory-laden but the observations themselves are theory-laden (1969): 
 
In short we usually “see” through spectacles made of our past experience, our 
knowledge, and tinted and molted by the logical forms of our special 
languages and notations. Seeing is what I shall call a “theory-laden” 
operation, about which I shall have increasingly more to say.  
                                                
72 Briefly speaking a paradigm refers to the scientific theory along with its auxiliary 
hypotheses that is most widely accepted by the scientific community and on the basis of 
which the latter conducts its research. Kuhn’s focus was on the scientific progress as a whole, 
comprising of the individual scientists, paradigms, scientific communities and so on. I am 
here only interested in the relation between the individual scientists and the scientific theories 
they are working on.  
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Famously, the debate also has a counterpart in the philosophy of mind, as it 
was taken up by Churchland (1979; 1988; 1989) and Fodor (1984; 1988). Fodor, 
by appealing to illusions such as the Muller-Lyer experiment whereby the 
subjects’ knowledge of the illusion does not alter their defective impressions, 
thinks that perceptual processes are modular (i.e., independent, closed, 
domain-specific processing modules). So, by definition, bodies of theory that 
are inaccessible to the modules do not affect the way the perceiver sees the 
world. Churchland, on the other hand, relying on studies such as those 
utilizing the ambiguous pictures of rabbit/duck and young/old woman, 
argues that higher cognitive processes can have an impact on visual 
processes. Specifically, higher order theories provide the agents with internal 
representations, which pick out important distinctions and structures in the 
external world. When the input to the agent’s perceptual processes is 
variegated, or noisy, and thereby not clearly represented, these 
representations allow the agent to “respond to those inputs in a fashion that 
systematically reduces the error messages to a tickle. These I need hardly 
remind, are the functions typically ascribed to “theories”” (1989, 177). 
 Considerations such as those of Hanson and Churchland have widely 
been thought to produce a relativistic picture of science—and possibly 
epistemology as well—whose most prominent proponents are thought to be 
Feyerabend (1975) and Kuhn (1962) (the latter quite possibly unjustly 
though). As one of Kuhn’s most infamous passages goes: “In so far as [the 
scientists’] recourse to that world is through what they see and do, we may 
want to say that after a revolution scientists respond to a different world” 
(1962, 110). Fortunately, however, modern cognitive psychology points away 
from relativism, at least as far as the theory-ladenness of observations is 
concerned, even though the phenomenon is not altogether denied.   
 In particular, Anna Estany (2001, 208) holds that  
The beliefs of the higher or more fundamental level influence how perceptual 
units are interpreted by the lower levels [...] Humans use both types of 
processes in perception because each have characteristic advantages and 
disadvantages. Thanks to top-down processes we can recognize patterns with 
incomplete or degraded information. Moreover, top-down processes make 
perception faster, but they can induce us to make mistakes in a perception by 
relying on previous knowledge. 
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However, even though our perceptual systems do get guidance from higher 
order expectations, it has been pointed out that when attention is caused by 
the mismatches between expectation and reality the inputs from the arousal 
system constitute a “reset wave” making it possible not to fall into arbitrary, 
relativistic errors of perception (Estany 2008, 213).     
 Similarly, Brewer and Lambert (2001), exploring the literature on 
relevant experiments, concede that “perception is determined by the 
interaction of top-down theory information and bottom-up sensory 
information” (178):  
However, note that in all of the above cases the stimuli were either 
ambiguous, degraded, or required a difficult perceptual judgment. In these 
cases the weak bottom-up information allowed the top-down influences to 
have a strong impact on perceptual experience. It seems likely that strong 
bottom-up information will override top-down information. [...] Thus, the top-
down/bottom-up analysis allows one to have cases of theory-laden 
perception, but does not necessarily lead down the slippery slope of 
relativism.  
 
For the purposes of the present chapter, however, the resolution of the 
problem of whether the theory-ladenness of observations may or may not lead 
to relativism is less important than its very existence. For it shows that 
scientific theories can be seen as cognitive dispositions whose employment 
actively drives the agents’ cognitive character by creating outputs 
(observations) which recycled as inputs drive the agent’s overall cognitive 
system along, resulting in further observations or scientific theories, which are 
hopefully—as Estany, Brewer and Lambert argue—still empirically testable. 
The theory-ladenness of the scientific process may sometimes lead to mistakes, 
but for the most part, when the input is ambiguous, noisy, or variegated it is 
an important facilitatory effect that boosts the scientists’ performance in 
several ways. In particular, Brewer and Lambert note that background 
theories affect not only the scientists’ perceptual processes but they also play a 
significant role in other aspects of the scientist’s cognitive and epistemic life 
including attention, data evaluation and interpretation, data production, 
memory, and communication.73 
 
                                                
73 Cf. Clark’s (1998, 169-173) “6 ways”. 
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  3.4.2.2) Extended Scientific Problem-Solving 
The discussion of the previous section was only intended as a hint that 
scientific theories may be seen as software artifacts that extend one’s cognitive 
character. Let me explain why. The main idea was that once one becomes 
fluent with a scientific theory, the way one perceives the world (in qualitative 
terms), the aspects of the world one attends to and considers worthy of 
consideration, and the way one stores and communicates one’s experiences 
will be fundamentally altered. In other words, scientific theories have a very 
strong impact on one’s point of view at the external world, allowing one to 
observationally interact with it in ways that would otherwise be unavailable, 
and this, in turn, affects back the ways one does science. Scientific theories, 
moreover, are external in the sense that no one is born with them inscribed on 
one’s neural apparatus. Theories, instead, are acquired through a long period 
of training and practice during which scientists interact with teachers, 
professors, textbooks, scientific equipment, and so on. And once scientists 
become masters of such externally derived theories, the cognitive operations 
(including their observations) they are able to perform are qualitatively altered 
and significantly enhanced.  Hence, scientific theories may be seen as external 
software epistemic artifacts that extend one’s cognitive character. Here is the 
problem, however, and why the above can be nothing more than a hint. In 
order to resist this picture, the opponent of cognitive extension does not need 
to deny that once such external scientific theories are appropriately 
internalized they will have dramatic effects on the epistemic agent’s cognitive 
loops. Crucially, however, he will further claim that all processing, including 
making theory-laden observations, will be exclusively performed within the 
scientist’s head. Why, then, should this count as a case of cognitive extension?
 Clark, of course, seems to be aware of this line of arguing against 
languages as software extensions, and this is why he does not restrict himself 
in claiming that all languages do is to facilitate or enhance one’s inner 
processes of thought and reason. Instead, the examples Clark uses in order to 
illustrate his point involve agents who physically manipulate external 
linguistic symbols and representations so as to achieve cognitive tasks that 
would otherwise be infeasible. So are there any similar examples from the 
scientific domain, which could motivate the view that scientific theories can 
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count as software cognitive artifacts in a similar way?     
 Let us move back to the example of long multiplication that was first 
presented in section 2.1. Drawing on McClelland et al. (1986), Giere and 
Moffatt (2003) claim that human brain networks have evolved for and are best 
at completing and recognizing patterns in input provided by the environment. 
But, the question is that “if something like that is correct, how does man do 
the kind of linear symbol processing required for activities such as using 
language and doing mathematics”? (Giere & Moffatt 2003, 302). “The answer 
given by McClelland et al.”, they note, “was that man does the kind of 
cognitive processing required for these linear activities by creating and 
manipulating external representations. These latter tasks can be done by a 
complex pattern matcher” (ibid.). So, again, think about the process of solving 
the multiplication problem ‘987 times 789’.  
This process involves an external representation consisting of written 
symbols. These symbols are manipulated, literally by hand. The process 
involves eye-hand motor coordination and is not simply going on in the head 
of the person doing the multiplying. The person’s contribution is: (1) setting 
up the problem in a physical form; (2) doing the correct manipulations in the 
right order; (3) supplying the products for any two integers, which can be 
done easily from memory (Giere & Moffatt 2003, 303). 
 
The rest of the mathematical cognitive task, however, is, literally, performed 
externally on the basis of the interaction between brain, hand, pen, and paper.  
Here is then an example according to which mathematics—again, a language 
according to Logan’s view—can be seen as a software artifact that extends an 
agent’s epistemic cognitive character. But if this analysis is correct, then very 
similar analyses can be provided for the solution of scientific problems, which 
involve the physical manipulation of external scientific symbols and formulas.
 Take, for example, the use of chemical formulas in organic chemistry as 
introduced by Berzelius and Dumas in the early nineteenth century.  
Assuming that the basic constituents in reactions are conserved, one can 
represent chemical reactions by equations in which the numbers of all 
constituents are the same on both sides of the equation. That is, the equation 
must balance. One can literally do theoretical chemistry by manipulating these 
symbols in the following example: (Giere & Moffatt 2003, 304)   
   
                         CH4+ 2O2 = CO2+ 2H2O     (The burning of methane)  
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Such formulas are clearly external representations that form part of an 
extended cognitive system that allows scientists to explore possible reactions 
in organic chemistry. “That is, the cognitive process of balancing an equation 
does not take place solely in the head of some person, but consists of 
interactions between a person and physical, external representations” (Ibid.). 
So here is an example of a scientific theory that does not only alter the agent’s 
inner cognitive processes, but also allows him to externalize his problems in 
symbols, whose physical manipulation enable him to come up with solutions 
that, arguably, would otherwise be unavailable. This example, however, is 
only one out of a vast number of similar cases and anyone who solved 
problems in mathematics, physics, chemistry, logic, or even biology at school 
could come up with one’s own examples.      
 So, although more remains to be said on this matter, my tentative 
conclusion is that it could be the case that scientific theories, like public 
language and text, are a software external element that can extend one’s 
cognitive character beyond one’s cognitive agency—that is, beyond one’s 
natural cognitive faculties. The fact that, as in the case of language so in the 
case of science too, we sometimes employ them without even realizing that we 
do so has nothing to do with their status of being external, cognitive, and 
consequently epistemic artifacts. Rather, it is an indication that they are so 
appropriately integrated within our cognitive characters that they are 
“transparent equipment”: “equipment (like the carpenter’s hammer) with 
which we are so familiar and fluent that we do not think about it in use, but 
rather rely on it to mediate our encounters with a still wider world. […] And it 
is this bundle of taken-for-granted skills, knowledge and abilities that—or so I 
am suggesting—quite properly structures and informs our sense of who we 
are, what we know, and what we can do” (Clark 2006, 106). They are the 
cognitive traits that make up our cognitive characters.  
3.5) Conclusion 
To recap, I have argued that COGAweak and HEC are complementary accounts. 
On one hand, COGAweak is an attempt to accommodate the ability intuition on 
knowledge (i.e., knowledge must be the product of cognitive ability). HEC, on 
the other hand, is an attempt to recognize a process as part of one’s cognitive 
system despite whether it is wholly realized within an agent’s head, or not. 
 89 
Interestingly, the criteria set forth by COGAweak in order for a belief-forming 
process to count as knowledge-conducive (i.e., be one’s cognitive ability) are 
the same as the criteria suggested by HEC in order for a process to be part of 
one’s overall cognitive mechanism. I have been referring to them as the 3+1 
criteria: 1) the process must be reliably available and typically invoked (i.e., it 
must be one of the agent’s habitual cognitive routines), 2) it must be more-or-
less automatically endorsed and not usually subject to critical scrutiny (i.e., it 
must be trustworthy/reliable), 3) it should also be easily accessible as and 
when required (i.e., it must have been appropriately integrated within the 
agent’s overall cognitive mechanism/character), and +1) there must be a 
continuous reciprocal interaction between the target process and the agent’s 
natural cognitive faculties.       
 Moreover, this agreement on the fundamental tenets of the two views 
provides us with a principled account of the way in which epistemic agents 
may extend their knowledge-conducive cognitive characters beyond their 
natural cognitive faculties by incorporating epistemic artifacts. Thus, 
COGAweak constitutes a formulation of the ability intuition on knowledge, 
which also bears the important advantage of allowing the acquisition of 
knowledge on the basis of epistemic artifacts.     
 Finally, having checked the 3+1 criteria against a series of thought 
experiments which are meant to unravel our epistemological intuitions and 
intuitions related to the nature of the mind, we examined the claim that it is 
not only hardware artifacts that may extend our cognitive characters but it 
may well be the case that our minds can be extended via the employment of 
software tools such as languages. Even though more remains to be said on this 
matter, we further noted that if scientific theories can be seen as languages 
then, arguably, they too could be considered as software artifacts that extend 
one’s cognitive system by actively driving (and restraining) one’s ongoing 
cognitive loops. As Lakatos once wrote: “[we, scientists,] use our most successful 















In the previous three chapters, we focused on the importance of the ability 
intuition on knowledge, namely the idea that knowledge must be the product 
of one’s cognitive ability.  Through the consideration of several thought 
experiments, Chapter 1 was mainly dedicated to the acknowledgement of the 
necessity of the ability intuition for any adequate account of knowledge. 
Another important consideration that emerged through the discussion of the 
first chapter was the realization that the ability intuition on knowledge, as 
captured by virtue reliabilism, cannot account for the acquisition of 
knowledge on the basis of epistemic artifacts. We thus introduced a necessary 
virtue reliabilistic condition on knowledge, which has recently been put 
forward by Pritchard (2010b), namely COGAweak. COGAweak appears to avoid 
many of the problems that trouble virtue reliabilism, while it can also 
reconcile the ability intuition on knowledge with the fact that we so often gain 
knowledge on the basis of the operation of epistemic artifacts. In particular, 
according to COGAweak, so long as one’s true belief is significantly creditable 
to one’s cognitive agency (i.e., one’s organismic faculties of the brain/CNS), 
then the process by which one came to form one’s true belief can count as 
bona fide cognitive ability. But, even though considering the operation of 
epistemic artifacts as cognitive abilities is epistemologically motivated, this is 
a radical claim that, in the absence of any metaphysical support, sounds 
rather implausible. Accordingly, Chapter 2 was devoted to the production of 
just this metaphysical support for this aspect of COGAweak, through the 
consideration of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC). Finally, in 
Chapter 3, we tried to provide substantial evidence for the theoretical affinity 
between COGAweak and HEC. In particular, we argued that the criteria to be 
met by an external process such that it can count as part of one’s cognitive 
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system are the same as the criteria that must be satisfied so that a belief-
forming process counts as knowledge-conducive. Given that both of these 
theories are meant to capture the notion of cognitive ability, this is exactly the 
outcome one would expect to find. Moreover, the fact that those two theories 
have been developed separately within different philosophical domains does 
not only render them mutually supportive and informative, but it is also a 
hint to their correctness.  
 With these considerations in mind, in this fourth chapter, I aim to 
explore the epistemological ramifications of understanding COGAweak along 
the lines suggested by HEC. In particular, the fact that knowledge-conducive 
belief-forming cognitive processes are no more restricted within the bodily 
boundaries of the individual epistemic agents is a good indication of the 
exogenous, social nature of knowledge. Notice, however, that the claim is not 
yet going to be that knowledge might, in certain cases, be entirely social (i.e., I 
won’t yet support robust anti-individualism in epistemology). This will be the 
topic of the last two chapters. Rather, I will here focus on the recognition of 
the dual nature of knowledge: the idea that, in most cases, knowledge is essentially 
both social and individual.  
 The starting point for this idea can be traced in the common element to 
be found in any virtue reliabilistic condition on knowledge. Below are the 
formulations of virtue reliabilism and COGAweak as we have encountered 
them in the previous chapters:   
Virtue Reliabilism 
• S knows that p if and only if S’s reliable cognitive character is the most 
important necessary part of the total set of causal factors that give rise 
to S’s believing the truth regarding p.  
Or, 
• S knows that p if and only if S’s cognitive success is primarily 
creditable to S’s cognitive character. 
(The above two formulations are supposed to be equivalent, since Greco 
(2004) holds that credit attributions are tantamount, or, at least, very much 
akin to causal explanations).74 
 
 
                                                
74 As I will later argue, however, credit attributions differ to causal explanations in at least 
one significant respect. That is, credit attributions pick out only intentional agents, whereas 
causal explanations may refer to both intentional and non-intentional aspects of the world.  
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COGAweak 
• If S knows that p, then S’s true belief that p is the product of a reliable 
belief-forming process, which is appropriately integrated within S’s 
cognitive character such that her cognitive success is to a significant 
degree creditable to her cognitive agency. 
 
Even though these two formulations of the ability intuition on knowledge are 
not the same—the most obvious difference being that virtue reliabilism is 
meant to be both a necessary and sufficient condition on knowledge—they 
nevertheless share a core insight of what knowledge is supposed to be. In 
particular, both accounts attempt to understand knowledge in terms of credit 
attributions. This commonality between the two accounts, however, should 
not come as a surprise. In trying to accommodate the ability intuition on 
knowledge, both views share another common idea: credit is usually 
attributable in cases of success through ability.75 Accordingly, as Greco notes, 
knowledge—or, at least, a necessary aspect of it—is creditable true belief (2007, 
57).            
 Notice a difference in the detail, however. Whereas virtue reliabilism 
requires that one’s cognitive success be primarily creditable to one’s cognitive 
character, COGAweak demands that one’s true belief be merely significantly 
creditable to one’s cognitive agency. As we noted in chapter 1, COGAweak’s 
lenient demands with respect to the degree of creditability of one’s cognitive 
success to one’s cognitive agency not only helps COGAweak to account for 
cases of testimonial knowledge,76 but focusing on one’s cognitive agency—as 
opposed to one’s cognitive character—allows COGAweak to also explain how it 
is possible for an epistemic artifact to count as part of one’s cognitive 
                                                
75 Let me note, however, a subtle difference between the two proposals again. While Greco 
presents knowledge as true belief which is ‘of credit’, Pritchard insists on thinking about 
knowledge merely as ‘creditable’ true belief. These two notions are not the same. “For 
example, one’s cognitive success could be creditable to one’s cognitive agency without being 
at all of credit to one (perhaps the cognitive success is the result of an inquiry that one ought 
not to be pursuing, because, say, there are epistemically more desirable inquiries that one 
should be focusing instead” (Pritchard forthcoming, en. 26). While this distinction is not 
important to the present discussion, it is of great significance with respect to the debate on the 
value of knowledge. If, as Greco claims, knowledge is true belief, which is ‘of credit’, this is 
because knowledge is an achievement. Since achievements are finally valuable, knowledge 
turns out to be finally valuable, as well. However, considering cases such as the one 
mentioned above, or mundane instances of knowledge such as perceptual beliefs, Pritchard 
claims that knowledge is not always an achievement and so not finally valuable either. For 
further discussion on this issue, see (Pritchard 2010a, §2.4). 
76 We will return to testimonial knowledge shortly, in the next section. 
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character, such that one can gain knowledge on its basis. In such cases, even 
though one’s cognitive success is primarily the product of the operation of the 
epistemic artifact, one’s cognitive agency deserves significant credit, for it is 
one’s cognitive agency that is first and foremost responsible for integrating 
into one’s cognitive character the epistemic artifact, whose operation allows 
one to enjoy cognitive success.         
 Now, understanding knowledge in terms of credit attributions, as 
suggested in the lines above, will help us reveal the social aspects of 
individual knowledge. For as it will become apparent in the following 
sections, a preponderance of the individualistic true beliefs that amount to 
knowledge cannot be wholly creditable to the individual subjects whose 
knowledge status is each time assessed. I will begin with considerations that 
pertain to testimonial knowledge and I will then move on to examine cases 
where one’s true believing is the product of epistemic artifacts. In all these 
cases, the cognitive success may well be significantly creditable to the 
cognitive agency of the individual subject whose knowledge status is being 
assessed. But the rest of the credit should, or so I will argue, be attributed to 
other specific individuals, or to the epistemic society in which the individual 
subjects are embedded. Finally, I will examine Hardwig’s claim that this 
epistemic dependence on one’s epistemic circle leads to either of the two 
following unpalatable conclusions: either scientific research and scholarship 
do not constitute knowledge at all, or such knowledge is not possessed by any 
individual alone, but by the epistemic community as a whole. Fortunately, 
there is a third conclusion to be drawn, originating from (but not jumping 
straight out of) externalist epistemology, and which points to the dual nature 
of knowledge. 
4.2) Testimonial Knowledge 
 4.2.1) Introduction to Testimonial Knowledge 
Testimonial knowledge has always been a central topic in epistemology. The 
reason is obvious: very many of our everyday beliefs appear to have 
testimonial origins. Accordingly, an adequate account of knowledge should 
be able to accommodate this powerful source of knowledge. Traditionally, the 
two opposing sides within the debate concerning testimonial knowledge are 
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those of reductionism—which assigns the entire epistemic burden to the 
hearer—and non-reductionism—which shifts the epistemic burden to the 
speaker. Recently, however, Jennifer Lackey (2008) has put forward a dualist 
account of testimonial knowledge that appears to accommodate both of these 
seemingly opposing views. The reason, she claims, is that “it takes two to 
tango”; “an adequate view of testimonial justification or warrant needs to 
recognize that the justification or warrant of a hearer’s belief has dual sources, 
being grounded in both the reliability of the speaker and the rationality of the 
hearer’s reasons for belief” (Lackey 2008, 177). The aim of this section is to 
present the debate between reductionism and non-reductionism, introduce 
Lackey’s view, and then check whether her dualist account is in line with 
COGAweak. If this turns out to be the case, then COGAweak is well equipped to 
share Lackey’s insight with respect to the epistemic burden distribution that 
testimonial knowledge points to, thus providing us with a first sense in which 
individual knowledge can at the same time be social in nature.  
To start with, consider reductionism about testimonial knowledge, 
according to which the epistemic status of testimony is ultimately reducible to 
sense perception, memory, and inductive inference. As Hume (1977, 75)—
who is often regarded (quite possibly unjustly) as the best-known supporter 
of reductionism regarding the epistemology of testimony—notes, “the reason 
why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any 
connexion, which we perceive a priori, between testimony and reality, but 
because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them.”77 
     More precisely, reductionists ascribe to the ‘positive reasons’ thesis, 
according to which justification or warrant is attached to testimonial beliefs 
only by the presence of appropriate positive reasons on the part of the 
hearers, thereby assigning all of the epistemic burden on the hearers’ 
shoulders. Since these reasons cannot be testimonial (otherwise there would 
be circularity) they must depend on other epistemic sources that typically 
include sense perception, memory and inductive inference. Testimonial 
                                                
77  In a similar vein, Faulkner (2000, 587-8) claims that “it is doxastically irresponsible to 
accept testimony without some background belief in the testimony's credibility or truth”, and 
“an audience is justified in forming a testimonial belief if and only if he is justified in 
accepting the speaker's testimony.” Or, consider Fricker (1994, 149-50): “the hearer should be 
discriminating in her attitude to the speaker, in that she should be continually evaluating him 
for trustworthiness throughout their exchange, in the light of the evidence, or cues, available 
to her”.  
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justification, or warrant is, therefore, ultimately reducible to the 
justification/warrant of these basic epistemic sources. Having these 
considerations in mind, Lackey formulates reductionism thusly: 
 
Reductionism 
For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B believes that p with 
justification/warrant on the basis of A’s testimony if and only if:    
(R1) B believes that p on the basis of A’s testimony; 
(R2) B has sufficiently good non-testimonial positive reasons to accept A’s 
testimony. (Lackey 2008, 145) 
 
As Lackey notes, however, the possession of appropriately positive reasons 
does not necessarily guarantee to the hearer the reliability of the speaker's 
testimony.78 Consider, for example, Max who has known Ethel for the last ten 
years, over the course of which, he has acquired excellent positive grounds for 
thinking that Ethel is a reliable source of testimony. Currently, however, Ethel 
is going through a personal crisis that no one knows about, and, so, in a state 
of distress, reports to Max that her purse has been stolen, even though she has 
no reason to think that this is the case. Ironically enough, however, and 
unbeknownst to Ethel, it turns out that her purse was in fact stolen when she 
was at the coffee shop, earlier that same day.    
    What this Gettier-case demonstrates, Lackey (2008, 152) explains, is 
that despite the fact that the hearer has excellent positive reasons for 
accepting the speaker’s testimony, the speaker acts “completely out of 
epistemic character”, delivering an unreliable report, which though it turns 
out to be true, prevents the hearer from acquiring knowledge. Therefore, as 
mentioned before, the possession of appropriately positive reasons does not 
necessarily guarantee to the hearer the reliability of the speaker's testimony 
and so, Lackey concludes, reductionism is not an adequate account of 
testimonial knowledge.  
 So, let us turn to non-reductionism, according to which testimony is 
just as epistemically basic as sense perception, memory, and inductive 
inference. Such a view can be traced back to the work of Reid (1983, 281-2) 
according to which “the wise author of nature hath planted in the human 
mind a propensity to rely upon human testimony before we can get a reason 
                                                
78 Lackey supports her claim through the consideration of two examples, namely ‘Nested 
Speaker’ and ‘Unnested Speaker’ (Lackey 2008, 148; 152). 
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for doing so”. So, on the non-reductionist view, acquiring testimonial 
knowledge does not require the possession of any positive reasons on the part 
of the hearer; instead, as Burge (1993, 467) explains, “a person is entitled to 
accept as true something that is presented as true and is intelligible to him, 
unless there are stronger reasons not to do so”. Or, consider Weiner (2003, 
257) who, in a similar vein, holds that “we are justified in accepting anything 
that we are told unless there is positive evidence against doing so”.79  
Notice the commonplace in all the aforementioned views; while the 
absence of any negative reasons is necessary for the acquisition of 
testimonially based knowledge, the presence of positive reasons is not. Put 
another way, non-reductionists hold that so long as there are no relevant 
undefeated defeaters,80 hearers can acquire testimonially based knowledge 
merely on the basis of a speaker’s testimony, thereby seemingly shifting the 
entire epistemic burden from the hearer to the speaker.81 




For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B knows that p on the basis of A’s 
testimony if and only if: 
 
(NR1)  B believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony; 
(NR2) B has no undefeated (psychological or normative) defeaters for 
A’s testimony;  
(NR3) It is true that p. (Lackey 2008, 158) 
 
 
Lackey, however, goes on to test non-reductionism against the ‘Incompetent 
Agent’ (158) where an unreliable speaker testifies to a hearer. But, the hearer 
possesses no relevant undefeated defeaters and so, according to non-
                                                
79 In a similar spirit, Audi (1998, 142) claims that “gaining testimonially grounded knowledge 
normally requires only having no reason for doubt about the credibility of the attester.”  
80  It is here important to introduce the two relevant types of defeaters that could affect one’s 
acquisition of testimonial knowledge. First, there are psychological defeaters, which are 
beliefs or doubts that are had by the hearer and which indicate that the hearer’s beliefs are 
either false or unreliably formed. Notice that psychological defeaters may not be objectively 
correct. Second, there are normative defeaters, which are doubts or beliefs that the hearer 
ought to have, and which indicate that the hearer’s beliefs are either false or unreliably 
formed. In other words, normative defeaters are beliefs or doubts that the hearer should have 
(despite whether or not the hearer does actually have them), given the presence of certain 
available evidence.   
81 I here say ‘seemingly’ because, as it will become apparent later on, to possess no 
undefeated defeaters against a testimonial report is actually a condition that requires a fairly 
active epistemic stance on the part of the hearer.  
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reductionism, must ultimately accept the proffered defective statement as 
true. Accordingly, just as in the case of merely possessing positive reasons, 
the mere absence of negative ones does not guarantee to the hearer the 
reliability of the speaker’s testimony and so, Lackey suggests, non-
reductionism is in need of the further condition (NR4): 
 
(NR4)  The speaker’s testimony is reliable or otherwise truth-conducive. 
 
Still, however, Lackey argues, if the receiver of testimony is either insensitive 
to the relevant undefeated defeaters—even though they are evidentially 
present to him—or oversensitive to them, then he will be 
unjustified/unwarranted in accepting the speaker’s testimony.82 Accordingly, 
we must ensure that the hearer in question has the capacity for and is 
appropriately sensitive to the relevant defeaters. Hence, non-reductionism 
must again be supplemented by the further condition (NR5): 
 
(NR5)  The hearer is a reliable or properly functioning recipient of testimony. 
(Lackey 2008, 164) 
 
Yet again, all of the five conditions that have been so far proposed appear 
inadequate. The reason is that the counterexample of the “Insular 
Community” (Lackey 2008, 164-5)—in which the hero happens to ask for 
directions the only reliable testifier in a city whose members always deceive 
the ‘outsiders’—accentuates the need that the environment wherein testimony 
is exchanged must be suitable for the reception of reliable testimony. 
Consequently, non-reductionism must be strengthened with one last 
condition: 
 
(NR6) The environment in which B receives A’s testimony is suitable for the 
reception of reliable testimony. (Lackey 2008, 167) 
 
 
 Finally, having formed non-reductionism along the lines of the above 
six conditions, Lackey goes on to test it against one last counterexample, 
namely ‘Alien’ (Lackey 2008, 168-9): Walking in the forest, Sam sees someone 
who looks like an alien dropping a book. Sam recovers the book and notices 
that it is written in what appears to be English and it looks like to what we on 
                                                
82 Lackey refers to these two examples as ‘Good-Natured’ and ‘Compulsively Paranoid’. See 
(Lackey 2008 160; 161). 
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Earth would call a diary. By reading the first sentence of the book, Sam forms 
the corresponding belief that tigers have eaten some of the inhabitants of the 
author’s planet. In reality, the book is a diary written in English and it is true 
and reliably written in it that tigers have eaten the aliens. Sam is also a 
properly functioning recipient of testimony and he is situated in an 
environment that is suitable for the reception of reliable reports.  
     Now, despite the fact that all the above six conditions are satisfied, it 
seems implausible to accept that Sam gains knowledge in this case. The 
reason, Lackey explains, is that Sam holds no positive reasons on behalf of the 
speaker’s testimony; he knows nothing about aliens, he has no beliefs about 
their reliability as testifiers, he has no idea about the purpose of alien ‘diaries’, 
he has no common-sense alien-psychological theory, he has no beliefs about 
the reliability of the author of this book and so on. In the absence of such 
positive reasons, Lackey suggests, the only rational choice for Sam is to 
withhold belief.  
     Overall, then, what the Alien counterexample purports to demonstrate 
is that in the absence of any positive reasons for the reliability of the speaker’s 
testimony, it is not rational for the hearer to accept the target testimony. 
Therefore, while reductionism as expressed through the positive reasons 
thesis is not a sufficient account of testimonial knowledge, it nevertheless 
seems to capture a necessary aspect of it. Therefore, Lackey proposes, we are 
in need of a dual account of testimonial knowledge that will involve both 




For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B knows (believes with 
justification/warrant) that p on the basis of A’s testimony only if: 
(D1)  B believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony; 
(D2)  A’s testimony is reliable or otherwise truth conducive; 
(D3)  B is a reliable or properly working recipient of testimony;    
(D4)  The environment in which B receives A’s testimony is suitable 
for the reception of reliable testimony; 
(D5)  B has no undefeated (psychological or normative) defeaters for 
A’s testimony; 
(D6)  B has appropriate positive reasons for accepting A’s testimony. 





To properly appreciate the motivating idea of Lackey’s dualist account, 
remember that reductionism puts all of the epistemic responsibility on the 
hearer while non-reductionism assigns the entire epistemic work to the 
speaker. On the contrary, the main idea that motivates Lackey’s dualist 
account is the realization that the epistemic burden must be distributed across 
both the speaker and the hearer. As Lackey vividly puts it, “it takes two to 
tango”, because “an adequate view of testimonial justification or warrant 
needs to recognize that the justification or warrant of a hearer’s belief has dual 
sources, being grounded in both the reliability of the speaker and the 
rationality of the hearer’s reasons for belief” (Lackey 2008, 177). 
     In addition, there are two interrelated clarifications that are in order 
here. First, notice that since the epistemic burden of testimonial 
justification/warrant is distributed across both the speaker and the hearer, the 
demand for the acquisition of positive reasons on the part of the hearer is not 
as strong as reductionists would require it to be. That is to say, the ‘positive 
reasons’ condition (D6) is not meant as a sufficient condition for acquiring 
testimonial knowledge. Rather, positive reasons are only required in order to 
render the hearer’s acceptance of the speaker’s testimony “rational, or at least, 
not irrational” (Lackey 2008, 180).  
     And second, notice that even though it has been argued that having 
positive reasons for accepting one’s testimony requires from the hearer to 
have all kinds of knowledge about people, their areas of expertise and their 
psychological propensities, which knowledge most subjects lack, this is not an 
actual problem for dualism. Granted, to accept one’s testimony as true on 
merely positive reasons requires a great deal of relevant knowledge, which is 
implausible to assume that normal subjects have. But, requiring positive 
reasons that can make my acceptance of one’s testimony rational, or at least 
not irrational is a far less demanding requisite that can be satisfied in much 
simpler ways. In particular, Lackey provides three types of inductively based 
positive reasons that could allow normal subjects to identify reliable (or 
unreliable) testimony.83 
                                                
83  Although the following types are originally meant for the provision of positive reasons for 
accepting one’s testimony, it is true that they can also be used equally well for the seemingly 
diametrically opposite process of coming up with undefeated defeaters for rejecting one’s 
testimony. 
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     The first type includes criteria for individuating epistemically reliable 
contexts and contextual features: 
 
Specifically, even if B has not observed a general conformity of reports 
delivered in contexts of kind C and the truth, B may have observed the 
general conformity of reports delivered in contexts of kind C and the truth. 
So, if B believes that A’s report is delivered in a C-context, then this, 
combined with B’s inductive evidence regarding contexts of kind C, may give 





For example, one may more easily accept the reports proffered in an 
astronomy lecture or found in National Geographic than the reports made in an 
astrology lecture or found in the National Enquirer. Or, in a similar vein, one 
may more easily accept the report of a calm and coherent witness testifying a 
robbery a few blocks away than would accept the report of a confused person 
who smells of alcohol.84 “Similar remarks can be made about countless other 
contextual factors such as facial expressions, eye contact, mannerisms, 
narrative voice and so on” (Lackey 2008, 182). 
     The second class of reasons pertains to criteria that can help us make 
distinctions between reports: 
 
In particular, even if B has not observed a general conformity between A’s 
reports and the truth, B may have observed the general conformity of reports 
of kind R and the truth. Thus, if B believes that A’s report is an instance of 
kind R, this, combined with B’s inductive evidence regarding R-reports, may 





For instance, one may uncritically accept one’s testimony of the time of the 
day, one’s name, what one ate for breakfast, while one may adopt a more 
critical stance towards one reporting about political matters, the achievements 
of one’s children, one’s sexual performance, UFO sightings, and so on.  
     Finally, the third kind of criteria that Lackey puts forward are meant to 
help the hearer to distinguish between epistemically reliable and unreliable 
speakers: 
 
                                                
84  In relation to the previous footnote, see how this second case, as Lackey herself also 
suggests, is best explained in terms of either the possession or absence of undefeated 
defeaters, rather than the presence of positive reasons (2008, 181).  
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Specifically, even if B has not observed the general conformity between A’s 
reports and the truth, B may have observed the general conformity of 
speakers of kind S and the truth. Thus, if B believes that A is an S-speaker, 
then this combined with B’s inductive evidence regarding S-speakers, may 




Consider, for example, that when one tries to find one's way to a desired 
destination in an unfamiliar city, one may accept in a less hesitant manner the 
testimony of someone who seems to be a local passer-by than would accept 
the word of someone who looks like a tourist. 
     The upshot of the above considerations is that despite the arguments 
that point to the opposite direction, there is indeed a plethora of ways in 
which a hearer can render her acceptance of a speaker’s testimony rational or, 
at least, not irrational, in the way that the ‘positive reasons’ condition of 
dualism demands. 
     In summary then, and before turning to COGAweak, since the process of 
acquiring information through testimony so as to form the corresponding 
beliefs is an interactive exchange between the hearer and the speaker, the 
relevant beliefs can only become justified/warranted by conditions that 
pertain to both parties of the said exchange. This realization has made Lackey 
go beyond the debate between reductionism and non-reductionism, thereby 
wedding these two views in a single dual account.  
 
4.2.2) Dualism in the Epistemology of Testimony and COGAweak 
 
Now, to see how virtue reliabilism fares with respect to testimonial 




Jenny gets off the train in an unfamiliar city and asks the first person that she 
meets for directions. The person that she asks is indeed knowledgeable about 
the area, and gives her directions. Jenny believes what she is told and goes on 
her way to her intended destination.  
 
 
    
                                                
85 (Pritchard 2009, 68). It is adapted from Lackey’s ‘Morris case’ (see Lackey 2007, 352) 
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Unless we want to deny a great amount of knowledge that we suppose we 
have, we must admit that Jenny gains knowledge in this way. Lackey (2007) 
has argued, however, that given the way Jenny gains knowledge, her 
cognitive character, it seems, has nothing to do with the true-status of her 
belief. Instead, it is the informant’s cognitive character that is the most salient 
factor in the causal explanation of why Jenny believes the truth. So, according 
to virtue reliabilism, Jenny lacks knowledge that she in fact possesses. 
 As Pritchard explains, however, if we are indeed inclined to accept that 
Jenny gains knowledge in this case, this is because we are reading the 
example both in such a way that Jenny’s cognitive character is to some 
significant extent—thought, of course, not primarily—involved in how she 
gets things right, and in a way that her environment is friendly for the 
reception of reliable testimony. In particular, Pritchard explains, to say that 
Jenny gains knowledge in this way, we must read the example in such a way 
that Jenny is in an epistemically friendly environment—i.e., the city that Jenny 
visits had better not be renowned for its dishonest informants. Were that to be 
the case, we would not credit Jenny with knowledge. Second, we presuppose 
some inclinations about Jenny’s cognitive character. We expect that Jenny can 
distinguish between potentially reliable and clearly unreliable informants; we 
do not expect that Jenny would be happy to ask just anybody. For example, 
we anticipate that she would not ask someone who clearly looked like a 
tourist (i.e., an unreliable informant). “Had the first person she met been 
obviously mad, or a stereotypical tourist, for example, then we would expect 
her to move on to the next prospective informant down the street” (Pritchard 
forthcoming, 18). Moreover, we expect that she is able to distinguish between 
potentially reliable and clearly unreliable information and thereby that she 
would not believe whatever she was told, had it been obviously false (for 
instance to go past the city hall whereas, in fact, she is in a village). 
“Furthermore, if the manner in which the informant passed on the directions 
was clearly questionable—if the informant was vague, shifty, hostile, and 
evasive, say—then we would expect our hero to exercise due caution” 
(Pritchard forthcoming, 18). Had Jenny not been responsive to these 
epistemically relevant factors, we would not have normally attributed her 
with knowledge. We, therefore, see that it is not that Jenny’s cognitive 
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character has nothing to do with her believing the truth; it is just that the 
informant’s role is more important.  
 Obviously, then, COGAweak can easily handle the Jenny case; although 
the cognitive success is not primarily creditable to Jenny—but to the 
stranger—Jenny, in so being responsive to the epistemically relevant factors, 
has the right sort of abilities and employs them in the right sort of way so as 
to accept the stranger’s information such that her cognitive success is 
significantly creditable to her cognitive agency.86 According to COGAweak, 
therefore, Jenny can gain knowledge in this way.  
 So, in contrast to virtue reliabilism, COGAweak appears to satisfactorily 
handle testimonial knowledge. Should we also be confident that it is in 
agreement with Lackey’s dualist account?  And, more importantly to the 
purpose of this chapter, can it accommodate the epistemic burden 
distribution that Lackey’s account brings to light? To answer to these two 
questions I will first consider condition D4, then I will move on to D6 and D5, 
D3 and I will finish with D2. 
 So, to begin with, consider condition D4 according to which the 
environment in which B receives A’s testimony must be suitable for the reception of 
reliable testimony. The reason for which I take up this point first is that there is 
no straight reference to it in the formulation of COGAweak. Nevertheless, 
notice that Pritchard’s investigation of what goes wrong in the Jenny case 
begins with the point that it is important to note that to say that Jenny gains 
knowledge in that way, we must read the example in such a way that Jenny is 
in an epistemically friendly environment; it is not as if the city that Jenny 
visits is renowned for its dishonest informants. Were that to be the case, then 
we would not attribute knowledge to Jenny. So we see that the problem 
posited by the knowledge-undermining luck that attaches to a true belief 
when formed in an inappropriate environment goes far beyond unnoticed in 
the process of formulating COGAweak.87.And since COGAweak is only a 
                                                
86 Notice that integrating information acquired by external sources within one’s cognitive 
character is itself a belief-forming process, which is reducible to more basic inductively and 
memory based belief-forming processes. Nevertheless, this kind of belief-forming process 
seems to be critical even though it is usually a transparent one. 
87  In fact, Pritchard recognizes the problem posited by the knowledge-undermining luck to 
be a central one. Accordingly, he elsewhere formulates a complete account of knowledge by 
combining COGAweak with an anti-luck condition on knowledge, namely the safety principle. 
Consider for example Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology: S knows that p if and only if S’s safe belief 
that p is the product of her relevant cognitive abilities (such that her safe cognitive success is to a 
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necessary condition on knowledge—and should this become a pressing 
point—there is nothing preventing us from adding to it a supplementary 
clause that could rule out the lucky acquisition of true beliefs due to the 
environmental inappropriateness. 
     Let us now turn to conditions D5 and D6 according to which the hearer 
must have no undefeated defeaters against the speaker’s testimony and the hearer 
must have appropriate positive reasons for the speaker’s testimony, respectively. The 
incentive for discussing these two conditions together is that they are jointly 
meant to ensure the rational or, at least, not irrational, acceptance of the 
speaker’s testimony. Moreover, notice that the absence of any undefeated 
defeaters against, and the possession of positive reasons for a testimonial 
report could be thought of as the two sides of the same coin. To see why, pay 
attention to the fact that both conditions require that one is aware of, able and 
supposed to detect any such reasons, should they become evidentially 
available. The only difference is that in order to acquire testimonial 
knowledge, in the end, no undefeated defeaters must remain while positive 
reasons must have been acquired. Importantly, however, both conditions 
require an active stance on the part of the hearer in the sense that she must be 
in a continuous lookout for satisfying them. I shall return to this point later on 
in the discussion of condition D3.  
     Meanwhile, we can return to COGAweak to see how conditions D5 and 
D6 can be seen through the lens of this account. First, notice that Pritchard 
clearly acknowledges that to say that Jenny gains knowledge in this way, we 
presuppose some natural inclinations about her cognitive character. We 
expect that Jenny can distinguish between potentially reliable and clearly 
unreliable informants; we do not expect that Jenny would be happy to ask just 
anybody. For example we anticipate that she would not ask someone who 
clearly looked like a tourist (i.e., an unreliable informant), or that she would 
not trust an informant that is vague, hostile or evasive. Moreover, we expect 
that she is able to distinguish between potentially reliable and clearly 
unreliable information and that she would therefore not believe whatever she 
was told, had it been obviously false. Had Jenny not been responsive to such 
                                                                                                                                      
significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency (Pritchard, forthcoming). And again, in 
(Pritchard 2010a, 76) we can read: “knowledge is safe belief that arises out of the reliable 
cognitive traits that make up one’s cognitive character, such that one’s cognitive success is to 
a significant degree creditable to one’s cognitive character”.   
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epistemically relevant factors then we would not have normally attributed 
her with knowledge. Interestingly, notice that Jenny's responsiveness to these 
epistemically relevant factors can also be described in terms of the three types 
of inductively based positive and negative reasons that Lackey grants to 
epistemic agents for identifying reliable (or unreliable) instances of testimony; 
namely, (i) criteria for individuating epistemically reliable contexts and 
contextual features, (ii) criteria for distinguishing between reliable and 
unreliable reports and (iii) criteria for identifying epistemically reliable 
speakers.88     
     Therefore, we see that Jenny, in so being responsive to such 
epistemologically relevant factors, has the right sort of inductively based 
belief-forming processes and employs them in the right sort of way so as to 
appropriately integrate the information conveyed by the communicable 
content of the speaker’s act of communication within the rest of her cognitive 
character. What is of further import, however, is to notice that since one’s 
cognitive character has been described as consisting of one’s perceptual 
cognitive faculties, acquired habits of thought, but also of one’s memories and 
the entire doxastic system, we can see that to say that Jenny, in so being 
responsive to the epistemically relevant factors, appropriately integrates the 
speaker’s information within her cognitive character is on a par with saying 
that Jenny renders rational or, at least, not irrational the acceptance of the 
speaker’s testimony. Because to rationally accept a piece of information is to 
say that this information does not conflict with the rest of one's beliefs, or that 
the process of acquiring it does not conflict with the rest of one’s doxastic 
attitudes. And this is exactly what Lackey’s conditions D5 and D6 were 
intended for. 
     Let us now move on to the last condition that pertains to the hearer. D3 
demands that the hearer is a reliable or properly functioning recipient of testimony. 
As we have seen, the reason for which Lackey includes this condition is to 
rule out cases in which the recipient of testimony either has positive or 
                                                
88  Notice that, as Lackey herself admits, this list is not meant to be exhaustive as there could 
be further inductively based ways to distinguish between the reliability and unreliability of 
testimonial reports (2008, 181). Nevertheless, the identification of reliable reports should not 
be thought of as being exclusively based on inductive reasons, as it may often be the outcome 
of reasons that have to do with the agent’s memory; consider, for example, an agent assessing 
the coherence of information provided by a proffered report with the rest of his/her doxastic 
system. 
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negative reasons evidentially available to him but fails to properly appreciate 
them, or is oversensitive to them, thereby being viciously justified in 
accepting the speaker’s testimony. What must be further noticed, though, is 
that Lackey makes condition D3 subtler by adding the qualification that the 
hearer must be a reliable or properly functioning recipient of testimony in a 
substantial way. In particular, in her defense of her dualist view against the 
Infant/Child Objection, Lackey argues (2008, ch.7) that the only meaningful 
way for the ‘no undefeated defeaters’ condition (D5) to be satisfied is 
substantively, as opposed to trivially. To better understand this point, she 
prompts us to consider the following: “if we impose a no-φing condition on X 
then there is a crucial difference between what we might call trivial satisfaction 
and substantive satisfaction of such condition, a difference that depends on X’s 
capacity to φ. In particular, let us put forth the following: 
 
Trivial Satisfaction: If X does not φ merely because X does not have the 
capacity to φ, then X has trivially satisfied the no-φing condition. 
Substantial Satisfaction: If X has the capacity to φ and does not φ, then X has 




Having this crucial distinction in mind, Lackey goes on to explain that if φ is 
an epistemological or moral condition, then only in the second case is X 
epistemologically or morally praiseworthy for satisfying it (Lackey 2008, 198). 
Therefore, conditions D5 and D6 should be understood only as requiring a 
substantial satisfaction of themselves. And while it may be true that there is 
no obvious sense in which the ‘positive reasons’ thesis (D6) could be satisfied 
in a non-substantial way, this qualification is crucial for the ‘no undefeated 
defeaters’ condition, the point being that if the hearer does not have any 
undefeated defeaters because she is incapable of having any at all, then she is 
not praiseworthy (justified/ warranted) for accepting an otherwise reliable 
testimony and, therefore, she lacks knowledge.  
           Now, to see how this is connected to Pritchard’s account, recall that 
COGAweak reads that for S to know that p, S’s true belief must be the product 
                                                
89  One of the examples that motivate Lackey’s view is the following: 
For instance, one of the reasons it doesn't make sense to impose a “no-lying condition” 
on a chair is because chairs cannot lie. To say that a chair has satisfied such a condition 
merely because it hasn't lied, without taking into account whether the chair has the 
capacity to lie, trivializes what satisfaction of such a condition. Of course, 
considerations of this sort apply to persons as well. (Lackey 2008, 197) 
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of some reliable belief-forming process that is appropriately integrated within 
S’s cognitive character, such that the cognitive success is significantly 
creditable to S’s cognitive agency. Since credit is attributed in cases of success 
through ability, however, this means that the employment and exercise of the 
belief-forming processes,90 via which S came to rationally accept the speaker’s 
testimony, must signify that S has exhibited some effort for which his/her 
cognitive agency is praiseworthy, and so, believing the truth is significantly 
creditable to him.91 And this, in turn, is on a par with Lackey’s demand that 
the acquisition of positive reasons and the failure to detect any negative ones 
are conditions on testimonial knowledge that must be substantively satisfied.  
     And finally, let us turn to Lackey’s only condition that pertains to the 
speaker, namely D2: the speaker’s testimony must be reliable or otherwise truth-
conducive. First, we should concentrate on the epistemic burden distribution 
that the inclusion of D2 entails. As it has been previously noted, Lackey’s 
dualism, contrary to reductionism and non-reductionism that only focus 
either on the hearer or the speaker, distributes the epistemic burden across 
both parties of the testimonial exchange. But how can COGAweak account for 
the dual origins of the epistemic justification/warrant? According to 
COGAweak, knowledge can be attributed to S only if the cognitive success of 
believing the truth can be significantly credited to S’s cognitive agency. 
Crucially, however, COGAweak denies that the cognitive success must be 
wholly attributed to the hearer’s cognitive agency thereby allowing, in cases of 
testimonial knowledge, for the rest of the credit to be, at least in part, 
attributed to the speaker’s epistemic effort. To see how this would work, it 
should be helpful to go back to the Jenny case; it is not that Jenny’s cognitive 
character has nothing to do with her believing the truth; it is just that the 
informant’s cognitive character is more important. Despite this fact, however, 
a significant part of the credit can be attributed to Jenny's cognitive agency for 
                                                
90  Remember that, in cases of testimonial knowledge, the belief-forming processes found in 
the formulation of COGAweak stand for the inductively and memory based positive and 
negative reasons that one may have for rationally, or at least not irrationally, accepting, or 
rejecting a speaker’s testimony (i.e., for appropriately integrating, or not, the speaker’s 
reports within the rest of one’s cognitive character).   
91 Notice that Lackey, not having in mind the ‘of credit/creditable’ debate between Greco and 
Pritchard, freely speaks of praiseworthiness, without, however, adopting any positive stance 
on the issue. Therefore, in this and the previous paragraph, ‘praiseworthy’ could be 
substituted for ‘creditable’ without any loss at the force of the argument. Manifesting some 
effort could be creditable to one, without the need to further specify whether the action 
performed was positive, negative, or neutral.  
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employing the right sort of belief-forming processes for rationally accepting 
the speaker’s words. At the same time, however, the rest of the credit can be, 
at least in part, attributed to the speaker’s cognitive agency for delivering a 
reliable report. So, we see that, in this way, COGAweak can accommodate the 
very essence of Lackey’s dualism in the epistemology of testimony, namely 
the epistemic burden distribution across both the speaker and the hearer.  
 To conclude, then, COGAweak does appear to accommodate one of the 
most detailed accounts of testimonial knowledge on offer. Since testimony 
appears to be responsible for a preponderance of our true beliefs that amount 
to knowledge this should be a felicitous conclusion on its own. What is 
distinctive of Lackey’s dualism on testimonial knowledge, however, is the fact 
that it explicitly points out to the dual sources of testimonial justification. That 
is, testimonial justification is not fully reducible to the hearer’s reasons for 
rationally accepting the speaker’s report. Instead, it also supervenes on the 
reliability of the speaker’s report. Remarkably, COGAweak, which is meant to 
capture a necessary aspect of knowledge understood in terms of creditable 
true belief, allows the hearer to acquire knowledge, because the cognitive 
success can be significantly creditable to her cognitive agency. At the same 
time, however, it allows for the rest of the credit to be attributed to the 
speaker for offering a reliable report. Accordingly, COGAweak has the 
resources to do justice to Lackey’s insight regarding the epistemic burden 
distribution that takes place in cases of testimonial knowledge. And since 
knowledge is understood as creditable true belief and credit must be 
attributed to both parties of a testimonial exchange, testimony appears to be a 
type of knowledge that, in a first sense, justifies the central claim of this 
chapter: knowledge, in many cases, is essentially both individual and social. 
   
4.3) Epistemic Coverage Support 
 
In his recent book, Sandy Goldberg (2010) appears to share Lackey’s insight 
with respect to the epistemic burden distribution that occurs in cases of 
testimonial knowledge. In fact, in order to accentuate the speaker’s 
involvement in the production of a reliable testimonial belief, he goes so far as 
to claim that the belief-forming process that produces the hearer’s justified 
true belief is a single belief-forming process that supervenes on both the 
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hearer and the speaker’s cognitive sub-processes: “far from being merely local 
features of the subject's environment, the testimony itself, along with the 
cognitive processes implicated in the production of that testimony, are more 
appropriately regarded as part of the testimonial belief-forming process itself. Call 
this the “extendedness hypothesis”” (2010, 79).92  
 In so arguing about testimonial knowledge, Goldberg’s ultimate aim is 
similar to the aim of the present chapter, which is to make explicit the social 
dimension of some kinds of individualistic knowledge.  Clearly, if testimonial 
knowledge is the product of a belief-forming process that ‘epistemically 
extends’ from the hearer to the speaker’s cognitive processes, then, in virtue 
reliabilistic terms, a significant part of the credit for the hearer’s cognitive 
success should be attributed to both parties of the testimonial exchange.93 
Although Goldberg’s account of testimonial knowledge is very interesting, 
we do not here need to dwell on its details, since the aim of this section is to 
concentrate on another very interesting epistemological phenomenon, which, 
as Goldberg himself claims, is not an instance of his “extendedness 
hypothesis”. I am referring to the ‘coverage-reliability’ of one’s community. 
 To illustrate Goldberg’s point, consider that you know that there is no 
World-War taking place at the moment, that none of your colleagues was 
fired in the past few days, that there are no protests taking place at the city 
center right now, that Messi has not signed a contract with Real Madrid and 
that Madonna is not dead. One of the underlying reasons for all these 
instances of knowledge, Goldberg claims, is that if any of those beliefs were true, 
you would have heard about it by now.  Call the italicized conditional the ‘true-to-
testimony conditional’. So, in some more detail, any coverage-supported 
belief will be a “species of inferential belief, where one of the premises 
involved is none other than (something like) the truth-to-testimony 
conditional itself” (Goldberg 2010, 174). Specifically, a subject’s coverage 
supported belief that p is justified by her current belief that she has no 
                                                
92 Notice that Goldberg does not make this claim on the basis of the extended cognition 
hypothesis, and indeed, as formulated in the previous chapters, HEC would rule out 
testimony as an extended cognitive belief-forming process. Rather, Goldberg holds that 
testimony is a belief-forming process that epistemically “extends” to the cognitive capacities of 
the speaker because testimony is a ‘quasi-belief dependent’ belief-forming process whose 
reliability is a function of the reliability of its input, which, in turn, depends on the reliability of 
the speaker’s cognitive processes that produced the relevant testimony. For more details see 
(Goldberg 2010, chs. 3, 4). For Goldberg’s disavowal of HEC see (2010, ch. 5).  
93 Notice that Goldberg commits himself only to process reliabilism. Accordingly, his way of 
unraveling the social dimension of knowledge is by ‘socializing reliability’.  
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memory of having been informed that not-p, together with her belief in the 
relevant instance of the truth-to-testimony conditional. There are, of course, 
relevant inferences that will not hold. So here is a set of five conditions that 
Goldberg (2010, 158-164) deems jointly sufficient for a subject’s coverage-
supported beliefs to count as knowledge: 
 
i) Source existence condition: there must be some subgroup of members 
of the hearer's community—we will call this group “the source”—
who are disposed to report about the relevant sort of matters. 
ii) Reliable coverage condition: the relied-upon source must be reliable in 
uncovering and subsequently publicizing truths about the domain 
in which the subject is exhibiting coverage-reliance. 
 
Let D be a domain of interest to subject H, let p be any proposition in D 
regarding whose truth H might take an interest, and let α be some source on 
whom H could rely on matters pertaining to D. Then we can characterize the 
relevant notion as follows: CR is coverage-reliable in D =def α (i) will (investigate 
and) reliably determine whether p, (ii) will be reliable in reporting the 
outcome of that investigation, and (iii) will satisfy both of the previous two 
conditions in a timely fashion. (Goldberg 2010, 159) 
 
 
iii) Sufficient interval condition: there must be some sort of coordination 
between the time-related expectations of H, on the one hand, and 
the abilities of α to make any relevant discoveries, on the other:  
 
α (the relied-upon source) must be such that, at the time t at which α is being 
relied upon by H, it is true that, were there some relevant discovery to be 
made, α would have made the relevant discovery by t, and would have 
reported on the matter. (2010, 160) 
 
 
iv) Silence Condition: in point of fact, H has not encountered any 
relevant report to date. 
v) Receptivity Condition: H must be such that she would come across 
whatever relevant reports were offered by the source(s) on whom 
she was relying, were one to be made. 
 
 
Now, letting any relevant details aside, the above conditions should be 
relevantly uncontroversial. What is more, notice how many of them really 
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pertain to the subject whose knowledge status is being assessed. Remarkably, 
as Goldberg notes, it is only the last two conditions that refer to the hearer. 
What those two conditions require is that the hearer be able to remember 
whether she has indeed encountered any relevant reports in the past and that 
she is actually open to the channels of information that she is relying upon. 
Now, moving to the sufficient interval condition, it apparently refers both to 
the hearer and the relied upon source. The hearer, on her part, must be able to 
appropriately appreciate how fast her relied upon source can regularly 
investigate and report on the matters it is relied upon, whereas the relied 
upon source must conform to the time interval that is regularly considered to 
take place between the occurrence of a relevant fact and its publication. 
Finally, both the first and second conditions refer to the subject’s community. 
There must be appropriate informational channels, which reliably both 
investigate and subsequently report on relevant matters.  
So if the epistemic phenomenon that Goldberg has unearthed does 
indeed obtain—and it appears that it does—one obvious conclusion is in 
order. Since of the five jointly sufficient conditions that must be satisfied in 
order for a subject’s belief to be coverage-supported such that it can amount 
to knowledge, two of them pertain to the hearer’s cognitive abilities, in such 
cases, the hearer’s cognitive success will be significantly creditable to the 
hearer’s cognitive agency. According to COGAweak then, a subject can gain 
knowledge on the basis of coverage support. What is of more interest, 
however, is that one of the five conditions is shared by both the hearer and 
her relied upon source, whereas the remaining two conditions really pertain 
to the epistemic community that the hearer is embedded in. Accordingly, the 
remaining epistemic credit should be attributed to the hearer’s epistemic 
community. And since, as it has been previously noted, knowledge is here 
understood in terms of creditable true believing, coverage-supported true 
beliefs is another instance of knowledge which is at the same time both social 
and individual.   
 
4.4) The Individual, Epistemic Artifacts, and the Society 
 
Testimonial beliefs and coverage-supported beliefs demonstrate the social 
nature of individualistic knowledge as in both cases the subject’s cognitive 
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success is not only creditable to her cognitive agency but also to other 
individual epistemic agents who have either contributed to the reliability of 
the testimonial reports, or the coverage-based beliefs that the subject 
rationally accepts as true. These are straightforward manifestations of the 
claim that individual knowledge can at the same time be social in the sense 
that the process of knowledge acquisition pertains to considerations that 
clearly go beyond the subject of knowledge. In this section, however, the aim 
is to concentrate on another category of cases whereby, even though one’s 
epistemic society affects one’s knowledge-acquisition only indirectly, 
individual knowledge may again turn out to be a social phenomenon as well.  
 The cases I have in mind are none other than the cases in which the 
agent comes to know something on the basis of the operation of an epistemic 
artifact. As it has been previously noted, in such cases, the cognitive success 
will be significantly creditable to one’s cognitive agency, for it is one’s 
cognitive agency that is first and foremost responsible for the integration and 
sustainment of the extended belief-forming process so as to eventually 
accomplish the aim of forming a true belief on the relevant matter.   
 In contrast, there appear to be cases of perceptual knowledge whereby 
one could claim that the credit can be wholly attributed to the agent’s 
cognitive agency, as he has solely employed his organismic cognitive faculties 
in order to form his true beliefs. This, however, may be a simplification. For if 
we consider the theory-laden nature of empirical observations and the other 
underlying processes that influence our understanding of the surrounding 
world, then, again, the cognitive agent seems to employ more processes than 
merely the ones that make up his organismic cognitive mechanism.94 I will 
leave the question on the nature of perceptual knowledge open for future 
research.  
 Now, to return to cases whereby an epistemic artifact is explicitly 
involved in the process of knowledge acquisition, one may fairly wonder 
whereto should the rest of the credit be attributed? This is a fair worry, for as 
                                                
94 The main idea here is that perceptual knowledge, i.e., the output of perceptual abilities, is 
observational. We also know, however, that observation is theory-laden, either by explicitly 
articulated scientific theories, or by implicit “natural interpretations” (Feyerabend 1975, ch. 
6). Now, if we accept the claim that scientific theories are themselves languages, which 
according to HEC are the ultimate (software) artifacts, then we are also led to the conclusion 
that even individual observations—the output of perceptual abilities—are not strictly 
individual in nature. Scientific theories are socially constructed.    
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it has been argued in the previous chapters, in such cases, the prevailing 
factor in the causal explanation of the agent’s cognitive success is the 
integrated extended belief-forming process that consists of both one’s cognitive 
agency and the epistemic artifact, operating in tandem. So, since a significant 
part of the credit has been attributed to the agent’s cognitive agency, should 
we attribute the rest of the credit to the relevant external reliable belief-
forming process? That is, should we attribute credit to telescopes, 
microscopes, calculators, languages, scientific theories and so on? It seems 
that the answer to these questions should be negative. 
 To see why, consider that even though Greco (2004) holds that credit 
attributions are very much akin to causal explanations, attributions of 
responsibility, praise, or merely neutral action (i.e., attributions of positive, 
negative, or merely neutral credit, respectively) have been traditionally 
associated with intentional agents.  Since, however, it would be highly 
implausible to claim that artifacts have intentions, it follows that no credit (be 
it positive, negative, or neutral) could be attributed to them.95 Notice, 
nevertheless, that artifacts can be defined as objects that have been 
intentionally made or produced for a certain purpose. Accordingly, what the 
above points seem to suggest is that even though no credit can be attributed 
to artifacts, whenever they figure most importantly in causal explanations, the 
corresponding credit could be attributed to the individuals that produced the 
relevant artifacts. Credit, therefore, cannot be attributed to telescopes, 
microscopes, calculators, languages and scientific theories; rather, in cases 
where knowledge is the product of an extended belief-forming process, the 
rest of the credit should be attributed to the individuals that brought the 
relevant belief-forming processes about. Mind, however, that, frequently, we 
will not be able to attribute the rest of the credit to only one single individual, 
because, in most cases, in order to come up with such reliable belief-forming 
processes the individual must employ similar belief-forming processes, or 
rely on knowledge that has been delivered by other individuals on the basis 
of further reliable belief-forming processes and so on. Now, before drawing 
                                                
95 In so avoiding to determine whether the credit will be negative, positive, or neutral, the 
issue of where it could be attributed to is orthogonal to Pritchard and Greco’s debate with 
regards to the question of whether knowledge is always ‘of credit’, and thereby an 
achievement.  
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our conclusions, let us consider two examples that may render the present 
view more intuitive.  
 Consider the FIA Formula One Championship. The F1 season consists 
of a series of races, the results of which are combined to determine two 
Annual World Championships; one for the drivers and one for the 
constructors. In this case, the analogue to be drawn is that the drivers play the 
role of the cognitive agents and the cars that of the epistemic artifact.96 
According to FIA’s rules, however, the credit for winning cannot only be 
attributed to the drivers; hence the two championships. Moreover, pay 
attention to the fact that the second championship is not attributed to the cars 
but to the constructors that built the cars. In other words, the credit for 
winning is not only attributed to the cognitive agent that drives the car, but, 
also, to the team that brought about the racing artifact (i.e., the car). 
 Next, consider a meteorologist who advises the sailors not to travel 
tomorrow because he knows there will be a storm. For coming to know the 
target proposition (that there will be a storm tomorrow) the meteorologist 
collects weather observations of atmospheric pressure, temperature, wind 
speed and direction, humidity, etc., which he inserts as inputs to a 
supercomputer. The supercomputer performs a simulation of the atmosphere, 
generating outputs, usually in the form of graphs, which then the 
meteorologist studies, feeds back new inputs in the supercomputer, and 
eventually forms the belief that there will be a storm. In other words, the 
meteorologist reciprocally interacts with the computer such that he 
appropriately integrates within his cognitive character the belief-forming 
process of the computer simulation so as to come to know the truth of the 
target proposition.  
Obviously, the meteorologist could not have come to know the target 
proposition soon enough—though one could argue that he could not have 
come to know it not even within a lifetime—without employing the reliable 
belief-forming process of the computer simulation. That is, for coming to 
know the target proposition, the meteorologist has to rely on an extended 
belief-forming process that was brought about on the basis of knowledge—
produced by further reliable belief-forming processes—of long generations of 
mathematicians, computer scientists, chemical and electrical engineers, 
                                                
96 Driving the car then, plays the role of the overall extended belief-forming process. 
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physicians, and, in general, a vast series of experts whose length could go on 
for a while.97 Had the meteorologist not been a part of this epistemic social 
structure, and therefore lacked the necessary reliable belief-forming process, 
he would be incapable of gaining knowledge of the target proposition. 
Overall, then, the cognitive success of coming to know there will be a 
storm is to a significant degree creditable to the particular meteorologist—it is 
he who came to know the target proposition by employing the necessary 
belief-forming process—but the rest of the credit must be attributed to the 
individuals, and in general to the social structure, that brought about the 
necessary belief-forming process.  
Furthermore, consider how a similar description of the process of 
gaining propositional knowledge could apply within the fields of astronomy, 
mechanics, physics, economics, biology, chemistry, neuroscience, 
mathematics, and so on. The moral seems to be that in order for one to know 
something on most of the matters, one needs the whole historical and cultural 
background that can generate and complement one’s expert knowledge. One 
needs the background knowledge and the reliable belief-forming processes 
produced by long generations of mathematicians, engineers, experimentalists, 
scientists, traders, explorers, philosophers and many other experts so as to 
come to know the truth of some proposition p. (Remember that, in section 3.4, 
it was argued that even scientific theories may qualify as extensions of one’s 
cognitive character). In other words, one could argue that the individual 
agent may have an advanced epistemic standing only within a given social 
structure.98 
Now, to pick up our epistemological discussion from where we left it, 
in the cases above, the knower is the individual who comes to know some 
proposition p by employing some reliable belief-forming process, which is 
appropriately integrated within her cognitive character such that the 
                                                
97 Notice, further, that the observations which the meteorologist uses as inputs to the 
computer simulation are also the product of instruments, or reliable belief-forming processes 
produced by a series of individuals who have relied on the knowledge grounded on further 
reliable belief-forming processes and so on. 
98 By ‘advanced epistemic standing’ I mean any kind of knowledge beyond perceptual 
knowledge. That is, knowledge that in order to be obtained, the individual agent has to 
employ extended belief-forming processes, or evidence delivered by extended belief-forming 
processes, or testimonial reports. Notice, however, that considering the theory-laden nature 
of the empirical observations and the rest of the underlying processes of our understanding 
of the world, one could strengthen the point by saying that the individual may be an 
epistemic agent, in general, only within a given social structure. 
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cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable to her cognitive agency. 
Crucially, however, the epistemic agent has come to know some proposition p 
by appropriately integrating within her cognitive character an extended 
reliable belief-forming process. In these cases, it has been argued, the rest of 
the credit for the cognitive success of S’s believing the truth with regards to 
the target proposition will have to be attributed to the individuals, and, in 
general, to the social structure that brought about the relevant reliable belief-
forming process.99 Therefore, since, according to the broader framework of 
virtue reliabilism, knowledge is creditable true belief that is the product of 
cognitive abilities, knowledge that is the product of the operation of epistemic 
artifacts turns out to be, essentially, both social and individual.  
In discussing the embodied and situated nature of cognition, Gallagher 
writes: “I do not disagree with Dennett concerning the role played by non-
conscious elements, except that I think we are even larger than he thinks—we 
are not just what happens in our brains. The ‘loop’ extends through and is 
limited by our bodily capabilities, into the surrounding environment, which is 
social as well as physical, and feeds back through our conscious experience 
into the decisions we make” (Gallagher 2005, 242). We, thus, see that 
cognition is both embodied and physically and socially situated. But, note 
that if knowledge is the product of cognitive abilities, then so knowledge, too, 
turns out to be both embodied and physically and socially situated. 
In other words, according to virtue reliabilism and, in particular, to 
COGAweak, we gain a view on knowledge whereby the individual agent can be 
an advanced epistemic agent only within a given social structure necessary 
for supplying him with reliable-belief forming processes that he later 
integrates within his cognitive character so as to come to know the truth of 
                                                
99 Conversely, if the external belief-forming process is not a reliable belief-forming disposition 
that is appropriately integrated within the agent’s cognitive character, then the agent won’t 
be credited with knowledge, and, thereby, neither the rest of the social structure that brought 
about the relevant belief-forming process will. For example, if when using a telescope for the 
first time I see something that looks like a star, I cannot be credited with knowledge of the 
proposition that ‘there is a star’, because what I see could have so easily been something 
completely different due to observational noise produced by, say, the atmospheric 
turbulence. In this case, the extended belief-forming process of telescopic observation is not 
appropriately integrated within my cognitive character, as it is not a belief-forming 
disposition for me (I use the telescope for the first time). Therefore, I cannot be credited with 
knowledge of the target proposition and, thereby, neither the rest of the social structure can. 
That is, the social structure can be credited with knowledge only through the epistemic 
agent’s cognitive agency that has come to know the truth of some proposition by 
appropriately integrating within his cognitive character the external belief-forming processes 
produced by the social structure. 
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some proposition p. At the same time, however, the social structure can gain 
knowledge and produce the relevant reliable belief-forming processes only 
through the necessary epistemic agency of the individual cognitive agent. 
This interesting epistemic interaction renders some more plausibility to the 
intuitive idea that the society and the individual are the two aspects of the 
same entity and, thereby, the one cannot be considered in isolation from the 
other. 
 
4.5) Conclusion: Epistemic Dependence and Epistemic Individualism: the 
Dual Nature of Knowledge 
 
 
 It has been argued so far that individual knowledge, understood along the 
virtue reliabilistic lines as creditable true believing, so often appears to be also 
social in nature. In particular, the focus has been on cases of testimonial 
knowledge, knowledge of coverage-supported beliefs, and knowledge 
acquired on the basis of the operation of epistemic artifacts. These cases 
admittedly represent a very important fraction of a subject’s channels of 
knowledge acquisition. In those cases, it was argued, the subject’s cognitive 
success is significantly creditable to her cognitive agency and thus, according 
to COGAweak, the individual is knowledgeable. Interestingly, however, the rest 
of the credit, in all these cases, is creditable to the individuals that belong to, 
and form the epistemic society, or culture, in which the subject of knowledge 
is embedded. This is so, either because those individuals offer reliable reports, 
form epistemic channels on which the subject can rely on for her coverage-
supported beliefs, or have produced some reliable belief-forming process that 
the subject can integrate within her cognitive character so as to reliably form 
true beliefs. Therefore, to repeat the claim, if knowledge is to be understood in 
terms of creditable true believing and significant credit must be attributed 
both to the individual subject and the epistemic society (or aspects of it) of 
which the subject is a proper part, then individual knowledge turns out to be 
in many cases social as well.    
 But, does this partly social nature of knowledge suggest, as some 
epistemologists have argued, that we should stop considering the individual 
as the proper object of our epistemological inquiries? To answer this question, 
let us briefly go through what Hardwig says concerning the following case: 
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A knows that m 
B knows that n 
C knows (1) that A knows that m, and (2) that if m, then o 
D knows (1) that B knows that n, (2) that C knows that o, and (3) that if n and 
o, then p. 
 
 
Having this case in mind, Hardwig writes: “Suppose that this is the only way 
to know that p and, moreover, that no one who “knows” that p knows that m, 
n and o except by knowing that others know them” (1985, 348). On the face of 
these considerations, Hardwig concludes that unless we do not want to retain 
that scientific research and scholarship result in knowledge, because of their 
cooperative methodology, we must support that p is known in this way. 
However, if p is so known, Hardwig further claims, then it is not known by 
anyone person but by the community that consists of A, B, C and D, because 
“this community is not reducible to a class of individuals, for no one 
individual and no one individually knows that p” (1985, 349).  
This is indeed a threatening conclusion for the individualistic nature of 
knowledge and a rather counterintuitive one. For this reason, let us try to 
investigate what may have gone wrong with Hardwig’s argument, leading 
him to this dubious statement.  First, we must straighten out the fact that 
Hardwig considers the classical account of knowledge as ‘justified true belief’, 
whereby justification is internally conceived. That is, Hardwig considers that 
the individual S must be able to justify his beliefs only by reflection alone; one 
of the weakest formulations of internalist justification holds that S’s reasons 
for his true beliefs must be accessible to him by reflection alone.100 Accordingly, 
even this weak formulation of internalism leads to the conclusion that 
epistemic agents must be intellectually autonomous. Therefore, considering 
intellectual autonomy as a prerequisite for knowledge and having in mind the 
above cooperative process for gaining knowledge, Hardwig validly draws the 
counterintuitive conclusion that, in most cases, we should claim that the seat 
of knowledge is the community and not the individual agent. Is there, 
however, an alternative way to go so as to avoid this devastating conclusion 
for individual knowledge?  
                                                
100 I am referring to accessibilism, which is also supposed to be the standard internalist view. 
Roughly stated: Whenever one knows that p, then one can become aware by reflection of 
one’s knowledge basis for p. For more details see (BonJour 1980; Chisholm 1977; Steup 1999).  
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It seems that, instead of challenging the individual nature of 
knowledge, one could bring into question the classical definition of 
knowledge as ‘internally justified true belief’.101 It is a happy incident, then, 
that virtue reliabilism and COGAweak are externalist approaches to knowledge 
that have been proposed as alternatives to the classical internalist account, 
leading to the more intuitive conclusion that the individual is a proper 
epistemic agent, even though not autonomously so. To see how this might be 
so consider that, according to externalism, in order for one’s true beliefs to 
count as knowledge, they need not be backed up by reasons to which one 
could in principle have introspective access. And so, denying the demand for 
introspective access to one’s justification for one’s beliefs also makes the 
demand for intellectually autonomy appear undermotivated. COGAweak, 
however, takes these considerations a step further. More in particular, by 
allowing knowledge to be acquired merely on the basis of reliable belief-
forming processes such that the cognitive success can only be significantly 
creditable to one’s cognitive agency it actually anticipates—if not ascertains—
the denial of intellectual autonomy. Either the reliability of the input for, or 
the reliability of the very belief-forming processes themselves may heavily 
depend on one’s epistemic society/culture and this is a fact that can be 
explicitly accommodated; COGAweak allows (the rest of the) credit to be 
attributed to those exogenous (or rather extra-organismic) epistemic factors as 
well. Nevertheless, at the same time, it stresses the importance of the 
individual epistemic agent by demanding that the cognitive success be 
significantly creditable to his/her cognitive agency.  
To be clear, however, mind that the above is not to claim that all 
externalist epistemology points away intellectual autonomy and robust 
individualism—as we may call the view that knowledge should be fully down 
to the individual. Having the reasons of one’s justification out of one’s 
awareness is certainly not the same as partly having those reasons out of 
one’s bodily boundaries. There certainly can be many externalist conditions 
on knowledge, which are individualistic in nature. Take for example Greco’s 
virtue reliabilism, which demands that the cognitive success be primarily 
creditable to S’s cognitive character. On a first look, this proposal appears to 
                                                
101 That is, one could bring into question one of Hardwig’s premises. 
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be a form of weak individualism.102 We therefore see that the 
internalism/externalism distinction is by no means the same as the 
individualism/anti-individualism distinction. Moreover, even though 
internalist conditions on knowledge may always be tied to robust 
individualism, externalist conditions appear to come in degrees, with the 
potential to lie anywhere on the continuum that the individualism/anti-
individualism distinction defines. Nevertheless, COGAweak—with its lenient 
demands on the creditability of the cognitive success to one’s cognitive 
agency—seems to be able to capture the full spectrum of the 
individualism/anti-individualism continuum. So far, we have been liberated 
from the demand for intellectual autonomy and the concomitant robust 
individualism, by pointing out that knowledge may be creditable both to the 
individual and the society of which he/she is a part. This might be called a 
version of weak epistemic anti-individualism. More on the most liberal—and 
diametrically opposite to robust individualism—version of (epistemic) 
externalism will be discussed in the chapters to follow.   
 For now, it suffices to conclude that knowledge can be both social and 
individual in nature exactly because, in most cases, the individual comes to 
know the truth of some proposition p by relying on the support provided by 
the social structure—through either the employment of socially derived 
belief-forming processes, the society’s epistemic structure, or by exploiting 
information that has been delivered by other individuals on the basis of 














                                                
102 If, instead, it demanded that one’s cognitive success be solely creditable to one’s cognitive 
agency, it would be a case of robust individualism. 
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CHAPTER 5 





In the previous chapter we focused on testimonial knowledge, coverage-
supported beliefs, and knowledge acquired on the basis of the operation of 
epistemic artifacts. In these cases, even though the agent’s justification lies 
partly outside his cognitive agency (i.e., his organismic cognitive apparatus), 
the agent manifests sufficient cognitive effort such that the cognitive success 
is significantly creditable to him. Thus, on the basis of COGAweak, we 
concluded, even though the agent is not intellectually autonomous, 
knowledge can still be properly ascribed to him.  
This weak version of anti-individualism also points towards the dual 
nature of knowledge. Knowledge—understood as creditable true belief—is 
individualistic in such cases, because the agent manifests cognitive effort such 
that the cognitive success is significantly creditable to him. In the case of 
testimony and coverage-supported beliefs, the cognitive success is 
significantly creditable to the agent because on the basis of his reliable 
cognitive abilities he either rationally accepts the speaker’s reliable report, or 
checks that he has not come across a contrary piece of information. In the case 
of knowledge attained on the basis of artifacts, cognitive success is again 
significantly creditable to him, because it is his cognitive agency that is first 
and foremost responsible for recruiting, maintaining, and overall integrating 
within his cognitive character the artifact that partly constitutes the extended 
belief-forming process on the basis of which he acquires a true belief. But, in 
all of the above cases knowledge is social as well. This is because in 
testimonial and coverage-supported beliefs, part of the credit should be 
attributed either to the testifiers, or to the individuals that bring about the 
socio-epistemic structure that allows the epistemic agent to enjoy coverage-
supported beliefs. Similarly, in the case of epistemic artifacts, part of the 
credit should be attributed to the individuals who brought those artifacts 
about. Accordingly, the above ways of knowing demonstrate that knowledge 
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may be partly social while being, at the same time, individual as well. 
Therefore, in such cases of epistemic dependence, we do not need to embrace 
Hardwig’s unpalatable conclusion, namely that the known proposition is not 
known by anyone individually, but only by the society as a whole. Going 
against robust individualism does not necessarily entail full-blown anti-
individualism. The middle grounds of weak anti-individualism are open for 
us.  
Yet, I here wish to examine whether Hardwig’s conclusion may still be 
true. That is, could there be cases of knowledge where it is not known by 
anyone individually? In other words, could we make a case for robust anti-
individualism in epistemology? 
 According to COGAweak and its concomitant understanding of 
knowledge as creditable true belief, robust anti-individualism can only get off 
the ground if there are cases of knowledge where the cognitive success won’t 
be significantly creditable to any individual alone. That is, we need a case 
where justification will be entirely distributed among several individuals 
and/or epistemic artifacts. In particular—cashed out in virtue reliabilistic 
terms—we are after a case of distributed cognitive ability (i.e., a distributed 
belief-forming process) on the basis of which knowledge may be acquired, 
such that the cognitive success won’t be creditable to anyone in particular but, 
instead, to a group of individuals as a whole.  
 In order to make such a case, therefore, we must focus on group 
agents, and particularly epistemic group agents. If such entities are possible 
then knowledge, which is only creditable, and thus possessed only at the 
group level should be possible as well. Again, being able to locate such a case 
would amount to making a case for epistemological robust anti-
individualism.  
 Accordingly, this and the following chapter will focus on group agents 
in general and epistemic group agents in particular. More specifically, the 
present chapter is dedicated to the metaphysical support of group agents on 
the basis of emergentist considerations. Interestingly, as we shall see, these 
considerations will invite us to re-invoke the arguments from dynamical 
systems theory (DST), which were offered in support of the postulation of 
coupled systems in chapter 2. Once metaphysical support is provided—
revealing some interesting, yet unsurprising, generic properties of group 
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agents—chapter 6 will focus on epistemic group agents. In particular, I will 
provide two examples of alleged epistemic group agents that seem to satisfy 
the generic properties to be revealed in this chapter. Then, I will move on to 
examine whether COGAweak can account for such cases and whether it can 
further reveal some of the more specific properties of epistemic group agents 
in particular. 
 
5.2) Group Agents 
 
5.2.1) Introduction  
 
The existence of group/collective agents has lately started receiving growing 
attention within philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and several 
approaches have been offered for arguing in their support. For example, List 
& Petite (2010) argue on the basis of collective judgments, Tollefsen (2002) has 
been interested in collective intentionality, while Theiner et al. (2010), Wilson 
(2005), and Hutchins (1995) focus on distributed cognitive/computational 
systems. Since, however, the focus here is on epistemic group agents, while 
also presupposing the validity of the ability intuition on knowledge—i.e., that 
knowledge must be the product of cognitive ability—we will only concern 
ourselves with considerations pertaining to distributed cognition. Remember, 
in order to make the case for robust anti-individualism we need to see 
whether there could be any distributed belief-forming processes, which are 
only possessed by groups of individuals and not by any individual alone. In 
such cases, knowledge will only be attributable to the group level. 
For doing so I will rehearse the points and arguments from (Sawyer 
2001), where the author claims that the best way to support the existence of 
social entities—or at least social properties—is the same way in which non-
reductive materialism is defended within philosophy of mind. The discussion 
will make apparent the importance of dense non-linear interactions amongst 
individuals in cases of non-reducible (i.e., emergent) social entities. Thus, I 
will argue, there can also be a second way for arguing for group agents; 
namely, by re-invoking the considerations from DST presented in chapter 
two. Having made explicit the connection between these two argumentative 
lines, I will then conclude by going through further theoretical support 
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available in the literature, which is in fact very much in line with the 
aforementioned arguments.   
 
5.2.2) Supervenience, Multiple Realizability, and Wild Disjunction  
 
Sawyer (2001) begins his article by explaining that the relationship between 
the individual and the collective is one of the most troubling issues in 
sociology, having perplexed the minds of such figures as Durkheim, Marx, 
Simmel, and Weber. In more liberal terms the question has been this: what is 
the connection between the micro and the macro? 
 Explanations of this micro-macro link have very often appealed to the 
notion of emergence: collective phenomena are collaboratively created by 
individuals, but may not be reducible to them. Furthermore, the debate on the 
micro-macro link has given rise to two main strands within sociology: 1) 
methodological individualism and 2) methodological collectivism. 
Methodological individualism is the claim that there exist emergent social 
properties, yet they can be reduced to explanations in terms of individuals 
and their relationships. Methodological collectivism, on the other hand, is the 
claim that collectives possess emergent properties that cannot be reduced to 
individual properties (or explanations in terms of individuals and their 
relationships). 
 As Sawyer observes, however, both of these two very distinct 
sociological accounts of the micro-macro link appeal to the concept of 
emergence. Yet, as we can see, they produce two opposite conclusions. 
Sociologists, however, Sawyer seems to suggest, are not philosophers; this 
awkward situation may result from a misunderstanding of what emergence is 
supposed to be. Thus, he turns to the best available philosophical account of 
the notion—the one arising from the arguments in favor of non-reductive 
materialism; i.e., the third path between dualism and identity theory within 
philosophy of mind.  
 To start with a bit of history, Sawyer notes that modern notions of 
emergentism were invoked in the early 20th century in order to reject vitalism 
and dualism, while accepting the materialist ontology that only matter exists: 
  
Higher level entities and properties were grounded in and determined by the 
more basic properties of physical matter; this was referred to as 
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Supervenience. However, the 1920s emergentists argued that when basic 
physical processes achieve a level of complexity of an appropriate kind, 
genuinely novel characteristics emerge; these emergent higher-level 
properties could not, even in theory, be predicted from a full and complete 
knowledge of the lower-level parts and their relations. Further, they could 
not be reduced to properties and their relations, even though those properties 
are supervenient on and thus determined by the system of parts ((Sawyer 
2001, 554), citing  (Kim 1993, 134) and (Teller 1992, 140-42)).   
 
 
Sawyer explains that these ideas revived within philosophy of mind in the 
1960s after the rejection of behaviorism. At that time, emergence was offered 
as a third alternative to the debate between identity theory and dualism; the 
former held that the mind is nothing more but the biological brain, while the 
latter held that mind and brain are fundamentally distinct: the one is material 
while the other is immaterial. Emergence, however, gave rise to non-reductive 
materialism, according to which even though only physical matter exists, 
mental properties are not reducible to physical ones (Davidson 1970; Fodor 
1974) and may indeed have causal powers over the physical brain (Anderson 
et al. 2000; Heil & Mele 1993).  
 The argument for non-reductive materialism begins with the 
Supervenience thesis: all there is is physical matter and all higher-level 
properties supervene on the system of lower-level components. Notice, also, 
that supervenience refers to the relation between two levels of analysis; if two 
events are identical with respect to their descriptions at the lower-level, then 
they cannot differ at the higher-level. Moreover, if an entity changes at a 
higher level it will also change at the lower level.103 Obviously, however, 
supervenience is not enough for emergence as it is compatible with the claim 
that all higher-level properties are identical with lower-level ones. As Fodor 
(1974) argued, what is further required are the phenomena of multiple 
realizability and wild disjunction.  
 According to Fodor’s argument for non-reductive materialism, a law is 
a statement within which the basic terms are natural kinds of that science. In 
order to reduce a law to the science of the lower-level, what is required is a 
bridge law that translates that law. But in order to come up with a bridge law, 
                                                
103 Of the last two sentences, I am only reluctant with respect to the first one. The reason is 
this. Even if we admit that the lower-level description may refer both to the properties of the 
lower-level components and their relations, given the discussion to follow, there could be 
certain non-linear relations amongst components, which may only be describable at the 
higher level. Accordingly, there could be identical descriptions at the lower level, which may 
nevertheless give rise to events that are not identical at the higher level.  
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what is further required is that each of the natural kind terms of the higher-
level science be translated into natural kind terms of the lower-level science. 
The main point of Fodor’s argument is that there are no a priori reasons to 
believe that this translation will always be possible for any given pair of 
scientific disciplines. A simple translation from psychology to neurobiology, 
or, in our case, from sociology to psychology may not be possible and this can 
only be empirically determined.  
 Now, the reason why this translation may be impossible has to do with 
the phenomenon of multiple realizability; even though each mental state is 
supervenient on some physical state, each given instance of that mental state 
might be realized by a different physical state. Again, however, multiple 
realizability alone does not entail irreducibility. If there are only a few 
realizing states, or if those states display some common features, the 
reduction may be performed unproblematically.      
 Nevertheless, reduction would indeed be problematic if the 
“neurobiologically equivalent of a psychological term were an otherwise 
unrelated combination of many neurobiological concepts and terms. Fodor 
termed such a realization wildly disjunctive” (Sawyer 2001, 557). According 
to Fodor, a true scientific law cannot have wildly disjunctive components, and 
thus, wild disjunction implies that there could be lawful relations among 
events described in psychological language, that would not be lawful 
relations in the language of physics. Take for instance the psychological law 
that pain leads to screaming. Pain, however, may be realized by several states 
(C-fibers, D-fibers, E-fibers, F-fibers, … ) that have nothing in common. The 
same may also hold for the mechanisms that produce screaming (although 
this is not necessary for the argument to go through) (see figure 1). If that is 
the case, then no law can be found at the neurobiological level, such that it 
can capture the scope of the psychological law. (That is, the neurobiological 
properties of the several realization bases that are grouped under the same 
psychological kind (e.g., pain) may have nothing in common. Thus, 
neurobiology alone cannot group them as one single kind. These realization 















Now, as Sawyer points out, even if one does not accept Fodor’s 
understanding of a scientific law, “it is clearly of limited scientific usefulness 
to have laws with wildly disjunctive terms, because they provide only limited 
understanding of the phenomena; they are of limited predictive usefulness, 
because they apply only to a specific token instance, whereas the higher-level 
law is likely to be more generally applicable” (Sawyer 557). Thus, Sawyer 
goes on, “when supervenience is supplemented with the argument from wild 
disjunction—the observation that a single higher-level property can be 
realized by many different low-level supervenience bases and that these 
different supervenience bases may have no lawful relation with one 
another—we have an account of emergence that shows why certain social 
properties and social laws may be irreducible” (ibid.).  
 Furthermore, according to Sawyer, many social properties seem to 
work this way. Take for instance the property ‘being a church’. Each 
individual member of the church may instantiate the property ‘believing in 
Xn’ such that the sum total of such individual beliefs are constitutive of the 
social property ‘being a church’. Yet, a wide range of individual beliefs may 
realize the property ‘being a church’. The same, Sawyer claims, is true of 
properties such as ‘being a family’, ‘being an argument’, ‘being a collective 
movement’ and so on. 
 Now, what is even more interesting is that the above analysis may also 
provide an explanation of downward causation; the claim that higher-level 
properties may have causal powers over lower-level properties. To see how 
this might be so, consider that “there can be a lawful, causal relation between 
a mental property and a physical property, even though there is no lawful, 
causal relation between the realizing physical properties of that mental 
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property and the caused physical property” (Sawyer 559). So, for instance, in 
the previous example, the higher-level mental property of ‘being in pain’ may 
cause any of the realizing physical states of the physical property ‘screaming’ 
while there being no lawful, causal relation between the properties of the 
several realization bases of ‘being in pain’ and those of ‘screaming’ (see figure 
2).  
 






C-fibers or D-Fibers or F-fibers or ….      A-chords or B-chords or C-chords or… 
                                                    
                                                                        
                                                                                              
   Figure 2                                                                                     
       
Accordingly, mental causation is a lawful relation between a mental property 
and a physical property, even though the causal force of the mental property 
inheres in its physical level supervenience base. Similarly, we might claim, 
social causation is a lawful relation between a social property and an 
individual one, even though the causal force of the social property inheres in 
its individual level supervenience base. In this sense, mental/social properties 
do constrain matter/individuals even though, at the same time, they are 
supervenient on the actions and interactions of those very materials or 
individuals.104 
                                                
104 Notice that Jaegwon Kim (1989) denies that there could be downwards causation on the 
basis of his ‘explanatory causal exclusion’ principle. That is, “no event can be given more than 
one complete and independent explanation” (Kim 1989, 79). So, in the example just provided, if, 
for some token instance of the occurrence of the two events, there is a sufficient causal 
relation between the underlying physical realization bases of the two events (between, for 
instance, C-fibers and A-chords), then it will be redundant to claim that the mental property 
of pain (that supervenes on its physical realization basis) also caused the A-chords vibration 
(i.e., screaming). In particular, the mental property of being in pain will be epiphenomenal. 
Therefore, Kim further argues, since mental properties have no causal force they are not real. 
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 We thus see that wild disjunction provides a strong argument in favor 
of non-reductive emergentism and downward causation. In fact, the 
possibility of downward causation should further be an indication of the 
reality of the higher levels of analysis. If we can identify that a phenomenon 
has causal power, then we must treat it as real. Despite all that, however, 
Sawyer draws a somewhat conservative conclusion for the social level. 
Drawing the analogy from non-reductive materialism, which holds that even 
though only matter exists, there also are emergent mental properties, he 
writes: “the analogous position in sociological theory would be to hold that 
only individuals exist and that social entities do not have distinct existence, 
yet there may be irreducible social properties and social laws” (2001, 559). In 
other words, this amounts to rejecting sociological realism, while supporting 
methodological collectivism (Sawyer 2001, 552). This is a thesis, however, that 
strikes me as quite peculiar. How could there be properties at some level and 
yet possessed by no entities at that level? 
 As a brief explanation, what seems to be going on here is that Sawyer, 
having drawn the analogy from non-reductive materialism, which holds that 
nothing else other than matter exists, wants to say that nothing else other than 
individuals exist. Yet, what seems to be wrong here is that the non-reductive 
materialist would not want to deny the existence of minds (such minds, 
however, would still be material). If he did, he may equally have to deny the 
existence of brains, while holding that neural/brain properties exist—and 
notice here that the supervenience of brain/neural properties on 
chemical/physical properties is far more obvious than that of mental on 
neural/brain properties. In so far as brain/neural properties exist, brains 
exist. Similarly, in so far as mental properties exist, minds exist. Granted, 
those minds supervene only on matter, and maybe only on brains—though 
strictly speaking, given the extended cognition hypothesis, they need not be. 
Accordingly, it seems that the correct analogy to be drawn is that in so far as 
social properties exist, social entities exist as well. Again granted, those social 
entities supervene only on matter, and maybe only on individuals—although 
again, given the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses, they need 
                                                                                                                                      
To see how the present analysis may solve this problem see fn. 105. Kallestrup (2006), 
however, has argued that the non-reductive materialist does not necessarily have to account 
for downwards causation.   
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not be, and as we shall see they arguably don’t. I will return to the issue of the 
existence of higher-level entities at the end of the following section.  
 
5.2.3) Characteristics of Wild Disjunction-Dynamical Systems Theory 
 
To be clear about the main argument so far, let us repeat the claim by quoting 
Sawyer (2001, 564-565) in length: 
 
A plausible account of an instance of the micro-to-macro emergence of a 
social property may be provided, but that account might not be the one that 
actually led to the emergence of that property in that token instance; due to 
multiple realizability the instance of the social property being modeled might 
have emerged from a different supervenience base. But suppose that all agree 
that the micro-to-macro emergence of a social property has been successfully 
modeled for one token instance of that social property. This still leaves us 
with the second more foundational problem: that account may not be 
applicable for any other token instances of the same property, due to multiple 
realizability and it may not provide any explanatory power beyond that 
token instance, due to wild disjunction. […] [Moreover] if social properties 
are implemented in wildly disjunctive sets of individual properties, then 
social terms and laws may not be lawfully reducible to individual terms and 
laws.  If a social property has a wildly disjunctive individual base, then the 
social property can participate in causal laws even though there is no 
equivalent lawful description in the language used to describe individuals.  
 
 
We thus see that the argument from wild disjunction can provide a strong 
case for emergence. Notice, however, that it does not demonstrate that all 
social properties will be emergent. Whether a higher-level property, or law is 
not fully reducible to the lower-level is a matter that can only be empirically 
determined. It should be very interesting, then, to see when wild disjunction 
is likely to occur. For doing so, Sawyer suggests that we should focus on the 
temporal mechanisms and processes of emergence that give rise to social 
properties. He also notes that in order to argue in favor of emergence, 
theorists have mainly stressed the importance of the interactions of the 
individuals and their properties, as opposed to the properties of the 
individuals themselves. “Interaction is central; higher-level properties emerge 
from the interactions of individuals in a complex system” (Sawyer 2001, 574). 
Yet, since reductionism is defined as the ability to predict higher-level 
properties from knowledge of the lower level parts and their 
relations/interactions, it appears that an unqualified appeal to interactions is 
problematic. Nevertheless as we shall see, the answer may lie at the 
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complexity of interactions between individuals, or, more generally, 
components of a system. 
 As Sawyer notes, in the late 1980s and 1990s complex system theorists 
began to identify the characteristics of systems that could be realized in a 
wildly disjunctive way. The first characteristic is non-aggregativity, and has 
been offered by Wimsatt (1986) who identified emergence with the failure of 
aggregativity. Aggregative properties, according to Wimsatt, meet four 
criteria: 1) The system property is not a product of the way the system is 
organized; the parts are intersubstitutable without affecting the system 
property. 2) An aggregative property should remain similar under addition or 
removal of a part from the system. 3) The systemic property should remain 
invariant under operation of decomposition and reaggregation of the parts. 
Finally, 4) there should be no cooperative or inhibitory interactions among the 
parts of the system for this property.  Aggregativity thus defined means that a 
system’s failure to satisfy any of the above conditions with respect to some of 
its properties will signify that the relevant properties are emergent. Yet, as 
Wimsatt himself claims, this account is too broad, and in this sense most 
social properties will be emergent. Moreover, Wimsatt notes that this 
understanding of emergence is compatible with reductionism and so cannot 
speak to the heart of the debate under consideration. 
 A second characteristic of emergent properties that Sawyer provides is 
non-decomposability:  
 
Decomposable systems are modular, with each component acting primarily 
according to its own intrinsic properties. Each component is influenced by the 
others only at its inputs; its function (processing of these inputs) is not itself 
influenced by other components (Simon 1969). In such a system, the behavior 
of any part is intrinsically determined: it is possible to determine the 
component’s properties in isolation from the other components, despite the 
fact that they interact. The organization of the entire system is critical for the 
function of the system as a whole, but the organization does not provide 
constraints on the internal functioning of components. […] In contrast, in non 
decomposable systems, the overall system organization is a significant 
influence on the function of any component; thus component function is no 
longer intrinsically determined. Dependence of components on each other is 
often mutual and even make it difficult to draw firm boundaries between 
components (Sawyer 2001, 577).  
 
 
And this, in turn, leads quite naturally to the third characteristic that is likely 
to point towards wild disjunction, namely non-localizability: 
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A system is localizable if the functional decomposition of the system 
corresponds to its physical decomposition, and each property of the system 
can be identified with a single component or subsystem. […] If system 
properties cannot be identified with components, but are instead distributed 
spatially within the system, that system is non-localizable. […] Higher level 
properties that are non-localizable are likely to have wildly disjunctive 
descriptions at the level of their components, and such properties are more 
likely to be irreducible to components (Sawyer 2001, 578).   
 
 
At this point, however, it is important to note that Sawyer does not explicitly 
provide any argument for why it is thought that non-decomposability and 
non-localizability are indicative of wild disjunction, and thereby emergence. It 
may, however, not be difficult to see why. Remember that emergentists want 
to stress the importance of interactions. Also note that if a higher-level 
property is multiply realizable in a wildly disjunctive way, this means that 
what is of primary importance for its appearance is not the properties of the 
components and their linear relations that constitute its supervenience base—
otherwise, its supervenience base wouldn’t be wildly disjunctive. Instead, 
what seems to be more important and distinctive of the occurrence of such 
higher-level properties is the existence of dense non-linear interactions between 
the given realizing components. And so, given that both non-decomposability 
and non-localizability point towards the existence of such complex 
interactions, we can now see why they also point to wild disjunction.  
I believe Sawyer would not object to this explanation as he himself 
goes on to suggest a fourth and final characteristic of wildly disjunctive 
systems, namely complexity of interactions. “The above criteria of non-
aggregativity, non-decomposability, and non-localizability” he notes, “are all 
defined in terms of complex systemic relations among components. 
Consequently, several emergence theorists have suggested that the 
complexity of each interaction among components may be another variable 
contributing to emergence […]. Baas (1994) suggested that emergence occurs 
when the interactions are non-linear” (Sawyer 2001, 579).  
 To sum up, then, what all of the above characteristics of wild 
disjunction, and thereby emergence, seem to suggest is that the (properties of) 
component parts and/or their linear interactions/relationships that constitute 
the realization base are both necessary and sufficient for the manifestation of 
reducible properties. In the case of emergent non-reducible properties, 
 133 
however, the (existence of some) realization base in only necessary for their 
manifestation. What is further required for such properties to arise is the 
existence of appropriate complex non-linear interactions amongst the 
component parts of some appropriate realization base. And, as we shall see in 
the next three paragraphs, such properties are emergent because the dense 
interactive processes they originate from depend on the function of, and can 
only be defined by appealing to higher-level emergent systems, i.e., systems 
whose boundaries and properties transcend the boundaries and properties of 
their lower level realizing component parts.105 
                                                
105 We may now be able to see how this analysis may explain away Kim’s explanatory causal 
exclusion problem. Remember, according to Kim, if there is an instance of causal relation 
between the physical properties of two events, then claiming that some higher-level property 
(that supervenes on the physical properties of its realization base) is also causally responsible 
for the occurrence of the events will be redundant; specifically, the higher-level property will 
be epiphenomenal. For instance, if C-fibers firing causally leads to A-chords vibration, then 
there is no need to claim that pain also led to A-chords vibration (i.e., screaming). In other 
words, if in order to explain one particular instance of screaming one can point to physical 
properties alone, then there is no need in positing (higher-level) mental properties as well. 
Here is a way out of this problem, however. Remember that pain might be multiply realizable 
in a wildly disjunctive way. That is, the physical properties and linear relations of the 
realizing component parts of every instance of pain may have nothing in common. Therefore, 
even though we may have a mere (as opposed to lawful) causal relation between C-fibers and 
A-chords, in order to have a lawful causal relation between pain and screaming in general 
(i.e., for every instance), we need to appeal to commonalities at a higher level of description. 
So, we need to appeal to properties that arise out of dense interactions between the realizing 
component parts, and which will (hopefully) be common for every instance. Now, such 
properties are emergent in that the dense interactions they arise out of can only be defined by 
appealing to higher level systems whose properties and boundaries transcend those of the 
realizing component parts. (Accordingly, pain may not be identical to the physical/chemical 
properties of C-fibers, because it may also depend on how C/D/E-fibers densely interact 
with other parts of the cognitive system. Pain, one might say in other words, may be 
identified with the functional role that C/F/E-fibers play in the larger cognitive system and 
not with the physical/chemical properties of C/F/E-fibers). Crucially, however, this is not to 
deny that higher-level mental properties are physical properties as well. It is only to say that 
they belong to a more complex level of physicality that cannot be captured by appealing to 
the lower-level properties of the component parts and their linear relations. Now, in this 
sense, even though mental properties inhere in the properties of their component parts and 
their linear relations (not all physical properties in any arrangement can give rise to mental 
ones), they, too, can be the cause of events. In particular, in order for the relevant events to 
occur (e.g., screaming) the properties of the parts of some realization base and their linear 
interactions must be in place. But what is further necessary and jointly sufficient with the 
former is the existence of the non-linear interactions between component parts, which the 
higher-level properties are identified with. So, higher-level mental properties and lower level 
physical properties are necessary and jointly sufficient for the occurrence of some physical 
event like screaming. (Although, notice, the lower level physical properties won’t be 
necessary in the same way the mental properties will be, as the former can be multiply 
realized. That is, the existence of one of the appropriate realization bases will be necessary, 
but since there can be a multitude of them, no specific realization base is necessary. In 
contrast, the existence of very specific dense interactions and, thus mental properties, will be 
necessary).           
 Kim may object to this that in so arguing we have gone against the principle of the 
causal closure of the physical (i.e., all physical effects must have sufficient physical causes). 
Yet this is not a good objection since on this analysis mental properties are themselves 
physical—though physical at a higher level of complexity. The fact that these properties are 
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 Let me explain further by first noting that the importance of such 
dense and complex non-linear interactions between components of the 
realization base for the emergence of systemic properties brings to mind some 
familiar considerations concerning dynamical systems theory. In section 2.3.2, 
we saw that when two components, or systems are mutually (and thus non-
linearly) interdependent on the basis of feedback loops—i.e., when 
continuous reciprocal causation is manifested between components—there 
emerge coupled systems with new properties that are not possessed by any of 
their component parts. We further claimed that this is so on the basis of two 
arguments.  
 The ‘ongoing feedback loops’ argument went like this: when the effects 
of component A on component B are partly defined by component B’s 
ongoing activity at that time, and vice versa, we cannot properly disentangle 
the two components in terms of distinct inputs and outputs from the one to 
the other. This is because the effects of each component to the other are not 
entirely intrinsic to the component itself, but they also depend on the affected 
component’s ongoing activity. So the two units form a causal amalgam, which 
cannot be properly disentangled—not even in theory. We may now add that 
what this means is that the behavior of every component that forms part of 
this causal amalgam is no more entirely identical to its intrinsic properties, as 
it also hinges on (and has a further effect on) the behavior and, thus, on some 
of the properties of the other component.106 Accordingly, such mutually 
determining and determined behavior will belong to both components at the 
same time and will disallow us to tell some of their properties apart. These 
will be (higher-level) properties of an overall emergent system that comprises 
of both subsystems that engage in the mutual interaction. Now, notice how 
                                                                                                                                      
called ‘mental’ has only to do with the fact that they are associated with the mind. But, there 
is absolutely no necessity to further associate mind-talk with either substance, or property 
dualist considerations. Mental properties just refer to physical properties within a higher-
level (physicalist) science of psychology.       
 (To generalize, then, according to this picture, higher-level sciences deal with the 
properties and causal powers of natural kinds that the natural kinds of the lower level 
sciences cannot capture. And the reason why they cannot capture them is because such 
higher-level kinds are multiply realizable, and thus their identification as kinds with specific 
properties and causal powers depends on a level of complexity that cannot be accounted for 
simply by referring to the properties and the linear relations of the kinds the lower-level 
science is appealing to).  
106 In what follows, I identify a component or system’s properties with its behavior. 
According to DST, a system’s dynamical law governs its behaviors, which can be represented 
as the system’s flow on the system’s phase portrait. The properties of the system are the 
geometrical properties of its flow.   
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this reasoning is very close, if not the same as, to the appeal to non-
decomposability as a characteristic of emergent properties. In non-
decomposable systems, the behavior of each component is directly dependent 
on the other components’ behavior, and so it is no more intrinsically 
determined; it is impossible to determine all of the components’ properties in 
isolation from the other components’ properties. Accordingly, it will be 
impossible to draw firm boundaries between components. If we still want to 
point to an intrinsically determined system, such that all its properties will be 
determined in isolation from any other factors, we have to point to a larger 
emergent system that comprises of all subcomponents. In other words, 
contrary to the (lower-level) properties of component parts that can both be 
determined in isolation from the other components’ behavior, and clearly 
individuate components, some of the properties of non-decomposable causal 
amalgams are interdependent properties that arise out of the component 
parts’ mutual interactions. Such interdependent (higher-level) properties will 
not pick out any distinct parts but will instead be properties of the emergent 
non-decomposable causal amalgam as a whole.   
 Similarly, the ‘systemic properties’ argument held that when mutual 
interactions are in place, they give rise to new systemic properties that do not 
belong to any of the subsystems alone, but to the ongoing processes of 
interaction, which are internal to the overall coupled system. In some more 
detail, emergent properties are primarily the product of processes of dense 
non-linear interactions between system components. Those processes of 
interaction, however, cannot be identified with any component boundaries, 
but instead with the components’ mutual interactivity. Accordingly, these 
properties belong to a larger system, comprising of all the components 
contributing to the relevant interactive processes. Moreover, since system 
individuation does not depend on any physical boundaries, but, instead, on 
the processes (and the properties they give rise to) one is interested in, and 
which emerge out of component interactions, the ontological postulation of 
coupled emergent systems seems to be necessary. Again, notice how this 
reasoning is very close to the appeal to non-localizability as a characteristic of 
emergent properties. In non-localizable systems, some properties cannot be 
identified with components, but are instead distributed spatially within the 
system. Accordingly, some of the properties of such systems won’t belong to 
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any subunit in particular, but instead to the overall system as a whole. In 
other words, such properties cannot be attributed to any component parts, 
since they do not arise aggregatively out of any (lower level) component 
properties and their linear relations. Instead, they emerge out of complex 
component interactions, which can only be defined by appealing to the 
overall emergent system.107  
 Now, before closing this section, here is what this second argument 
further demonstrates. Since, in system individuation, processes take priority 
over the physical boundaries of components (see section 2.3.2), and since 
higher-level systemic properties emerge out of processes of interactions, 
which define and are internal only to still wider systems, it appears that the 
existence of higher-level properties is tied to the existence of higher-level 
systems (i.e., entities). To be more precise, since one is primarily interested in 
processes (and/because of the properties they give rise to), and since 
mutually interactive processes (distinctive of emergent properties) can only 
be properly understood in terms of coupled and larger systems they belong 
to, the ontological postulation of such larger, emergent systems seems to be 
necessary. Contrary to Sawyer, therefore, we should not think that even 
though there could be emergent social properties, no social entities exist.    
 Apart from this last point, however, the upshot of the last paragraphs 
is that as in the case of extended cognitive systems, so in the case of 
distributed cognitive systems the existence of continuous reciprocal causation 
                                                
107 So let me try to be clear about the connection I try to establish between Sawyer’s 
arguments and dynamical systems theory. Sawyer argues that a wildly disjunctive realization 
basis of a property points to the fact that the relevant property will be emergent and thus 
belong to an irreducible higher-level system of analysis. Here is the reason according to DST. 
A wildly disjunctive realization basis indicates that the relevant property does not really 
depend on the lower level properties and the linear relations of the components of its 
realization basis (as it can be wildly realized). Instead, it depends on appropriate dense 
interactions between the component parts of some appropriate realization basis. Due to two 
arguments from DST, however, such properties will be emergent. Here are the two 
arguments in brief: 1) When two lower level components mutually interact, we cannot 
individuate the interacting lower level components by telling their inputs/outputs, or 
properties apart, so we cannot but appeal to higher level systems that comprise of both of them 
and that are not recognized by the lower level analysis (this is the idea of non-
decomposability). 2) We must appeal to higher level entities since the mutual interactions, and 
the properties these interactions give rise to depend on both systems at the same time, and 
thus to an overall system comprising of both of them, and which, again, is not recognized by 
the lower level system of analysis (this is the idea of non-localizability).    
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amongst their component parts is indicative of their emergence, and the 
emergence of their distinctive (higher-level) properties.108   
 
5.3) Further Support for CRC as a Condition on Emergence 
 
The upshot of the previous section, therefore, is the following. Even though 
the role of interactions has always seemed to be central in cases of emergent 
properties, it is not any kind of interactions that will do. Instead, it appears 
that only mutual, dense, non-linear interactions, which are indicative of 
continuous reciprocal causation between component parts can give rise to 
emergent properties and entities. The role of the present section will thus be 
to offer some independent theoretical support for the above claim, originating 
from research on distributed/group cognition. This will also allow us to 
become a bit clearer about how those interactions can give rise to distributed 
                                                
108 Let me finally offer one last example that will help us understand how non-reducible 
emergent properties and systems are supposed to appear on the basis of complex interactions 
between the component parts of their realization bases. So suppose we want to provide a 
lawful causal explanation of how agents may perform action X solely on the basis of 
chemical/physical terms. That is, suppose we want to reduce the occurrence of action X in 
the language of physics and chemistry. Notice, however, that agents might be multiply 
realizable in a wildly disjunctive way. So an agent’s realization base may comprise of a 
biological perceptual system, a biological brain, a heart, and biological body parts, or by an 
artificial perceptual system, a silicon-based computer, a fuel pump, and artificial body parts. 
Now both agents may perform the same action X, whose occurrence, in both instances, 
depends on their respective realization bases. Yet the two causal explanations that in each 
instance led to action X are going to be fundamentally different because of the wild 
differences in the two agents’ realization bases. Accordingly, no lawful causal explanation 
that only appeals to chemical/ physical properties can be provided such that it can capture 
both cases. That is, there is nothing common in the physical/chemical properties of, and the 
linear relations between the component parts of these two realization bases that explains how 
both of these two aggregates of realizing component parts performed action X. Instead, if one 
wanted to find such commonalities, one could only hope to find them at a higher level of 
description, i.e., at the level of dense interactions between component parts. So, in order to 
provide a lawful causal explanation for such wildly multiple realizations one can only appeal 
to the dense non-linear interactions between the realizing component parts. In so doing, 
however, due to DST (and, in particular, due to the ‘ongoing feedback loops’ and ‘systemic 
properties’ arguments), one must appeal to the higher-level system, namely to the agent, and 
its higher-level mental properties (i.e., the dense non-linear interactions of its component 
parts). And in so doing one must be a realist about this higher level of analysis not only 
because such entities and properties are irreducible to the entities and properties of the lower 
level of analysis (due to wild disjunction), but also because they do serious explanatory work. 
That is, the existence of some (but, not specific, due to multiple realizability) lower-level 
properties is necessary for the higher-level properties to be manifested, but in order for X to 
occur the higher-level properties (i.e., the dense interactions between the component parts) 
must also be in place. In other words, in order for X to occur, both higher and lower level 
properties must be in place. Adding a body, a heart, a brain, and perceptual system together 
in the right way without having them densely interact would never bring about X (and 
similarly for the artificial counterpart). Again, however, these dense interactions (i.e., 
emergent properties) derive from, belong to, and can only be accounted for by the higher-
level system, i.e., the agent, which cannot be captured by the lower system of analysis (i.e., by 
lower-level properties of the lower level entities and their linear relations). 
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cognition and why this phenomenon in particular may not be reducible to the 
cognitive states/processes of individuals. 
 To start with, then, let us quote in length Heylighen at al. (2007) who 
invite us to  
 
consider a group of initially autonomous actors, actants or agents, where the 
agents can be human, animal, social or artificial. Agents by definition perform 
actions. Through their shared environment the action of the one will in 
general affect the other. Therefore, agents in proximity are likely to interact, 
meaning that the changes of state of the one causally affect the changes of 
state of the other. These causal dependencies imply that the agents 
collectively form a dynamical system, evolving under the impulse of individual 
actions, their indirect effects as they are propagated to other agents, and 
changes in the environment. It is important to note that a dynamical system 
has computational structure and is therefore able to process information. Not 
only that, but the dynamics themselves will generate a pattern, not just seek 
to complete it (Crutchfield 1998). Moreover, this system will typically be non-
linear, since causal influences propagate in cycles, forming a complex of 
positive and negative feedback loops (6).   
 
 
We thus see that Heylighen et al. also embrace the dynamical systems 
perspective in understanding group cognition, while also stressing the 
importance of mutual, dense and non-linear interactions amongst the 
individuals as a sign of the non-reducibility of their collective action. They 
then go on to note that all dynamical systems tend to self-organize. That is, 
they tend to evolve to a relatively stable configuration of states, i.e., what we 
termed in section 2.3.2 as an attractor of the dynamics. Once the system has 
achieved this stable configuration we can say that its component parts (in our 
case the agents) have mutually adapted by restricting their interactions to 
those that allow the collective configuration to survive. This process of “self-
organization and further evolution of the collective effectively creates a form 
of “social” organization, in which agents help each other so as to maximize the 
collective benefit”  (ibid.). 
 Furthermore, by taking a close look at this synergetic organization, 
they explain, we can distinguish between two fundamental dependencies 
between the agents’ activities, or, more generally, the system’s processes. 
First, two processes can use the same resource (input) and/or contribute to 
the same task or goal (output). Second, one process can be prerequisite for the 
next process (output of the first is input of the second). The first kind of 
dependence between processes or activities gives rise to tasks to be performed 
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in parallel, and the second to tasks to be performed in sequence. The 
delegation of the right activities to the right agents at the right time is crucial 
for the efficient organization of the system, and this determines its overall 
shape. The parallel distribution of tasks determines the division of labor 
between the agents, whereas the sequential distribution determines their 
workflow. (Heylighen et al. 2007, 7). 
 Now, having these organizational considerations in mind, Heylighen 
et al. further note: 
 
Division of labor reinforces the specialization of agents, allowing each of 
them to develop an expertise that the others do not have (Gaines 1994; 
Martens 2004). This enables the collective to overcome individual cognitive 
limitations, accumulating a much larger amount of knowledge than any 
single agent might. Workflow allows information to be propagated and 
processed sequentially, so that it can be refined at each stage of the process. 
Self-organization thus potentially produces emergent cognitive capabilities 
that do not exist at the individual level. Moreover, it may give rise to 
unexpected organizational properties such as the emergence of a requirement 
of a new function, the loss of crucial information, the development of 
additional tasks and the deviation from existing workflow rules (Hutchins 
1995) (Heylighen et al. 2007, 7).    
 
 
So, as the authors note “self organization in this sense can be seen as the more 
efficient, synergetic use of interactions”. However, they are fast to notice that 
the whole system is not entirely comprised by individuals. Interactions 
between agents necessarily pass through their shared physical environment, 
and we can call all the external phenomena that support these interactions 
media. Moreover, “certain aspects of the environment better lend themselves 
to synergetic interaction than others do. For example, a low bandwidth 
communication channel that is difficult to control and that produces a lot of 
errors, such as smoke signals, will support less synergetic interactions than a 
reliable, high bandwidth one, such as optical cable. Thus, there is a selective 
pressure for agents to preferentially learn to use the more efficient media, i.e. 
the ones through which causal influences—and therefore information—are 
transmitted most reliably and accurately” (ibid.). 
 They then go on to add that 
 
simply by using them, the agents will change the media, generally adapting 
them to better suit their purposes. For example, animals or people that 
regularly travel over an irregular terrain between different target locations 
(such as food reserves, water holes or dwellings) will by that activity erode 
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paths or trails in the terrain that facilitate further movement. The paths 
created by certain agents will attract and steer the actions of other agents, 
thus providing a shared coordination mechanism that lets the agents 
communicate indirectly. A slightly more sophisticated version of this 
mechanism are the traits of pheromones laid by ants to guide other members 
of their colony to the various food resources […] Humans as specialized tool 
builders, excel in this adaptation of the environment to their needs, and 
especially in the use of physical supports such as paper, electromagnetic 




We thus see that by this process of altering the media by using them, which in 
turn alters the way agents may interact and so on, “external media are 
increasingly assimilated or co-opted into the social organization, making the 
organization’s functioning even more dependent on them. As a result, the 
cognitive system is extended into the physical environment and can no longer 
be separated by it” (Heylighen at al. 2007, 8). 
 Now, to pass to a different—yet substantially similar—defense of 
group agents, Theiner at al. (2010) hold that, on the basis of several case 
studies they explore, “specific cognitive capacities that are commonly 
ascribed to individuals are also aptly ascribed at the level of groups. These 
case studies show how dense interactions among people within a group lead 
to both similarity-inducing and differentiating dynamics that affect the 
group’s ability to solve problems. This supports our claim that groups have 
organization-dependent cognitive capacities that go beyond the simple 
aggregation of the cognitive capacities of individuals” (378). Furthermore, 
they go on to explain, the underlying idea of their methodology is that the 
groups they are interested in have a particular structure, which is important 
to their behavior, including their ability to adapt to different circumstances. It 
is this organizational structure that allows them to speak of mechanisms of 
group cognition, which is not “simply the unstructured aggregation of 
individual cognition, but the outcome of a division of cognitive labor among 
cognitive agents. Such a division of cognitive labor may be the result of 
explicit organizational decisions by the individual agents, or (and we believe 
more commonly) the result of interactions among the agents that lead to 
enhanced group capacities without the express intent of the agents” (379). 
 Now, putting aside the empirical cases of group cognition the authors 
invoke—we will return to one of them (viz., transactive memory systems) in 
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the chapter to follow—Theiner et al. provide three reasons for which they 
think there are cognitive phenomena that require an explanation that goes 
beyond individual cognition. First, they claim, groups’ behaviors depend 
critically on environmentally-enabled interactions between people. 
Environmental variables are part of the larger context in which people are 
situated, and are not reducible to individual cognition. We thus see that 
Theiner et al. are in complete agreement with Heylighen et al.’s point that the 
environment in the form of media is part of the overall distributed cognitive 
system. Second, Theiner et al. note that groups’ solutions to problems may 
never be entertained by any individual, and in fact, the individuals may not 
even know that this is a problem they should be trying to solve. This, again, 
seems to be close to Heylighen et al.’s point that groups, which form 
dynamical systems tend to self-organize (that is, engage in the right sort of 
interactions), such that they, as a group, can operate competently and, thereby, 
survive.  Finally, a third reason for which certain cognitive capacities can only 
be explained at the group level is that “the groups’ solutions are not simply 
composites, unions, or intersections of individuals’ solutions” (Theiner at al. 
2010, 390). Once again, this brings to mind Heylighen et al.’s point that self-
organization potentially produces emergent cognitive capabilities that do not 
exist at the individual level and which may give rise to unexpected 
organizational properties. 
 We thus see that there appears to be a consensus on the intuitions that 
may drive to collectivist considerations. But before closing this section, it 
should also be interesting to quote Theiner et al. when they explain what is 
required for a group of people to constitute a cognitive system in its own right. 
They write: 
 
For a group of two, or more people to constitute a cognitive system in its own 
right, we require that these people are coupled (in their functioning as 
members of the group, collectively performing a cognitive task) so as to form 
an integrated system with functional gains. Following Wilson (in press p. 19), 
we can break down the composite notion of a functionally gainful, integrative 
coupling as follows. First, two (or more) elements are coupled just in case they 
exchange information by means of reliable, two-way causal connections 
between them. Individuals who are collectively coupled are interdependent 
in their cognitive and behavioral activities. Second, two (or more) coupled 
elements form an integrated system in situations in which they operate as a 
single causal whole within the causal nexus—with causes affecting the 
resultant system as a whole, and the activities of that system as a whole 
producing certain effects. Third, an integratively coupled system shows 
functional gain just when it either enhances the existing functions of its 
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coupled elements, or manifests novel functions relative to those possessed by 
any of its members. Distinguishing these two aspects of functional gain is 
important for an account of group cognition, because it implies that the 
cognitive interdependence between people has both individual-level as well 
as group-level effects (390-1). 
 
 
As far as I can see, the above quote nicely summarizes the arguments and 
considerations originating from DST and which were presented in chapter 2 
in favor of extended cognitive systems (and thereby extended cognition). 
These very same coupling arguments, we now see, can also be invoked in 
support of distributed cognition. Ongoing mutual interactions (i.e., 
continuous reciprocal causation) between agents and their artifacts can give 
rise to emergent processes (and properties), which belong to larger (cognitive) 
systems. Those are integrated systems in that the effects of each component 
directly affect the other components’ activity, thus creating a causal nexus (or, 
a causal amalgam), where causes affect the systems as a whole. This 
integrated system can then give rise to new and unexpected properties both at 
the individual and the group level, and which may be mathematically 
perceived as new regularities in the coupled dynamical system’s phase 
portrait (for example new attractors may appear and old ones may 
disappear). Those are qualitative changes, which can only emerge out of 
dense interactions between the system’s subcomponents, and which may be 




To sum up, the present chapter focused on the metaphysical support of group 
cognitive agents and their properties. Accordingly, we came across two 
argumentative lines to this effect. On the standard debate between 
reductionism and non-reductionism, the existence of the phenomenon of wild 
disjunction provides a strong case for emergence (when wild disjunction is 
present). The same debate, reconstructed in mathematical terms, 
demonstrates that the coupling of two or more elements provides a clear 
verdict for emergent properties and entities. Even though seemingly distinct, 
those two arguments are far from unrelated. The link between these two 
approaches is that dense, non-linear interactions between component parts is 
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indicative both of wild-disjunction and coupled/extended, or distributed 
cognitive systems.  
 We may, therefore, conclude that the existence of continuous reciprocal 
causation between individuals and the artifacts they use can give rise to 
group agents, whose function cannot be fully reduced to the individual level. 
Accordingly, we can consider such complex interactions as a necessary 
condition on the emergence of group cognitive agents.109 Furthermore, those 
interactions give rise to synergetic behavior on the part of the group as a 
whole, which self-organizes into an appropriate structure such that it may 
function competently and thus survive (or more generally, fulfill its goal). 
Moreover, given the properties of the group members and the group’s goal, 
this process of self-organization, which is the result of complex interactions 
between the members of the group and their artifacts, determines the division 
of labor and workflow of the whole structure, which may be the result of 
explicit organizational decisions, or not. 
 On the whole, we now have some considerable metaphysical support 
for the idea that there could be group processes, which give rise to group 
properties that may not belong to any individual alone, but to the group as a 
whole.  It is time then to see how these considerations may apply to 
epistemology and the idea of epistemic group agents. More in particular, the 
fact that we now have a strong case for group cognition is an indication that 














                                                
109 It may be tempting to consider them as sufficient for group emergence as well. However, 
individuals could plausibly engage in such interactions while fighting, or being in war. 
Surely group entities could be identified in such cases, but not all individuals could belong at 
the same group, or system. Adding Clark’s glue and trust criteria, however, could 









The central aims of this chapter are to argue for epistemic robust anti-
individualism, and understand the phenomenon through the lens of 
COGAweak. I will start by providing two examples of epistemic group agents 
that satisfy the metaphysical criteria for group agency as revealed in chapter 
5. Then, having these examples in mind I will ask what are the epistemic 
properties they have in common, and how can those common traits be 
accounted for by our preferred approach to knowledge, namely COGAweak. 
 In some more detail, the previous chapter demonstrated that the idea 
of group agents can be motivated by the existence of non-reducible cognitive 
processes that emerge at the group level. What is required for such processes 
to emerge, I argued, is the manifestation of continuous reciprocal causation—
on the basis of feedback loops—between the members of the group and their 
technological scaffolding, which may contribute both to the members’ 
communication channels and their information-processing. Since, however, 
the focus here is on the cognitive task of knowledge production and 
acquisition, what we are here after is the existence of propositional 
knowledge that has been acquired by a collective reliable belief-forming 
process, which cannot be fully reduced to the set of cognitive abilities 
possessed by the individual members of the group—let alone the cognitive 
abilities of any individual in particular. If no such reduction is possible, then 
forming a true belief on the basis of the collective process won’t be 
attributable to any particular member’s cognitive agency either—not even 
merely to a significant, as opposed to a primary, degree. Accordingly, by the 
light of COGAweak two options will be available—reminiscent of Hardwig’s 
(1985) two unpalatable conclusions—: either no one knows, or knowledge is 
not possessed by any individual alone.  
Fortunately, however, being able to recognize groups as cognitive 
subjects in themselves, we can legitimately apply COGAweak at the group level, 
thus making sense of the claim that p is known by S even though it is not 
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known by any individual alone (thus embracing the second of the two 
options above, and which amounts to epistemic robust anti-individualism). 
By way of giving flesh to this picture I will examine two cases: Transactive 
Memory Systems as studied by Wegner at al. (1985), and the case of 
knowledge acquired by research teams within scientific laboratories. Both 
cases demonstrate knowledge acquired at the group level, because in both 
cases true beliefs are acquired on the basis of reliable collective/distributed 
belief-forming processes that arise out of CRC between the members of the 
group and (if applicable) their artifacts as well. 
What is more, these two examples of epistemic group agents have 
several properties in common that will help us understand how we can apply 
COGAweak to them. More specifically, in order to apply COGAweak at the group 
level we need to understand who is S in ‘S knows that p’, what is the ‘reliable 
belief-forming process’ that gives rise to S’s true believing, what is S’s 
‘cognitive character’ in which the collective belief-forming process must have 
been ‘appropriately integrated’, and, finally, what is the group’s ‘cognitive 
agency’, to which the ‘cognitive success must be significantly creditable’, such 
that S can know that p.  
 
6.2) Transactive Memory Systems 
 
It should be rather uncontroversial to claim that memory is a reliable belief-
forming process. Memory, that is, has a high propensity to deliver true rather 
than false beliefs. This is mainly the reason why memory is very often cited as 
a justificatory process on the basis of which an individual can claim to know 
some proposition p that he has encountered in the past. Interestingly, 
however, literature originating from cognitive psychology suggests that 
memory may be instantiated by more than just one individual on the basis of 
transactive memory processes. Accordingly, the first candidate for an 
epistemic group agent—that is a collective agent who can come to know on 
the basis of a belief-forming process that is not fully reducible to the cognitive 
abilities possessed by its individual members—will be a Transactive Memory 
System (TMS), (i.e., a group of individuals who collaboratively encode, store 
and retrieve information).  
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 The reason why TMSs are good candidates for group minds—and 
thereby for epistemic group agents—is because, as Sutton et al. observe 
(2007), such systems are likely to involve skillful interactive simultaneous 
coordination of people, thus manifesting continuous reciprocal causation 
between individuals. As Wegner et al. (1985) claim, we can use TMSs in order 
“to conceptualize how people in close relationships may depend on each 
other for acquiring, remembering, and generating knowledge” (253). And 
they go on to further explain that it is primarily this ‘cognitive 
interdependence’ that motivated them to speak about group minds; when 
people come together, “they think about things in ways they would not 
alone” (254).  
 Now, before moving on to the details of a TMS, let us first take a look 
at two important methodological points that Wegner et al. stress. First, 
identifying a TMS as a group mind with respect to the process of memory 
does not imply a fine-grained similarity between the individual mental 
processes and the group mental processes. Instead, they are interested in the 
“functional equivalence of individual and transactive memory” (256):110 
 
Ordinarily, psychologists think of memory as an individual’s store of 
knowledge, along with the processes whereby that knowledge is constructed, 
organized, and accessed. So, it is fair to say that we are studying “memory” 
when we are concerned with how knowledge gets into the person’s mind, 
how it is arranged in the context of other knowledge when it gets there, and 
how it is retrieved for later use. At this broad level of definition, our 
conception of transactive memory is not much different from the notion of 
individual memory. With transactive memory we are concerned with how 
knowledge enters the dyad, is organized within it, and is made available for 
subsequent use by it (256). 
 
 
Second, they explain, communication processes among group members are 
the center of group thought and it is communication processes that “produce 
the distinction between the group mind and the minds of individual 
members” (256). In some more detail, Wegner et al. hold that transactive 
memory systems are made up of two components: 1) an organized body of 
knowledge that is wholly contained in the memory systems of the individual 
                                                
110 Notice that proponents of extended cognition stress the exact same methodological point 
when they claim that there could be extended cognitive abilities that seem to be same in kind 
as organismic cognitive abilities (think, for example, about Otto’s extended memory system). 
See also section  2.2. 
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members and 2) a repertoire of knowledge-relevant transactive processes that 
occur among group members on the basis of communication: 
 
Stated more colloquially, we envision transactive memory to be a 
combination of individual minds and the communication among them. This 
definition recognizes explicitly that transactive memory must be understood 
as a name for the interplay of knowledge, and that this interplay, no matter 
how complex, is always capable of being analyzed in terms of communicative 
events that have individual recipients. […] Using this line of interpretation, 
we recognize that the observable interaction between individuals entails not 
only the transfer of knowledge, but the construction of a knowledge-
acquiring, knowledge-holding and knowledge-using system that is greater 
than the sum of its individual member systems (256). 
 
 
So, having these preliminary considerations in mind, here is a first example of 
a transactive memory process: 
 
Suppose we are spending an evening with Rudy and Lulu, a couple married 
for several years. Lulu is in another room for the moment, and we happen to 
ask Rudy where they got that wonderful staffed Canadian goose on the 
mantle. He says “we were in British Columbia…,” and then bellows, “Lulu! 
What was the name of that place where we got the goose?” Lulu returns to 
the room to say that it was near Kelowna or Penticton—somewhere along 
lake Okanogan. Rudy says, “Yes, in that area with all the fruit stands.” Lulu 
finally makes the identification: Peachland (257). 
 
 
 As Wegner at al. explain, during the discussion between Rudy and 
Lulu, the various ideas they exchange lead them through and elicit their 
individual memories. “In a process of interactive cueing, they move 
sequentially toward the retrieval of a memory trace, the existence of which is 
known to both of them. And it is possible that without each other, neither 
Rudy nor Lulu could have produced the item” (1985, 257). 
 They go on, however, to note that transactive processes do not only 
take place during the retrieval of memories; they may, for example, occur 
during encoding as well. For instance, when partners perceive some event, 
each one may form some individual, private memory of it, but they may as 
well discuss about it along the way. Now, this discussion, far from being a 
mere rehash of the original event, could be much more. Here is an example of 
this transactive process of encoding memories: 
 
When a couple observes some event—say, a wedding—they may develop 
somewhat disparate initial encodings. Each will understand that it was 
indeed a wedding; but only one may encode the fact that the father of the 
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bride left the reception in a huff; the other might notice instead the odd, 
cardboard-like flavor in the wedding cake. Their whispered chat during all 
this could lead them to infer that the bride’s father was upset by the strange 
cake (Wegner at al. 1985, 259).  
 
 
Since it is the group that generated the interpretation of the events, both 
partners will in the end encode the group’s understanding of the events. In 
other words, their chat during the overall event will lead them to the 
encoding of a memory, which is qualitatively different from the memories 
they would have acquired, had they been on their own.111  
 We thus see that both encoding and retrieval may profit from 
transactive processes thus giving rise to group memories and knowledge that 
are qualitatively different from the memories and knowledge that one would 
have encoded and retrieved alone. In order for these transactions and their 
effects to occur, however, Wegner et al. note that certain conditions must be in 
place.  
 As they explain, “to build a transactive memory is to acquire a set of 
communication processes whereby two minds can work as one” (Wegner et 
al. 1985, 263). The first step in acquiring such a transactive memory system is 
to ensure that its candidate members will share a common culture and 
language so that they can adequately understand each other and, thus, 
communicate. In other words they must possess a common set of background 
assumptions. If this set of common knowledge is in place, the members of the 
group can begin a relationship, even as strangers, with a certain sense that 
each knows something that the other knows.  
 The second step is differentiation. Couples typically begin a 
relationship by revealing information about themselves to each other. Thus, 
in trading knowledge of their life goals, personality traits, emotional 
investments and so on, they are building the differentiation of their 
transactive memory; each fact about the self that is revealed to the other lends 
the other a sense of one’s expertise and experience. As each member becomes 
more cognizant of the specialties of the other, the dyad’s memory as a whole 
grows in differentiation.   
                                                
111 Notice that very similar transactive processes and effects may occur during the stage of 
memory storage as well. If, for instance, the dyad exchanges information not during the 
actual event but later on, when it is on its own, it may qualitatively alter the members’ initial, 
individual memories of the event.  
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 Now, this process of differentiation allows each member of the group 
to hold three kinds of information in his or her personal memory system. 
First, they may hold beliefs about the existence of higher-order information. 
Higher-order information can be thought of as the topic, theme, or gist of 
some set of lower-order information. For example, ‘what George said’ can be 
regarded as higher-order information for the actual words he spoke, which, in 
turn, constitute the lower-order information on this topic. Similarly, 
‘philosophy’ is the higher order information for everything Orestis—a 
philosophy student—may know about this topic. Second, the above implies 
that each member of the group will also hold some lower-level information 
within their individual memory systems. And, third, they will also hold 
location information, which is information as to where any piece of higher-
order, or lower-order information may be found. Now, communication in the 
dyad may transmit any of these three types of information. One may convey 
the lower-level information itself, or may just make known the existence of 
some higher-level information by saying “I spoke with George”, or “I study 
philosophy”. Moreover, in so doing, one immediately conveys location 
information, as one makes explicit that these facts are available in one’s own 
memory. In Wegner et al.’s words then, “a differentiated structure, in this 
light, is one that contains mutual higher-order and location information, but 
reserves lower-order information for one or the other partner’s memory 
alone” (264-65).  
 Now, once common knowledge and differentiation are in place, the 
dyad is ready for the final step towards the acquisition of a TMS, i.e., the 
formulation of an integrated structure. According to Wegner et al., an 
integrated structure comes about when members of a group combine their 
lower-level information about shared higher-order information so as to 
interactively produce knowledge of the higher-order topic that is qualitatively 
different from the lower-order information that they individually possess. 
Even though in all the previous examples the dyad manifested an integrated 
structure, here is yet another case: 
 
Imagine […] that a couple is leaving a party. At different times, they each 
talked to Tex. The male notes that Tex was depressed this evening; he stared 
at the floor and barely talked. The female says that Tex was not at all 
depressed; in fact, she saw him for quite a while early in the party and he 
seemed unusually frisky and friendly. The male recalls that Tex said he was 
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thinking about separating from his wife. And in short order, the couple 
reached the conclusion: Tex was flirting with the female and feeling 
embarrassed about it in the presence of the male. (Wegner et al., 267) 
 
 
So we see that integration of a TMS occurs when its members can 
productively take advantage of their differentiated structure so as to create 
new knowledge on the basis of effective communication feedback loops. In 
other words, once differentiation is in place, the dyad can move on to the 
integration process, whereby on the basis of the transactive processes of 
encoding, storage, or retrieval of information, it combines the lower-level 
information of its members in order to produce an integrated understanding 
of some higher-order topic. The existence of this integrated structure and its 
effects are the final indication that the group has successfully formed a TMS. 
Furthermore, these integrated bits of information—collaboratively produced 
on the basis of interactive feedback loops between the individual members—
can, in turn, be stored on the individual memory systems of the members, 
thus becoming part of the common knowledge of the TMS, which can then be 
used in the future for even more effective transactive processes, and so on.  
 Now, having described TMSs in some detail it should be obvious that 
such systems manifest continuous reciprocal causation between their 
members at almost every dimension of their operation—i.e., during encoding, 
retrieval, storage, differentiation, and integration—thus clearly qualifying as a 
case of group mind/agent. Remember, in chapter 5, we argued that in order 
to have a group cognitive agent, its members must engage in continuous 
mutual interactions. The reason is that such interactive processes and the 
cognitive properties they give rise to, according to DST, can only be 
conceptualized by appealing to a larger system (i.e., the group agent) that 
comprises of all the individual members. Accordingly, such interdependent 
processes and properties do not belong to any individual alone; instead, they 
can only be ascribed to the group entity.112 Moreover, given that memory 
                                                
112 Moreover, here is why such properties are not reducible to the properties possessed by the 
individual members, even though they supervene on them. Such properties are identified 
with the higher level interactions and not with the supervenient base that supports these 
interactions, because several supervenient bases that may have nothing in common at the 
individual level (and so resist lawful categorization on the basis of lower-level individual 
properties) could give rise to the relevant dense interactions. Therefore, the dense 
interactions, which are crucial to the group properties, cannot be identified with their actual 
supervenience base because in order to be manifested, they do not need any particular 
supervenient base, but only the existence of an appropriate one. Moreover, such properties 
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does, in general, count as a knowledge-conducive belief-forming process, and 
provided that the group’s TMS is reliable, TMSs are good candidates for 
epistemic group agents (i.e., epistemic agents who come to know on the basis 
of collective belief-forming processes that are possessed only at the group 
level). So we now seem to have a first case of knowledge that is produced by a 
collective (memory) process that is not fully reducible to the cognitive 
processes possessed by the individual members of the group.  
 
6.3) Scientific Research Teams 
 
Inspired by Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) ethnographic study of high energy physics 
(HEP) experiments in CERN, Hutchins’ work (1995) on ship navigation, as 
well as Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) hypothesis of extended cognition, Giere 
(Giere 2002a; 2002b; 2006; 2007; Giere & Moffat 2003) proposes to understand 
scientific experiments in terms of distributed cognitive systems. The main 
reason he offers for this is that, in much of scientific experimentation, 
“completing the task requires coordinated action by several different people” 
(2006, 711), and this coordinated action “makes possible the acquisition of 
knowledge that no single person, or a group of people without instruments, 
could possibly acquire” (2003, 305). He thus suggests understanding scientific 
experiments as emergent distributed cognitive systems that produce 
knowledge that no individual could on his/her own. And in order to 
understand this collective process of knowledge acquisition and production, 
that is, in order to “understand the workings of the big cognitive system one 
has to consider the human-machine interactions as well as the human-human 
interactions” (2002b, 292). The examples that Giere proposes are HEP 
experiments (2002a), the Hubble Space Telescope (2006), and Latour’s (1999) 
(Giere & Mofat 2003) example of a scientific investigation that seeks to 
determine whether the Amazonian rainforest is encroaching on the adjacent 
savannah or if the savannah is encroaching on the rainforest.  
 Giere’s focus on human-machine and human-human interactions 
should make clear that scientific experiments are good candidates for 
                                                                                                                                      
will be properties of a higher system of analysis (here, the system of analysis that refers to 
group agents), because the dense interactions that are essential for their manifestation can 
only be conceptualized, according to DST, by a system of analysis that refers to systems 
whose boundaries and properties transcend those of the systems that the lower level system 
of analysis is able to deal with.  
 152 
counting as epistemic group agents. Giere, however, goes nowhere close to 
providing a detailed description of the workings of the distributed cognitive 
systems he considers—no surprise, given their immense complexity—and 
neither will I. I will, however, provide a description of the interactive 
processes involved in an imaginary scientific experiment, which—even 
though an (over) simplification—captures the kind of complexity involved in 
real scientific investigations. The fact that real cases might be much more 
complex than my simplified scenario can then add to, rather than undermine, 
the argument. This added complexity and how it may further contribute to 
the overall discussion will become clear, later on, as we will also take a look at 
certain considerations from Knorr-Cetina’s (1999) ethnographic study of HEP 
experiments. 
 The imaginary scientific experiment consists of a laboratory and three 
experts: an experimentalist, a mathematician, and a theoretical physicist. 
Before they enter the laboratory, of course, the three of them must come 
together in order to decide what instrumentation and analytical approaches 
they are going to employ. In other words, given their pre-experimental 
understanding of the relevant theoretical domain, and the available software 
and hardware tools (i.e., the available mathematical models and 
instrumentation, respectively), they must brainstorm in order to choose how 
they should tailor their scientific laboratory so as to most effectively study 
some proposition p, or a series of them. 
 Now, once agreement on these matters is achieved, the three experts 
can start the actual experimental work (for an illustration, consult the 
workflow, at page 154). The starting point of the experiment is the calibration 
of the instrument. In this first stage, the experimentalist runs several cycles of 
data collection in order to check whether they correspond with data in the 
literature, which are available from previous, similar experiments. In order to 
check the correspondence, of course, she will collaborate with the physicist 
who will interpret the available data for her. If the data turn out to 
correspond, the experimentalist will proceed to the next stage of collecting 
data relevant to the actual experiment. Otherwise, experimentalist and 
physicist will further collaborate in order to better calibrate the instrument. 
Once the instrument has been calibrated and sufficiently enough data have 
been collected, the experiment may proceed to its third stage. 
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 This is the stage of data validation, whereby the mathematician 
confirms that the processed data are accurate and of good quality (i.e., there 
are no overlaps or weak peaks). If the results of data validation are not 
satisfactory, he will send them back to the experimentalist in order to perform 
a more accurate calibration, again, along with the physicist. If, however, the 
data are satisfactory, the mathematician will go on to analyze them. This is 
the process of identifying which theoretical entities are responsible for the 
observed signals in the sample. By its very nature, this stage cannot be 
performed by the mathematician alone; the contribution of the physicist is 
crucial at this point as well.  
 Now, once the data have been validated, and analyzed by both the 
physicist and the mathematician, the former can then study them on his own 
in order to come up with a model for them. During this stage, the physicist 
will use his knowledge and training in order to ‘make the data fit’ in 
mathematical models that are consistent with, or similar to models that have 
been previously used in the relevant theoretical domain—very rarely, but 
occasionally, he may even try to come up with an entirely new and surprising 
model. As soon, however, as the data have been satisfactorily modeled, the 
physicist will check his work with the mathematician. If the mathematician 
discovers any problems—say, with the calculations, or the arguments 
involved—he will send the model back to the physicist along with comments 
and suggestions, or the two of them may further collaborate in order to 
improve the model. Now, once the model passes satisfactorily the ‘model 
check’ stage, the physicist can work on an interpretation of it, thus, generating 
a working hypothesis with respect to the proposition(s) under consideration. 
 Once a working hypothesis has been generated the experiment can go 
through to its final stage, i.e., testing the hypothesis. At this stage, having the 
model at her hands—thereby knowing how the theoretical entities are 
supposed to behave with respect to varying conditions—the experimentalist 
can collect several data in order to check the validity of the working 
hypothesis. Should the data, after analysis and validation, match the 
predictions of the model—which will hardly ever happen from the first run of 
the whole experimental cycle—the three experts can finally come together in 
order to write an article and submit it for publication. Otherwise, the whole 
cycle begins all over again on the basis of more data that could be used in 
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order to refine the proposed model and working hypothesis, or give rise to 
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Now, to see why such experiments are good candidates for counting as 
group agents let me stress the following points. First notice that in order for 
the stages of instrument calibration, data analysis, and publication to 
complete, the direct collaboration of at least two experts is required (as 
indicated by the two- and three-colored boxes in the above workflow). 
Second, notice the direct feedback loops between the stages of ‘data 
validation’ and ‘instrument calibration’, ‘testing hypothesis’ and ‘data 
collection’, and finally, ‘model check’ and ‘data modeling’. Now, add to these 
points the fact that—contrary to the first impression created by the 
workflow—not all of the above stages need to follow each other in discrete 
steps  (for instance, the experimentalist may be continuously sending data to 
the mathematician for validation). As a result, the direct influence and 
continuous reciprocal causation between the activities of all experts should 
now be obvious. There is, then, a direct interdependence between these three 
individuals, which, as far as the process of experimentation is concerned, 
brings them together in a non-reducible emergent cognitive group. Put 
another way, as far as the processes of justifying and producing the final 
working hypothesis are concerned, they are not performed by any individual 
alone, but by the experiment as a whole, comprising of all the three experts 
and the instruments they use to collect and process data, and communicate 
between them. 
Why should we include the instrumentation to the collective epistemic 
agent? First, as we saw in the previous chapter, Heylighen et al. (2007) explain 
that when a group uses some instrument in order to communicate or process 
information, altering the instrument by using it, which, in turn, alters the way 
the group members may interact and what they can do, “the external media 
are increasingly coopted into the social organization making the 
organization’s functioning even more dependent on them. As a result, the 
cognitive system is extended into the physical environment and can no longer 
be separated by it” (8). In the previous example, this process of mutual 
dependence between the individuals and their instruments is most apparent 
during the instrument calibration, data collection, and data validation stages. 
Second, instruments are indispensable constitutive elements of the 
experiment in the more direct sense that during such experiments individual 
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agents often extend their cognitive abilities (as discussed in chapter 2) to 
artifacts, by engaging in CRC with them. And since the epistemic group agent 
is constituted by the cognitive abilities of its individual members—which may 
extend to their instruments—the instruments are parts of the emergent 
collective entity as well.  
Now, one possible worry that might be raised against the imaginary 
experiment presented above is that it is an oversimplification. Experiments 
are usually much more complex, involving more than just three experts and 
one experimental apparatus. It should be clear, however, that adding to the 
complexity of the experiment will actually generate more mutual interactions 
between scientists and their equipment, thus, reinforcing the idea that they 
form a collective entity. Is this, however, always the case? What about HEP 
experiments like UA2 and ATLAS, which have around 100, or even 2000 
participants, respectively? Due to the amount of the participants involved, it 
may appear implausible that everyone, or at least most of the scientists taking 
part in such experiments will be able to directly influence each other. 
In response, let us focus on what Knorr-Cetina says about HEP 
experiments in her book Epistemic Cultures, where she also argues for the 
“erasure of the individual as an epistemic subject” (166), on the basis of some 
“sort of distributed cognition” (173). Cetina explains that such large 
collaborations are not run by any individual alone and no individual is 
responsible for their management and organization. Instead, such 
experiments are managed by discourse, which “channels individual 
knowledge in the experiment, providing it with a sort of distributed cognition 
[…], which flows from the astonishingly intricate webs of communication 
pathways” (173). 
Cetina notes that this discourse may take place in numerous occasions, 
localities, and time slots. “Almost any situation, it seems, in which a 
participant finds him- or herself in the presence of another generates technical 
talk, including jogging in the vineyards and fields surrounding CERN or a 
bus ride to town” (174). Other opportunities for discourse may also occur in 
“the cafeteria”, during lunch, drinks, and dinner, or around apparatus and 
equipment.  
Apart from these informal cases, however, there is also a much more 
formal grid of discourse spaces created by intersections between participants, 
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and “this grid was and is today perhaps the most important vehicle of 
experimental coordination and integration” (ibid. 174). More specifically, 
Cetina provides the following examples of the formally arranged discourse 
occasions that one may find in ATLAS: research and development meetings, 
panel meetings, institute meetings, steering group meetings, collaboration 
meetings, referee meetings, accelerator meetings, fixed committee meetings, 
special workshops dedicated to detector complexes, submeetings of some of 
the former, and the very important “meetings after meetings” (the informal 
exchanges that occur after scheduled events) (174). 
 Moreover, she notes, these meetings do not take place randomly, but 
they rather follow a specific sequence and temporal structure: 
 
The sequential structure and temporal structure of these meeting schedules is 
not without significance. As indicated, institute meetings placed at the end of 
several days of working group meetings and the plenary allow the earlier 
meetings to inform the institute meeting. The same succession of meetings 
existed in UA2, and it exists in ATLAS on the level of detector and R&D 
[(research and development)] collaborations. The sequential order suggests a 
passing of knowledge and technical decisions from the expert group where 
the responsibility lies to wider circles that take note of these details and play 
them back—through discussions, questions, and comments. Several rounds 
of this feed-forward and feedback result in the major technical decisions that 
are made by institute meetings (e.g., choices between competing detector 
technologies) after months of discussion. These rounds of discussion include 
panel feedback and panel recommendations, which are also channeled 
through working group meetings, submeetings, and plenary meetings (175). 
 
 
Furthermore, Cetina accentuates the importance of the timing of those 
schedules in order for the above feedback and feed-forward communication 
loops to occur. “Schedules pace, phrase, and state the work, allocating turns 
within which certain points must be made or else points, and turns may be 
lost. For someone to hold their turn in the collective conversation, other 
activities (a study, a check, a calculation, an assembly task, a panel 
recommendation) must be performed on time and the results exhibited in 
status reports” (190). However, she also notes, schedules in HEP experiments 
are not in any individual’s hands but they “originate from disperse and 
diverse sources, among which object requirements and the expertise of the 
researchers whom they regulate play a central role” (191). We therefore see 
that experiments, in Heylighen et al.’s (2007) terminology, ‘self-organize’ on 
the basis of schedules that derive from the workings of the experiment itself. 
 158 
These schedules lock experimental activities firmly into deadlines and time 
slots, and they give rise to a ‘common time ordering’ of the individual 
activities, which constitutes a strong coordinating force that stitches the whole 
collaboration together.  
 As collaborations grow bigger and bigger, then, their participants do 
not lack the opportunity to directly interact with each other. To the contrary, 
as an ethnographic study of HEP experiments indicates, distant collaborators 
actually inform about and affect each other’s work on the basis of formal 
avenues of discourse, ordered on a common time scale that coordinates 
everyone’s work. As expected then, even in HEP experiments—at least in 
most of their aspects—most participants seem to engage in continuous 
reciprocal causation, which we have so far been using as an indication for the 
emergence of collective entities. 
 So, finally, in order to line up the discussion on scientific experiments 
with that on TMSs let me note that any collaborative scientific experiment 
must manifest the following characteristics. First, as in the case of TMSs, the 
participants of a scientific experiment must share some common knowledge 
on the basis of which they can communicate. Of course, contrary to TMSs this 
set of background knowledge does not have to be a common culture or 
language—as understood in the commonsensical way. Participants in such 
experiments may come from very disparate cultural backgrounds. Instead, in 
scientific experiments their members must share something close to what 
Kuhn termed as a paradigm: a set of metaphysical and methodological 
assumptions about what constitutes good scientific practice, as well as an 
agreement on and understanding of the broader set of theoretical tools and 
equipment they may employ. In other words, they must speak a common 
scientific language. Second, it must be clear enough that any scientific 
experiment, just like TMSs, will have a differentiated structure. That is, 
participants will hold beliefs about higher- and lower-order information as 
well as location information; participants will know each other’s expertise 
and will know with whom they must communicate in order to retrieve 
higher- or lower-order information, which might be relevant to their work. 
An experiment will, thus, have a differentiated structure when its 
participants, just like in TMSs, have mutual higher-order and location 
information (i.e., information about everyone’s expertise) but reserve lower-
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order information for one or the other expert and only retrieve it as required. 
And finally, given the aforementioned common knowledge and differentiated 
structure, a scientific collaboration will only count as integrated once its 
participants can take advantage of the above characteristics in order to 
interactively create new bits of knowledge which are qualitatively different 
from the knowledge each one could produce on one’s own, and which they 
may later use to further progress their experiment.113 
So, to move on to the next section, we have now seen two examples of 
epistemic group agents and their common characteristics. It is time then to see 
how COGAweak can account for knowledge possessed only at the group level 
(i.e., for robust anti-individualism in epistemology).  
 
6.4) Epistemic Group Agents and COGAweak 
 
To recapitulate, in the previous two sections we came across two examples of 
groups of individuals that form a distributed/collective cognitive agent in 
virtue of the collective cognitive belief-forming processes that emerge out of 
the non-linear interactions between the members and the artifacts they use. 
Assuming, moreover, that their collective belief-forming processes are reliable 
we can claim that these are cases of epistemic group agents.  
 Let us then see how COGAweak  can account for them. Here is COGAweak 
again: 
 
                                                
113 Here is a further characteristic of such collective entities concerning the members’ 
communication, and which may have escaped our attention both in the discussion of TMSs 
and scientific experiments. In such cognitive collaborations, experts will communicate on a 
certain kind of trust, which is rather distinct form the kind of trust exemplified in ordinary 
cases of testimony. In discussing testimonial knowledge in chapter 4, we mentioned that in 
order for the hearer to accept the speaker’s testimony he must check both that there are 
positive reasons for, and no negative ones against doing so (i.e., the hearer must check for the 
reliability of the report). Not so with communication within group cognitive agents. In the 
case of collective epistemic agents each expert will by default accept another expert’s reports 
without checking for its reliability. This is probably because they have a common goal—the 
group’s goal—and they also share a paradigm/common language, which means that they 
should, in principle, agree with and recognize as reliable the methods their informant used in 
order to arrive to the offered report, even though, in practice, they may know nothing about 
them (i.e., their methods).  
In other words, one further characteristic of group cognitive entities is that each 
member is by default warranted in accepting every other member’s reports. What this means 
is that the transmission of knowledge in such cases is not strictly testimonial, as it is 
knowledge that does not really originate from outside the epistemic agent but is instead 
circulated within it. 
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If S knows that p, then S’s true belief is the product of a reliable belief-
forming process, which is appropriately integrated within S’s cognitive 
character such that her cognitive success is to a significant degree creditable 
to her cognitive agency (Pritchard 2010b, 136-7). 
 
 
So, to begin with, according to a robustly anti-individualistic reading 
of COGAweak, who is S? As previously noted, we can individuate group agents 
on the basis of the collective processes their component parts give rise to. The 
reason for this is that such collective processes emerge out of subsystems 
interacting continuously and reciprocally, which behavior, according to DST, 
leads to the postulation of an overall system, because in its absence the 
relevant collective processes cannot be understood. Since, however, not only 
human agents but also artifacts may take part in the relevant interactions, the 
upshot is that the collective epistemic agent, S, may be comprised of both 
individuals and the artifacts they use in order to process information and 
communicate.  
Let’s now turn to the notions of a reliable belief-forming process and 
S’s cognitive character. In the discussion of virtue reliabilism in chapter 1, we 
noted that, according to Greco, one’s cognitive character is the set of reliable 
and stable dispositions (i.e., belief-forming processes), as well as one’s 
memories and overall doxastic system, that one manifests when one is 
conscientious (i.e., motivated to believe what is true). Now, there is no reason 
why we should understand an epistemic group agent’s cognitive character 
any differently. Notice, however, that epistemic group agents usually come 
together to form just one collective belief-forming process—in virtue of which 
they also exist. We might assume, then, that, usually, an epistemic group 
agent’s cognitive character will be identical to just that one collective belief-
forming process. Greco, however, includes to one’s cognitive character one’s 
memories and overall doxastic system as well. Perhaps, then, we should also 
add within an epistemic group agent’s cognitive character the shared 
common knowledge of its members (i.e., their paradigm in cases of research 
teams)—including their common knowledge of the group’s differentiated 
structure—which allows for and provides the framework for their collective 
belief-forming process to arise, and, maybe, even make sense.  
Here are also some thoughts regarding the reliability of the collective 
belief-forming process and its relation to a conscientious epistemic agent. 
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Remember that according to Heyllighen et al. (2007) individuals form 
collective entities on the basis of the process of self-organization so as to bring 
about a desired result or maximize the collective benefit. That is, collections of 
people tend to interact until they evolve to a stable configuration of states. 
Once the system has achieved this stable configuration we can say that its 
component parts have mutually adapted by restricting their interactions to 
those that allow achieving their end (the end, amongst other things, could be 
fitness, profit, or, in our case, objectively reliable true beliefs). Now, given that 
we here focus on epistemic group agents who are also conscientious, i.e., 
motivated to believe what is true, it follows that their process of self-
organization, which gives rise to the relevant collective belief-forming 
process, will also ensure the latter’s reliability. Otherwise, the collective agent 
would have not accomplished its end, thereby dissolving, or would have 
given rise to another internal configuration and, thus, to a different belief-
forming process that would have been more appropriate (i.e., objectively 
reliable). Notice, moreover, that as in the case of individual epistemic agents, 
in order for the group to be also subjectively justified, it does not need to have 
any beliefs regarding the reliability of the collective belief-forming process. 
Instead, provided 1) that the belief-forming process is a disposition of the 
group agent, and 2) that the group is motivated to believe what is true (such 
that it would not employ any belief-forming processes that have, in the past, 
notably failed in being conducive to this end) we can make the following 
claim. The group will be subjectively justified in holding the resultant beliefs 
merely by not having any beliefs that the collective belief-forming process has 
been notably problematic in the past. (In Clark’s terms, the collective belief-
forming process must not usually be subject to critical scrutiny).  
So, let us finally turn to the idea of appropriate integration, which will 
also allow us to explain what could count as the epistemic group agent’s 
cognitive agency. Back in section 3.2, where we were discussing when an 
external element can count as properly integrated within one’s cognitive 
character, we claimed that in order for this to be the case, the external element 
must be continuously and reciprocally interacting with the agent’s organismic 
cognitive faculties. That is, in order for an artifact to be a constitutive element 
of one’s cognitive economy, the agent must deliver on its basis outputs which 
recycled as inputs will drive his cognitive character along. Therefore, in order 
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for a belief-forming process to be appropriately integrated within one’s 
cognitive character, the phenomenon of CRC must be manifested between the 
target process and one’s organismic cognitive faculties. We also noted that the 
underlying reason for this is that HEC clearly acknowledges the central role 
of the persisting biological organism in order to eventually accomplish its 
very own cognizing: “Human cognitive processing (sometimes) extends to 
the environment surrounding the organism. But the organism (and within the 
organism the brain/CNS) remains the core and currently the most active 
element. Cognition is organism centered even when it is not organism bound” 
(Clark 2007, sec. 4). And this, we further noted, explains why using the CRC 
phenomenon to judge whether an artifact has been appropriately integrated 
within one’s cognitive character is in line with COGAweak, which demands 
that the cognitive success be, in the end, significantly creditable to one’s 
cognitive agency. It is the agent’s organismic cognitive faculties (i.e., the 
brain/CNS) that are first and foremost responsible for the appropriate 
employment and recruitment of the external elements, on whose basis the 
agent will deliver outputs, which recycled as inputs will drive her cognitive 
character further along, so as to eventually form a true belief with respect to 
some proposition p. (Notice here, then, that I, in effect, identify an agent’s 
cognitive agency with the agent’s organismic cognitive faculties).   
An analogous understanding of the process of integration and of the 
notion of cognitive agency should, I think, be provided in the case of 
epistemic group agents. Notice, however, that the case of distributed 
cognition and group agency does not involve merely an artifact being 
employed by an agent, but is, instead, about many agents and their artifacts 
coming together to form a cognitive system comprising of all of them. So, it is 
not really apposite to speak of any agent, or artifact being integrated within 
anyone else’s cognitive character; instead, we should rather ask when the 
whole group of individuals and their artifacts counts as having an integrated 
structure. In other words, we need to know when a potentially shared belief-
forming process is going to count as having an integrated structure that can 
give rise to S’s shared cognitive character—and thereby to S. And this, 
according to what has been said about group agents (see chapter 5 and 
especially sections 5.2.3 and 5.3), won’t happen unless S’s members engage in 
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CRC between them and their instruments—notice that this is very much in 
agreement to Wegner’s view regarding the integration of TMSs. 
 Moreover, demanding CRC so as to have a shared integrated cognitive 
character also points out how we should understand a group’s cognitive 
agency. Since CRC within a group is manifested and maintained primarily 
due to the organismic cognitive faculties of its members, it is the set of these 
organismic cognitive faculties that is first and foremost responsible for the 
emergence of distributed cognition, and which should count as the group’s 
cognitive agency; to paraphrase Clark, cognition is organism centered even 
when it is distributed. So, an epistemic group agent’s shared reliable belief-
forming process—which may consist of both humans and instruments—is 
primarily the product of dense interactions between the organismic cognitive 
faculties of its members. Accordingly, we can see why—and in accordance to 
COGAweak—the collective cognitive success must be significantly creditable to 
the group’s cognitive agency (i.e., to repeat the claim, the set of the organismic 
cognitive faculties of its individual members). It is the set of these organismic 
cognitive faculties that is first and foremost responsible for the emergence and 
appropriate employment of the collective belief-forming process so as to 
eventually accomplish its own cognizing.  
Crucially, furthermore, the above considerations also indicate why 
knowledge, in such cases, cannot be attributed to any individual alone, thus, 
giving rise to robust anti-individualism in epistemology. As noted in section 
2.3.2, whenever components exhibit CRC between them, they give rise to an 
overall system consisting of all of them, without any single component 
causally standing out of the whole. In other words, the activity of the system 
depends on the system as a whole and it is to the system as a whole that the 
success of its activity must be attributed. Therefore, in cases of collective 
cognitive success that is the product of the interactions of the organismic 
cognitive faculties of the members of the group, the success must be 
attributed to the set of the members’ cognitive agencies as a whole (i.e., to the 
cognitive agency of the group), and to none of the individual members alone. 
And, to anticipate our final conclusion, given that, according to COGAweak, 
knowledge must be creditable and reliably formed true belief, such beliefs 
won’t be known by any individual alone, but by the group agent as a whole, 
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because it is only to the group agent’s cognitive agency that the cognitive 
success can be significantly attributed.114 
 
6.5) COGAweak and Robust Epistemic Anti-Individualism 
 
Here is then the overall picture motivating robust anti-individualism in 
epistemology. There are cases where individual epistemic agents come 
together with the motivation to believe what is true. This leads them to 
interact as a group, which self-organizes so as to believe what is true. For the 
sake of truth and on the basis of interactive self-organization there emerges a 
reliable collective belief-forming process that constitutes the group’s shared 
cognitive character, and in virtue of which we have a non-reducible epistemic 
group agent. The reason why this is a non-reducible epistemic group agent is 
that its cognitive character emerges out of dense, non-linear interactions 
between its individual members and their artifacts, and according to DST, 
such emergent properties or processes cannot be conceptualized in the 
absence of the system as a whole, which is more than the sum of its parts. 
Accordingly, any cognitive success achieved on the basis of a collective belief-
forming process cannot be fully reduced to the sum of the cognitive abilities 
of the participating individuals. It can, however, be at least significantly 
attributed to the set of all the participating individual members of the group 
as a whole, as it is the set of their cognitive agencies that is first and foremost 
responsible for recruiting and maintaining the overall group agent.115  
Due to its collaborative nature, therefore, this is cognitive success that 
is not produced by, and, thereby, not creditable to any individual alone. 
Should we then conclude that such collaboratively, socially produced beliefs 
cannot count as knowledge, or should we embrace Hardwig’s second 
conclusion: there can be knowledge that is not known by any individual 
alone? What the above discussion indicates is that we can opt for this second 
                                                
114 Put another way, since the justificatory process is a collective one—arising out of the 
members’ interaction—none of the members could have come to know the proposition on 
their own. This point can be further motivated, if we also consider the differentiated structure 
of group agents. Members contribute only differentially to the collective belief-forming 
process and so the cognitive success cannot be significantly attributed to any specific 
individual alone.  
115 Furthermore, if the group has not produced its own artifacts then, in the spirit of chapter 4, 
the rest of the credit should be attributed to the broader epistemic community that brought 
those artifacts about.  
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option; since the cognitive success of such collaboratively produced true 
beliefs can be significantly attributed to the group agent’s cognitive agency, 
we can claim that such beliefs, according to COGAweak, can be known by S, the 
epistemic group agent. In other words, being able to recognize group agents as 
epistemic (qua cognitive) subjects in themselves, we can now apply COGAweak 
to such robustly anti-individualistic cases as well. Therefore, we can now 
make sense of the claim that p is known by S, even though it is not known by 
any individual alone.  
And finally, let me also note that this is not to claim that a piece of 
collectively produced propositional knowledge cannot be individually 
known. As soon as the group publishes its results, or in anyway, testifies 
them, one can come to know them individually. The initial justification of the 
proposition, however, will always lie with the group. So, if one asked to 
reproduce that initial justification, then, unless technology has progressed so 
much as to simulate the group agent, one would have to recreate the group 
structure that gave rise to the initial collective belief-forming process. 
Moreover, this possibility of gaining—on the basis of testimony—individual 
knowledge of a collectively produced true belief—which cannot be otherwise 
produced—appears to be a good case of downward causation within 
epistemology, whereby some non-reducible social entity affects the epistemic 


























I have here argued that COGAweak—a virtue reliabilistic necessary condition 
on knowledge—allows to reveal and account for the social nature of several 
kinds of knowledge. More specifically, COGAweak can easily handle 
testimonial knowledge and knowledge of coverage supported beliefs. But 
reading COGAweak along the lines suggested by HEC can also explain how one 
may acquire knowledge on the basis of the operation of epistemic artifacts, 
while remaining fast to the ability intuition on knowledge. Now, to the point, 
all of these three cases reveal the dual nature of knowledge. That is, in these 
cases, knowledge is not only attributable to the individual agent that holds 
the true belief, but also to other individuals who contributed to the 
individual’s reliable formation of her true belief either directly or indirectly. 
All three cases, therefore, point towards weak anti-individualism in 
epistemology. We also noted, however, that reading COGAweak through the 
spectacles of HDC can help us account for robust anti-individualism in 
epistemology, i.e., for knowledge that is not possessed by any individual 
alone. This is so, because there are certain cases whereby a true belief is not 
reliably formed by any individual’s cognitive ability, but by a collective 
cognitive ability that belongs to a group agent. Accordingly, this kind of 
knowledge cannot be attributed to any individual alone, but to the group 
agent as a whole. Still, however, since on the basis of HDC we can recognize 
group agents as epistemic subjects in themselves we can legitimately apply 
COGAweak to such robustly anti-individualistic cases as well. In other words, 
we can now make sense not only of the claim that knowledge might be both 
social and individual, but also of the claim that a proposition might be known 
by S even if it is not known by any individual alone.       
 So the overall picture is this:  using (active) externalist philosophy of 
mind to interpret one of the most popular mainstream individualistic 
approaches to the theory of knowledge (that of virtue reliabilism)—as 
captured by COGAweak—allows to account even for the most provocative 
claims that one could come across within social epistemology (that of robust 
anti-individualism). In other words, externalist philosophy of mind is the 
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means by which we can reconcile individualistic and social epistemology, 
while remaining fast to mainstream epistemology.     
 So, let us try to localize the present account within the general field of 
epistemology in some more detail. COGAweak is clearly an analysis of 
knowledge in individualistic terms. For this reason it fits well within the 
realm of mainstream contemporary epistemology. Pointing, however, to the 
social nature of many instances of knowledge, the present account also fits 
within the field of social epistemology. In which exact sense? In “Why Social 
Epistemology Is Real Epistemology” (2009) Goldman distinguishes social 
epistemology in two branches. The first, ‘preservationist’ social epistemology, 
preserves the core individualistic assumptions of mainstream epistemology 
while studying themes such as testimonial knowledge and peer 
disagreement. The second branch, ‘expansionist’ social epistemology, is 
supposed to distance itself from some of the individualistic assumptions of 
mainstream epistemology as it is mainly concerned with the topics of the 
epistemic properties of group doxastic agents, and the influence of social 
systems and their policies on epistemic outcomes.     
 Wherein does the present account best fit? We have seen how 
COGAweak accounts both for ‘preservationist’ topics such as testimonial 
knowledge, and ‘expansionist’ topics such as group doxastic agents. The 
answer, therefore, is that it fits both within the scope of preservationist and 
expansionist social epistemology. Crucially, however, in both cases, it does so 
by remaining fast to individualist mainstream epistemology. Therefore, one 
could claim, reading COGAweak through the spectacles of HEC and HDC 
provides a reconciliation of individualist epistemology with both 
preservationist and expansionist social epistemology.    
 What about the history and philosophy of science? After the second 
half of the 20th century, and in particular the current of Historicism as initiated 
by Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, hardly anyone could deny the 
social nature of the scientific process. This realization, however, seemed to 
pose a problem for the application of mainstream individualistic 
epistemology to the study of science.  The present account, however, could 
now provide a useful link between the two. In particular, science is primarily 
performed by individual scientists employing their hardware and software 
epistemic artifacts, or by research teams operating within scientific labs, which 
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are uniquely tailored to fit their purposes. Extended epistemic agents, and 
epistemic group agents could, therefore, become very handy for a mainstream 
epistemological analysis of the scientific progress. Indicatively, discussing the 
scientific revolution of the 16th century, Giere and Moffat (2003, 308) write: 
   
’No “new man” suddenly emerged sometime in the sixteenth century….The 
idea that a more rational mind…emerged from darkness and chaos is too 
complicated a hypothesis’ [Latour 1986, 1]. We agree completely. Appeals to 
cognitive architecture and capacities now studied in cognitive sciences are 
meant to explain how humans with normal human cognitive capacities 
manage to do modern science. One way, we suggest, is by constructing 
distributed cognitive systems that can be operated by humans possessing 
only the limited cognitive capacities they in fact possess. 
 
 
And elsewhere (2002b, 298 ) on the same topic, Giere alone writes: 
 
 
It is often claimed that the scientific revolution introduced a new way of 
thinking about the world, but there is less agreement as to what constituted 
the ‘new way’. The historiography of the scientific revolution has long 
included both theoretical and experimental bents. Those on the theoretical 
side emphasize the role of mathematics, Platonic idealization, and thought 
experiments. The experimentalists emphasize the role of experimental 
methods and new instruments such as the telescope and microscope. 
Everyone acknowledges, of course, that both theory and experiment were 
crucial, but these remain a happy conjunction.     
 The concept of distributed cognition provides a unified way of 
understanding what was new in the way of thinking. It was the creation of 
new distributed cognitive systems. Cartesian co-ordinates and the calculus, 
for example, provided a wealth of new external representations that could be 
manipulated to good advantage. And the new instruments such as the 
telescope and microscope made possible the creation of extended cognitive 
systems for acquiring new empirical knowledge of the material world. From 
this perspective, what powered the scientific revolution was an explosion of 
new forms of distributed cognitive systems. There remains, of course, the 
historical question of how all these new forms of cognitive systems happened 
to come together when they did, but understanding the source of their power 
should now be much easier.  
 
 
Now, as Giere himself notes in the end of the above quote, 16th century 
scientific revolution was probably also the result of further underlying 
cultural changes that may go unobserved, at first pass, by the historian and 
philosopher of science. But the point I want to make remains the same. 
Combining the frameworks of externalist philosophy of mind and externalist 
epistemology is a significant step forward towards a deeper understanding of 
the workings of the social epistemic project that is called science.   
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 So let me finally close by mentioning some potential topics of future 
research that this thesis may hint to. In this essay, I have only used active 
externalism within philosophy of mind to demonstrate the partly or entirely 
social nature of certain kinds of knowledge. Since, however, as I explained in 
my foreword, active externalism (in the form of HEC and HDC) is the 
extreme consequent of the embodied and embedded paradigm shift within 
cognitive science, one could expect that these latter, less provocative theses 
could be of interest to epistemology as well. This, admittedly, could be the 
topic of a second thesis. In particular, since epistemic agents are both 
embodied and embedded, the embodied and embedded approach in 
cognitive science could resolve many issues both in individualist and social 
epistemology that I have here passed in silence. For instance, how can 
changes in one’s body or environment affect the reliability of one’s cognitive 
abilities? And, how can we manipulate such changes to good (epistemic) 
effect? How can we design an epistemic agent’s environment, such that we 
can maximize her epistemic benefits? Or, in which specific ways one’s society 
may affect one’s epistemic standing? Could we tailor epistemic societies such 
that the problem of peer disagreement would be less worrying? What is it 
about contemporary society that allows for an exponential growth of 
knowledge and technology?     
 Moreover, even though I have argued that COGAweak can in general 
account for knowledge possessed at the group level, I have gone almost in no 
detail about the specific epistemic/cognitive properties that each time allow 
such entities to achieve their epistemic ends, and how such ends may inhibit 
or reinforce the (epistemic or practical) goals of their individual members.  So 
in the future, and having the present account at hand, it should be interesting 
to see how one could maximize the epistemic benefit of such collective 
entities as a function of their organization, and how this maximization may 
stand in the way, or promote the needs of their individuals members. Such an 
in depth analysis of the epistemic properties of group agents and their 
members could profit from both a purely theoretical approach, and the study 
of several historical and contemporary case studies, originating from the 
fields of the history and philosophy of science.      
 And finally, turning back to the individual and given the combination 
of the hypothesis of extended cognition and COGAweak, how can we further 
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boost (i.e., extend) the epistemic agent’s cognitive capacities? In other words, 
how can we create epistemic artifacts that are more reliable, transparent in 
use, and easier to integrate within one’s cognitive character? Epistemology 
can explain both how knowledge is actually being achieved, and how it can 




































      




Ability Intuition (on knowledge): Knowledge must be the product of 
cognitive ability. 
 
Anti-luck Intuition (on knowledge): Knowledge must not be due to luck. 
 
Attractors: Limits sets that gravitate trajectories passing through all nearby 
states. Attractors also govern the long-term behavior of a system.  
 
Autonomous System: A system whose dynamical law depends only on the 
values of its state variables and the values of some set of fixed parameters. 
 
Basin of Attraction: The set of initial states that converge to a given attractor.   
 
Bifurcations: Qualitative differences in the system’s flow as a result of 
changes in the system’s parameter values. 
 
CNS: Central nervous system. 
 
COGAweak: If S knows that p, then S’s true belief that p is the product of a 
reliable belief-forming process, which is appropriately integrated within S’s 
cognitive character such that her cognitive success is to a significant degree 
creditable to her cognitive agency. (Pritchard 2010b, 136-7) 
 
Cognitive Agency (of individuals): One’s organismic cognitive faculties of the 
brain/central nervous system. 
 
Cognitive Agency (of group agents): The set of organismic cognitive 
capacities of its individual members, as a whole. 
 
Cognitive Character: The dispositional/habitual belief-forming processes 
that one manifests when one thinks conscientiously. It consists of one’s 
cognitive faculties of the brain/central nervous system, including one’s 
natural perceptual cognitive faculties, one’s memories and the overall 
doxastic system. In addition, it can also consist of acquired habits of thought, 
“acquired skills of perception and acquired methods of inquiry, including 
those involving highly specialized training or even advanced technology” 
(Greco 1999, 287). 
 
Coupled System: An autonomous system that consists of two (or more) 
nonautonomous systems that mutually interact in that the parameters of each 
system function as state variables of the other, and vice versa.  
 
‘Coupling-Constitution’ Fallacy: Simple Version: “It simply does not follow 
from the fact that process X is in some way causally connected to a cognitive 
process that X is thereby part of that cognitive process” (Adams & Aizawa 
2008, 91). Systems Version: It unfolds in two steps: “The first is to move from 
the observation of some sort of causal connection to the claim that the brain, 
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body and relevant parts of the world form a cognitive system. The second 
step is a tacit shift from the hypothesis that something constitutes a system to 
the hypothesis that is an instance of extended cognition” (Adams & Aizawa 
2008, 92). This, however, is again fallacious: “It simply does not follow from 
the fact that one has identified an X system in terms of a causal process of 
type X that that process pervades every component of the system” (ibid., 125). 
 
CRC: Continuous Reciprocal Causation (between objects, components, 
systems and so on) . 
 
DST: Dynamical Systems Theory. 
 
Dynamical Law (of a system): A set of differential equations that regulate the 
change of the state variables of the system. 
 
Epistemic Externalism: The denial of epistemic internalism. 
 
Epistemic Internalism: One knows that p only if one has, in principle, 
internal access (i.e., by reflection alone) to the reasons for one’s belief that p. 
 
Externalism (in philosophy of mind): Cognition may extend beyond the 
agent’s organismic boundaries to epistemic artifacts, or distributed across 
individuals and their epistemic artifacts. 
 
Flow (of a system): The entire range of the possible trajectories of an abstract 
dynamical system. 
 
HEC: Hypothesis of Extended Cognition. 
 
HEMC: Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition. 
 
HEP: High Energy Physics. 
 
Input: The parameters of nonautonomous systems that vary across time.  
 
Internalism (in philosophy of mind): Cognition is restricted within the 
agent’s head, or, at most, her organismic boundaries. 
 
Limit set: Sets of points on a system’s state space that are unaffected by the 
dynamical law, in that if the state of the system enters a limit set, the 
dynamical law will keep it there indefinitely.  
 
Nonautonomous System: A dynamical system in which, in addition to its 
state variables, one or more of its parameters vary across time, as well.   
 
Parameter Space: A theoretical space with geometrical properties that 
includes the values of all the parameters encountered in a mathematical 
model. 
 
Phase Portrait: A graphical representation of the different phases (sequences 
of trajectories) the system might enter into, given its attractors and repellors.  
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Process Reliabilism: Knowledge is the product of a reliable belief-forming 
process. 
 
Repellors: Limit sets that are unstable in that some nearby trajectories diverge 
from them. 
 
Robust Epistemic Anti-Individualism: Knowledge that is not known by any 
individual alone. 
 
Robust Epistemic Individualism: Knowledge must be fully down to the 
individual.  
 
State Space (of a system): A theoretical space with geometrical properties that 
includes all the possible values of the state variables of the system.   
 
TMS: Transactive Memory System.  
 
Trajectory: A sequence of states the system will enter, given its dynamical 
law and some initial state x0.  
 
Transients: The portions of trajectories that are found within a basin of 
attraction, but which do not lie in the attractor itself.  
Vector Field: A field on a system’s state space that determines the direction of 
the system’s trajectories.  
Virtue Reliabilism: S knows that p if and only if S’s reliable cognitive 
character is the most important necessary part of the total set of causal factors 
that give rise to S’s believing the truth regarding p.  
Weak Epistemic Anti-Individualism: Knowledge is partly individual and 
partly social. 
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